It seems to us that the project of legal modernity still represents a horizon that cannot be crossed, rationally and politically, for thinking about contemporary legal issues. Despite repeated anti-modernist ideological attacks, the idea of ​​legal modernity works rather well, and today it is undoubtedly the necessary counter-horizon to contemporary legal perception. Far from offering any “remnants" of the past (as postmodernists claim), the promise of legal modernity – still incomplete, as Habermas assures us – constitutes an essential incentive to enable us to understand the challenges of our commitment to the law and to take a stand in this regard. To this end, we analyze the concept of legal modernity according to Jürgen Habermas, as it centers on the promise of democratic self-regulation (). It is here to examine Habermas' formula according to which we should understand legal modernity according to the model of subjects of law who can mutually recognize us as authors and recipients of law, legal norms and institutions, but also and especially to clarify the meaning of this formula by enacting a fully democratic conception of law that seeks to create the necessary distancing from ideas Rationality and ethics for today's legal philosophers. Before we can clarify Habermas's concept of legal modernity, it is first appropriate to look at the philosophical constitution of legal modernity and self-legislation as linked to what is called "normative interaction." We will then consider how the Habermasian concept of legal modernity finds its resonance in the democratic view of legal issues.