This study examines the impact of board of director's governance on cash holding in the Egyptian listed companies. Specifically, the resercher investigates the impact of board governance quality (using an index consists of three mechanisms, they are: board size, board independence, and chief executive officer “CEO" duality) on cash holding, and to investigate the impact of each mechanism on cash holding. The study investigates hypotheses on a sample of 82 Egyptian companies listed on the Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchange (CASE) for the year 2009. Using regression analysis, the paper offers empirical evidence that board governance index (quality) has a negative relationship with cash holding in the Egyptian companies. This result means that companies with weaker board governance structure choose to stockpile more cash. This finding is consistent with the flexibility, empire building, and free cash flow hypotheses. Also, the empirical results appear to strongly support the negative effect of board governance mechanisms, in particular: board independence and CEO duality, on cash holding, with different measures. Finally, I perform a battery of sensitivity tests to assess the robustness of my findings.