There is a shortage in the International Relations (IR) literature on the Egyptian-Israeli dispute over the Taba Strip in the 1980s. There is also a shortage the IR literature on the in-tandem use of various third-party conflict resolution methods simultaneously. The Taba case was a remarkable border dispute, because it was solved through a mix of international arbitration and American mediation (a mix which will be called “med-arb-med" in this paper). Using a variant of the Strategic Selection Theory, the theoretical tradition set by Wiegand and Beuck, this paper argues that Egypt has used this mix of international arbitration and American mediation for three strategic reasons: First, to counterbalance Israel's policy of imposing facts on the ground through military presence and illegal construction of buildings. Second, because of the benefits of using arbitration in increasing the probability of regaining Taba from Israel, given Egypt's strong legal case. Third, due to the benefits of accepting American mediation, in terms of Washington's so-called “reward power" and its power to guarantee fair arbitrational procedures and the implementation of the tribunal's final ruling.