Throughout the 1950's, relations between the United States and Egypt vacillated widely from relative amicability to salient confrontations. Whereas containment of the communist menace and forming intra-regional coalitions were the focal points of the US foreign policy in the Middle East, eliminating Western influence and establishing Egypt as the dominant actor in the Arab world directed Nasser's policy. This conflict of interests came to a head in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis and the declaration of Eisenhower Doctrine. However, by the beginning of 1958, the State Department realized that its efforts to halt Nasser's growing power in the Arab world had failed and that the only way they could achieve their objectives in the region was by reestablishing a working relationship with Nasser and his newly-formed United Arab Republic. Taking this as an initial point, the main purpose of this paper is to answer the question: Why did the United States recognize the UAR despite the threats it represented to its interests?