This study looks at the impact of governance variables, notably audit committee independence, on earnings manipulation practices (discretionary accruals). We use a panel of 78 Egyptian public businesses from 2010 to 2020 to investigate the relationship between governance structure and earnings management, as measured by discretionary accruals. EM activity based on discretionary accruals (DAs) is measured using the modified Jones model (1995), Kasznik (1999), Kotahri, Leon, and Wasely's (2005) model, and Raman and Shahrur's (2008). Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) found that audit committee independence is adversely and strongly associated to DAs. Given these findings, the FGLS revealed negative relationship between Audit committee independence and earnings manipulations. we recommend that policymakers carefully weigh the benefits and drawbacks of governance indicators while implementing appropriate financial policies to improve the quality of financial reporting in emerging markets.