Abandoning the sterile, unrealistic and outdated hopes of the discourses of the "normative basis" since Jürgen Habermas's legal communication model, which for its part is based on the discursive horizon of the "choice of norms" through the choice of the democratic concept of law, Habermas's communicative model of legal modernity invites us with complete confidence to abandon any interest, inclination or "foundational" desire in favor of the perspective of law, definitively and without regret "choosing" the norms that must be respected as democratically valid ( ). This opens up a new way of understanding, thinking and considering the problem of the validity of norms ( ). It is the meaning of this practical revolution that interests us and which we analyze, later on, to the extent that it leaves room for a way of thinking that, over centuries or even millennia, has compromised the sound development of the philosophy of law. The aim we adopt is to examine this logic of "choice" closely by confronting it with the "foundational" madness that is often cynically adopted, even today, in the field of the philosophy of law. Habermas's anti-fundamentalism, as well as his insistence on selective reasoning, constitutes his theory of communicative action. As it is, the selective rationality he defends certainly finds its explanation in the intersubjectivity and in the real possibility of social dialogue that is affirmed in the pluralistic and modern democratic processes.