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351415

THE IMPACT OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY ON THE CONTROL OF DIRECTORS' REMUNERATION

Article

Last updated: 04 Jan 2025

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Abstract

The 2008-2012 global financial and economic crisis has once more brought to light the vulnerabilities of the capitalist system and the necessity to impose restrictions on specific actors who possess substantial sway over the trajectory of the economy and business. The remuneration transgressions that certain boards of directors, particularly in the financial sector, have engaged in have once again demonstrated the significance of agency problems. During this period, instances arose in which Egyptian corporations rewarded their executives and directors with millions in compensation, remuneration, or bonuses, only to have to be rescued by government authorities in the end. This and other comparable circumstances have eroded the morale of Egyptian society, particularly because the Egyptian government funded some companies that had been perpetrating abuses while the populace was forced to make sacrifices in order to overcome the crisis. As a result, there has been a growing focus on the administration of director compensation in recent years. Considering these circumstances, national-level recommendations have centered on enhancing the transparency of information regarding compensation practices, particularly regarding the comprehensive remuneration policy and individual compensation received by Board of Directors members. The significance of this research stems from the fact that while numerous studies investigate the correlation between directors' compensation and "board independence" and firm performance, comparatively few scrutinize the association between board compensation disclosure and the level of directors' compensation. Within this framework, this article presents an empirical examination of the relationship between board remuneration transparency and voluntary disclosure and the level of directors' compensation in Egypt. The objective is to ascertain whether firms with greater transparency of directors' compensation have lower directors' compensation ("transparency control effect" and "transparency deterrent effect") or higher directors' compensation ("effects of transparency on increasing competition in pay").  To accomplish this, a singular panel of data comprising publicly traded Egyptian companies from 2013 to 2018 has been compiled.

DOI

10.21608/abj.2024.351415

Keywords

Voluntary Disclosure, Transparency, Directors’ remuneration

Authors

First Name

bassam

Last Name

baroma

MiddleName

-

Affiliation

كلية التجارة ، جامعة طنطا

Email

basam.baroma@commerce.tanta.edu.eg

City

طنطا

Orcid

0000000200010055

Volume

11

Article Issue

1

Related Issue

47252

Issue Date

2024-03-01

Receive Date

2024-01-23

Publish Date

2024-03-01

Page Start

124

Page End

158

Print ISSN

2682-3446

Online ISSN

2682-4817

Link

https://abj.journals.ekb.eg/article_351415.html

Detail API

https://abj.journals.ekb.eg/service?article_code=351415

Order

14

Publication Type

Journal

Publication Title

مجلة البحوث المحاسبية

Publication Link

https://abj.journals.ekb.eg/

MainTitle

THE IMPACT OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY ON THE CONTROL OF DIRECTORS' REMUNERATION

Details

Type

Article

Created At

25 Dec 2024