



Nationalist Revolution and its Influence on Political and Social Democracies: Educational and Agricultural Systems under Nasser, 1952-1970

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Abstract:

In July 23rd, 1952, the Free Officers revolted against the monarchical regime of Egypt. The revolutionaries succeeded in establishing republic regime instead. This historical event known as “July 23rd Revolution”, in which was watershed on the contemporary history of Egypt. After nearly a decade of the July 23rd, 1952, President Gamal Abdul Nasser professed that “freedom” could not be achieved without *democracy* and *socialism*. Moreover, in equal importance, Nasser emphasized on *revolutionary* consciousness to obtain freedom. All historical resources pertaining to this event indicated that this revolution was inspired, in the first place, by nationalist motive. This brings this paper to wonder if the nationalist revolution really established intact democratic life. In other words, did this nationalist revolution maintain the two wings of real political and social freedoms? How did the revolutionary leaders understand democracy and socialism? This paper aims to explore how nationalism, during the 1950s and 1960s in Egypt, was used to build a national single-party-state. This major question will also reveal how nationalism was utilized to exclude other political and social organizations rather than encourage multiple participation. This question further attempts to explain the role of nationalism in forming a state-society relationship. Such relationship could be explained through two fields: education and agriculture.

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The *democracy* is political freedom. The *socialism* is social freedom. It is impossible to separate between them. They are the two wings of real freedom, without them or [even] one of them, the freedom cannot soar overhead of a foreseeable tomorrow... The depth of *revolutionary* consciousness of Egyptians enabled them ... to ... create [their] freedom [via a *revolution*].

President Gamal Abdul Nasser, *The National Charter: May 21, 1961*.

In July 23rd, 1952, the Free Officers (al-Ḍubbāt al-Aḥrār) revolted against the monarchical regime of Egypt. The revolutionaries succeeded in establishing a republic regime instead. This historical event known as “July 23rd Revolution”, in which was watershed on the contemporary history of Egypt. After nearly a decade of the July 23rd, 1952, President Gamal Abdul Nasser professed that “freedom” could not be achieved without *democracy* and *socialism*. Moreover, in equal importance, Nasser emphasized on *revolutionary* consciousness to obtain freedom. All historical resources pertaining to this event indicated that this revolution was inspired, in the first place, by nationalist motive. This brings this paper to wonder if the nationalist revolution really established intact democratic life. In other words, did this nationalist revolution maintain the two wings of real political and social freedoms? How did the revolutionary leaders understand democracy and socialism? But before answer such questions, concepts of nationalism, revolution, socialism and democracy in the Egyptian cases should be understood first, because they were the principal motivator for seeking to establish political and social freedoms.

This paper aims to explore how nationalism, during the 1950s and 1960s in Egypt, was used to build a national single-party-state. This major question will also reveal how nationalism was utilized to exclude other political and social organizations rather than encourage multiple participations. This question further attempts to explain the role of nationalism in forming a state-society relationship. Such relationship could be explained through two fields: education and agriculture.

I. Nationalism and Socialism in the Egyptian case:

To understand socialist policy of the new regime, one should acknowledge that the new regime revolted against three interrelated forces, monarchism, exploitation –consisting of feudalism and capitalism, and colonialism. It seems likely that the main purpose of the Free Officers was to change the society, they noticed that the Egyptian society, for long time, formed by local aristocracy and foreign invaders, who favored their interests at the expense of the Egyptian population. In his speech, on the ninth anniversary of revolution, Nasser said “We, through the July 23 revolution, do not reform, we completely change... if we say that we will reform the society, we cannot afford to do anything... we must change fundamentally the society”.¹

Nasser based his speech on the six principles of the Revolution already declared. After having seized power, immediately, the revolutionaries declared six principles, which revolved around expelling British troops to put an end to colonization in Egypt, eliminating feudalism to free the land, eliminating feudalist and capitalist exploitation to fairly redistribute the local resources, establishing social justice to eliminate authoritarianism, creating a strong national army that could be used to ward off external invasion, and establishing intact democratic life. Such principles were vividly articulated in *The National Charter* presented by Nasser on June 21, 1962.²

The new regime, as a result, needed a strong enough ideology to change Egyptian society. Henceforth, socialism was adopted as an ideology of Nasser's nationalism to reshape Egyptians' political and social consciousness alike. In the socialism system, Nasser saw the socialist option as the best way to resolve the economic and social backwardness. In other words, he deemed the socialist option as "historical inevitability imposed by the current situation and by the great hopes of masses".³ Nasser presented the socialism as an inevitable solution to encounter feudalism and capitalism, and ultimately using it as a weapon to eliminate local aristocracy and foreign colonization. As a result, to Nasser, socialism was the solution to the path of a social and political democracy:

This socialist solution is the sole escape to social and economic advance, and it is the way to the democracy in all its social and political patterns... the national struggle of the masses made the core of public sector, and through its determination [he means the Egyptian society] it retrieved monopolized foreign interests, and nationalized them to be returned in its natural place as a public ownership for all society... This national struggle even during its military battle against colonization added for this public sector all British and French money that was in Egypt, this money was pillaged from the society under the circumstances of foreign privileges during the epochs where inviolability of national wealth was being violated, [this national wealth] became looted by foreign adventurers.⁴

Indeed, as some observers noticed, the socialist consciousness of Nasser's Egypt stemmed mainly from nationalist motivation. Maturing nationalist consciousness of Egyptians could be traced through the three phases lasting from 1882 to 1952. The first phase was the Urabi's revolt of 1882 had been seen as the first nationalist revolt against the alliance between local aristocracy and foreign interference in Egyptian internal affairs. In this phase, the national sense had been formed. The second phase emerged in 1919, when Egyptians desired to rule their country by themselves. Nazīh Nāṣif al-Ayyūbī regards the 1919 revolt as a phase crystallizing the nationalist Egyptian consciousness. According to Ayubi, Egyptians, for the first time, intended to expel the foreign colonizer; they wanted Egypt to be administered by local government without any external intervention.⁵ The final phase came

after the 23rd July revolution of 1952, the nationalist consciousness extended to include socialist sense. Sa'ad Al-Den Ibrahim views the 23rd July revolution as a distinct social scheme. Ibrahim emphasizes that the Egyptians were fully aware the correlation between local monopolization by feudalists, and capitalists, who predominate over the rule, and exploitation in international order presented by colonization. The revolution therefore, came to redistribute the national wealth and establish democratic rule, Ibrahim suggests.⁶

II. Nationalism and Democracy in the Egyptian Case:

One of the most striking phenomena of modern political life in the Arab world has been the emergence of single-party government. In Egyptian case, this phenomenon could be explained through the historical roots of centralized rule in Egypt. Nazih Nassif Ayubi relies on the environmental interpretation. He asserts that the nature of Egyptian geography depending on the Nile River as a main economic source, and that irrigation is the only way to regulate this resource. This requires building a state enjoying a central authority through its control of the irrigation system, which Ayubi calls the "hydraulic state." The supervisory bureaucracy is formed through offices because of this centralized power imposed by the state on its subjects. Ayubi argued that the ruler in Egypt historically had played the role of mediator between the river and the human being through his supervision of the irrigation system in a way that guarantees the continuation of economic life and political security. State's centralization continued during the Islamic reign over Egypt, so almost all powers were concentrated in the hands of the governor, who ruled the country completely without being accountable except to the Caliph. Ayubi depicted the centralized power of the Egyptian ruler as a functional centralization, which is among the main features dominating the Egyptian political and administrative heritage. The ruler who heads the state absolutely, he is responsible for the economy, distribution, organization, development of water resources and control of the conflict over it.⁷

Charles Issawi concurs with Ayubi on environmental interpretation. Although the state's centralization collapsed at the end of the eighteenth century, Issawi emphasizes "it quickly returned by Muhammad Ali Pasha, and it has continued without interruption until now".⁸ During the nineteenth century onward, developmental nationalism began to emerge, which required centralization and mobilization for the sake of military construction and economic development from a national standpoint.⁹ The Egyptian state, therefore, throughout its political history could be depicted as a centralized and an authoritarian state that control society, asserts Halim Barakat.¹⁰

Recent interpretations sought to explain the phenomenon of single-party government in Arab republicans through obliterating the difference between the state and government concepts. Such

concepts were intertwining with each other to form the political legitimacy of existing Arabic republic regimes.

Abdul Ilah Biliqaziz draws a distinction between state and government, defining the state as a “political polity that is possessed by a society or *al-Ummah*. This polity is embodied in institutional system expressing a quiddity of that society, fulfilling its sovereignty on itself, on its territory, and on its interests”. Whereas he expresses, the government is regarded as a device of the rule embodying the authority to form a balance between political and social forces.¹¹

Nonetheless, most people in the Arab world reduced the idea of state to the government and its devices, such as police, army, courts, and prisons. As Biliqaziz explains, once ordinaries imagine such devices, they evoke the idea of state, “this is only the situation that the state concept is understood in the people’s consciousness [in Arab world]”. This blend, Biliqaziz describes as ‘fabricated interpenetrate’, contributing to the obliteration of the difference between state and government. Thus, in political Arab societies, there is no institutional embodiment for the state, but the ruling regime.¹² It resulted in emerging false understanding of modern state. The state concept, rather, was understood as the center of predominant group who seize power by force or even violence in some cases.

Based on this blend virtually all republic governments in the Arab world, acted as a single-party ruling out other political and social forces from building the modern state. The ruling regime exploited the impaired political consciousness of ordinaries to form the state’s institutions based on their own interests. This could be observed in Egyptian case. For instance, in tracing the political history of Egypt since the Free Officers seized power in 1952, one can observe that the new republic regime sought to centralize the power in its makers’ hands. This is clear in the nature of several institutions and military council that were established immediately after the 1952 revolution that succeeded in overthrowing the Egyptian monarchy. The 1952 Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), 1953 Liberation Council, 1957 Nationalist Union, and the 1962 Arabic Socialist Union, all endeavored to strengthen new political elites to be the sole group that were representatives not only of the state but also of society, after having abolished all existing political parties. Actually, it would be better to refer to the 1952 clause of the Constitution enacting that the mission of Nationalist Union is centered upon “acting on achieving the objectives that the revolution broke out for the sake of”.¹³ Consequently, the new political elite, as the state’s representatives, possessed the exclusive right to draw most, if not all, domestic policies, including educational and agricultural policies.

Another picture of blending the state concept into government could be deduced from the composition of Egyptian cabinet at that time. The officers, despite their few numbers in contrast to the

civilians in the cabinet, held makers-decision-positions in the country. As Mahmud A. Faksh, in his article analyzes, the political weight of military officers could be understood from the kinds of important jobs they held, and not merely from the percentages of their number in the cabinet. Faksh presents from 1954 to 1970, the presidency position, the presidents' vices, and the premiership, that have all been occupied by officers. Although the numerical superiority of civilians over officers was obvious, the fact remains that the civilians did not hold the crucial jobs that might affect the political or domestic policies.¹⁴

There were many pretexts, such as corruption, political charlatanism, inefficiency, that the ruling regime used to exclude their contenders of other political parties. As General Neguib warranted in his autobiography, for example, the new military regime, abolished all political parties, albeit they were allowed to submit sworn statements, Neguib said:

We asked them [representatives of political parties] to purge themselves of corruption... On 10 September [1952] I promulgated another decree law giving the parties one month in which to submit sworn statements ... The purpose of the law... was to protect the people from political charlatanism. There was no a single party, including the Wafd, which represented anything but the personal interests and ambitions of its leaders... None of the parties could offer the program that different in any important respect from the program of the Council of the Revolution... But inasmuch as they had all fulfilled the letter, if not the spirit, of the political reform decree, we had no alternative but let them function for the time being.¹⁵

Nationalist campaign, above all, played a groundbreaking role in strengthening the government of Free Officers. Nationalist mobilization had been utilized in confronting external dangers. This was obvious in nationalizing the Suez Canal in 26 July of 1956.¹⁶ Appearing as the sole representative of the society in encountering foreign powers enabled evidently the government of Free Officers to as a state. This helped them to be predominant group among other. As noted by Joel S. Migdal, "a prime motivation in expanding the state's rule-making domain at the expense of other social organizations ... had been to build sufficient clout to survive the dangers posed by the outside its boundaries".¹⁷ This resulted in an emerging single-party government, which blending the state concept into government.

In Egyptian case, and in some Arab republic regimes, blending between the concepts of state and government had processed mostly within militarizing the state. Further, this inaugurated a new sphere of military domination over the rule in Egypt. Thus, the term "militarizing the state" could be attributed to this period. Military officers, assigned by Nasser, had markedly run many various high leading positions in government, including Ministries of Education and Agriculture.

Given all this, it is no surprise that the path was paved for the military regime to obtain political legitimacy without any real political competition from other parties. Legitimacy is “the most potent factor determining the strength of the state, involving an acceptance of the state’s rules of the game, its social control, as true and right”, emphasizes Migdal.¹⁸ However, as Biliqaziz points out, political legitimacy entailed two models: violent and ideological. The former imposes the political legitimacy through a violent instrument, and the latter creates social awareness compromised with values of the political ruling regime, and adapted as well as naturalized with actuality that the violent instrument could not afford to dominate. Biliqaziz concludes that the function of ideological effectiveness in creating political legitimacy is more effective than violent instruments.¹⁹ As a matter of fact, both two models were adopted under Nasser’s regime. Thus, I will touch on the ideological model within the government’s policy in formulating educational and agricultural systems. Additionally, the violent model will be argued to evaluate such policies.

As can be seen from this political scene, one could vividly observe that a contradiction exists to what the revolutionary leaders previously promised that they would establish intact democratic life. Nasser, nine years post the revolution, saw the democracy as a rule in favor of all members of society. However, paradoxically, he did not believe that democracy could be derived from issuing the Constitution or establishing Parliament. Democracy, as Nasser understood, “is not determined by the Constitution or Parliament, it is existed by eliminating feudalism, monopolization, capitalism, there is no democracy without equality”.²⁰ He used his war with feudalism and capitalism as a pretext to persuade his adherents that the practice of democracy cannot be constitutional or parliamentary. Nasser cited the failure of the monarchical regime in establishing intact democratic life through the constitution and parliament to justify his unbelief in constitutional and parliamentary process. He depicted the democratic process under the monarchical regime as reactionary and counterfeited. The reason for this depiction as Nasser said “the facade of counterfeited democracy was not constituting but reactionary democracy ... and the reaction [he meant local aristocracy] was not willing to cut its communication with colonization ... logically we find [Nasser continued] the ministries under reactionary democracy and what was called national independence could not work [independently] but through inspiration of colonized representative in Egypt”.²¹ However, one presumably says that this citation was invalid post-revolution, because the reactionary democracy, as Nasser depicted, had been demised when the revolution succeeded in overthrowing the monarchy regime.

Nasser still linked between foreign colonialism and vestiges of local aristocracy. Without hesitation, the nationalists, in many cases, accused those capitalists and feudalists of treason. The

phenomenon of treason, thus, became vividly consumed in political nationalist discourse. Here, Nasser used it to stand up to his foes:

The colonization and foreign power that controlled our home felt, if they would not steer a severe blow toward the power of Arab national liberation, the entire region would not be under their control, and the sweeping popular current would sweep away the little traitors and tear down the hireling thrones that backed by the colonizer and his cannon and tank.²²

This skeptical attitude towards the vestiges of old regime contributed to drive Nasser to restricted equality only to social realm of Egyptian society. Seemingly, he wanted to dismiss the idea of political participation, on other hand. For instance, Nasser, as it will be discussed in detail in the agriculture section, focused on the social disparities among Egyptians: laborer and landlord. One can therefore notice that Nasser did not touch on the existing political disparity, he said:

In order to eliminate social disparity ... it was necessary to take different initiatives ... enabling the laborer to participate in administrating the factory, and participating in administrating the factory has meaningful that is may be greater than the ratio of profit; because the capitalist through his money was able to establish a factory, was he able to administrate this factory without laborers? [Nasser asked]. It was, of course, impossible [he answered]. Then, the capitalist [had to] cooperate with laborers on administrating the factory ... then [when] the landlord is alone with administrating this factory, [it will be] regarded as a social injustice, because the share capital is social function, and the task that the laborer performs is social function, therefore, the share capital and the task must share in the administration.²³

Nasser, on other hand, restricted the political participation and accomplishing the revolution's principles to the revolutionary leaders, he named them "revolutionary vanguard". To manipulate the public opinion, particularly low and middle classes, Nasser attempted to persuade, he to large extent succeeded, Egyptians that they were the owners of the revolution. Moreover, he depicted them as the inspirer of the revolution.²⁴ There was no room for political participation, except the revolutionary officers, in the political construction of the new regime. In one of his speech, Nasser explained, "the meaning of new political construction is that the revolution will emancipate earners from capitalism and its exploitation, from dominance of feudalism and its exploitation, the revolution will work for all people ... it will transform them from earners to possessors".²⁵ Nasser did not mention that the door is open for the people to participate in the political process. Indeed, blending between state and government, and portraying the ruling regime as the sole representative of the society on one hand, and

nationalist sentiment that the revolutionaries created on the other hand, played a key role in pinning the hopes on the shoulders of the revolutionary leaders.

It could be understood therefore, as some observers noted that when the foreign colonizer and monarchy regime had been expelled and abolished respectively, the political partner was no longer to be existed to dispute with the revolutionary regime.²⁶ As Tariq Al-Bishri puts it, “the national justification for the pluralist partisanship was wrapped up, and the “institutional monopoly” became the base of the political construction of the state –post –the 23 July –revolution. Therefore, there were no potent social institutions that could contain the dominance of the “central unilateralism”.²⁷

Monopolizing the power, as shown above, suggested that the new regime assiduously sought to achieve two goals, establishing a single-party regime, and then easily dominating the society. This monopoly needed two significant ways to be exclusively fulfilled: resources and ideas. Such two ways could be used, as Migdal assumes, to control an entire society.²⁸ The ideas could be gauged through the educational system, and the resources could be explained through the economic network, but, I will narrow it to agriculture as a case study.

III. Nationalism and Education in the Egypt's Nasser:

As Anthony D. Smith argues that “the first nationalists on coming to power”, utilized public education to establish a system of their own expressions, and reflections of their national values.²⁹ The new republic regime in Egypt, paid great attention to the public educational system, which was the most significant instrument in implementing the state’s nationalist and socialist agendas. In two years, after the 1952revolution, Nasser appointed Kamal El-Den Hussein, a member of RCC, as a Minister of Social Affairs and later as a Minister of Education. The regime allocated huge financial subsidizations that resulted in noticeable increase the number of public schools that began to reach rural areas. Kamal al-Monofibelievesthat the education became, under Nasser, one of the crucial issues alongside politics and economy.³⁰

In*The National Charter*, Nasser emphasized on the importance of education for the revolution. He deemed a revolution without education merely as “a psychological explosion that the nation breaths its long suppression within”. In fact, Nasser suggested that “education is the weapon achieving the revolutionary triumph”. He, therefore, asserted that the economic and social problems urgently need a scientific solution. What is more, Nasser explained that the backwardness that the Egyptian society extremely suffered from was imposed on Egypt during the colonization period. Here onwards, Nasser used the education as the revolutionary weapon for the national struggle against his enemies: monarchists, feudalists, capitalists and colonizers alike.

Seen from this point of view, Nasser called education for the society and not for education itself, stating: “the scientific research centers are now, in the phase of struggle, demanded to progress themselves, that way the education is for the society. The education for education per se is responsibility our national capacities cannot bear its burdens”. In short, Nasser believed at the time that education is the cultural symbol of the revolution that leads to fulfilling any objectives of the revolution regardless of the educational objectives themselves.³¹

Through educational policy, the new regime had borne a responsibility to create a new generation who were – hopefully – saturated with nationalist and socialist ideas. By Nasser’s regime, socialism was intended to accomplish two purposes, eliminating capitalism and feudalism, and creating educated and professional cadres. Nasser said “We regard the education as [an instrument] that makes us to build our land, build our factories, and build plantations, and we do progress the economic base, thus it will be strong base that enables us to establish true socialism”.³² For this reason, Nasser asked the faculties staffs in Egyptian universities to interpret the socialism concept to the students, “we ask the men of universities and faculties to provide further researches in explaining the socialism”.³³

Obviously, cultivating the values and ideas of socialism was the fundamental task of education. Therefore, the revolutionary regime prompted free education, it was a hallmark of the 1952 revolution, albeit it was offered before the revolution, but was limited. After revolution many schools were built in villages. Thus, all strata of the Egyptian society were ostensibly capable of sending their children easily to the schools as well as of being accepted without financial conditions.

In retrospect, beginning in the nineteenth century, secular education provided the country with a foundation for a civil bureaucracy. Access to a university education and government employment, however, was limited to the urban upper classes until the mid-1930s, when sons of urban and rural middle-class families were accepted into the military or civil administration. On the other hand, the lower economic class in Egypt was living under hard circumstances that prevented them from sending their children to schools. They were poor and could not financially afford to pay tuition and fees. Such circumstances forced them to be engaged in cultivating the plantations in favor of the feudalist masters. The feudal order was prevalent during the monarchy regime. However, did the revolution really eliminate the poorness? And were the peasants after the revolution able to send their children to schools built in their villages? Such questions will be answered in the agriculture section.

Unquestionably, the new regime was obsessed with developing the economic situation. Focusing on rural areas was the major priority of the revolutionary leaders. They saw that the education as an urgent need for progressing the public consciousness, in particular villagers. Thus, as a result, the most

difficulties that the developments potentially face could be overcome. Nasser, in chapter seven of *The National Charter*, pointed out that “[once the village reaches] the civilizational level of the city particularly in terms of culture, it would be the outset of schematic consciousness of individuals. This consciousness that is capable of encountering the most difficulties that the development faces, that is, the growth of population”.³⁴

Ibrahim Esmat Mattawa summarized the aims of education under the new regime. He suggests that the education was intended to be coupled with work and activism. Thus, it was aimed to enable the villagers to be capable of developing their own livelihood and, thus, their society. Education also was aimed at increasing the production. It aimed to help the villagers become aware of the problem of population growth. Additionally, the goal was also, to estrange the peasants from the old superstitions, to increase their health awareness, and to identify the peasants with national history of Egypt.³⁵ Education was for the society regardless of its educational objectives. Hence, this, as Abdul Latif Fouad Ibrahim noted, was aimed at focusing, in the first place, on agricultural education, in which was helpful, within its programs, to develop agricultural skills and awareness.³⁶

Most telling of all was the fact that Free Education principle offered to conform to socialist ideology of the Free Officers during the 1950s and the 1960s, which concentrated on social change, and producing a new technocratic class collaborating with the state in implementing its policies. This would not be accomplished however, unless the new regime enabled the middle and lower economic classes that were marginalized before the revolution to a new predominant class counterweighting the upper class. In hypothesizing that most Free Officers came from middle urban and lower rural economic classes, such new urban and rural technocrats would be loyalists to the new regime. This social change process would serve the political, economic and social stabilities of the nascent political elite. As number of observers analyze, the revolutionary leaders, through disseminating the socialist values, they aimed to establish a front consisting of all citizens apart from feudalists and capitalists who had economic relations with foreign colonizers.³⁷ Nasser drew the Egyptians a map of how Egypt should be governed, he suggested:

Leadership could be represented by those who build and work in an electric factory, those who work in agricultural reform, and who is a delegate of endowments in every place, and the person who works for a municipality as an inspector, and the person who interacts with people in the scene... those are the educated group who hold the leadership, and I would, by the ultimate devotion and sacrifice, submit its reins to them.³⁸

But what about democracy, which Nasser described as political freedom and that it is one of two wings, with socialism, of real freedom that it cannot be achieved without. Thana'a Fouad Abdullah points out that the revolutionary regime settled for the wide, mass advocacy. The revolutionary leaders, on the other hand, did not take bold steps to allow people to participate in the political process, rather they established most organizations under their control and supervision. On that note, the revolutionary regime could be regarded as totalitarian and authoritarian.³⁹ This maintained the bureaucratic performance of the revolutionary regime that the bygone monarchical regime was performing before, alive, and as an inevitable result, simultaneously created new military order generating new bureaucratic-nationalists. Consequently, the new political elite, as the state's representatives, possessed the exclusive right to draw most, if not all, domestic policies.

The bureaucratic performance could be seen in the nature of the official appointments that Nasser endowed. As mentioned already, Nasser appointed Kamal El-Den Hussein, a member of RCC, as the Minister of Social Affairs and later as a Minister of Education. This appointment, in fact, contradicted with Nasser's speech to university professors. Hussein was a military man, he was not specialized in the education field. Nevertheless, he was appointed as a minister of education. Nasser in his speech, directed to the professors said:

Every one of us is able in his own way to perform a miracle. His primary duty is to bend every effort to his work. And if you, as university professors, were to think of your students' welfare, and consider them as you should, your basic work, you would be in a position to provide us with the fundamental strength to build our motherland.⁴⁰

Nasser's speech conveys two points. First, the revolutionary regime wanted to use the education as an effective instrument to cultivate the socialist values and to create new generation who believed in socialism. Second, Nasser excluded the educated people not only from participating in making political decisions, but from designing domestic policy as well. He wanted education to provide trained citizens without promoting them participate in ruling the country. It was not an astonishment, therefore, that Nasser proclaimed that the purpose of education was no longer produced employees to work for the government offices.⁴¹

The revolutionary regime undertook the "Free Education principle" to imply that it has a right to design the educational policy. In the 1964 constitution, the state's socialist policy came out in the open. This led to increasingly broadened sphere of Freeing Education. In article 93, it highlights that the state supervised education and regularized its affairs, emphasizing on unpaid tuitions for various educational levels.

Free Education principle sought to achieve two things: First was to help as can as possible immense number of Egyptians to be educated and skilled to develop social life, but no political. Second, it was to woo low and middle classes. Unlike old monarchical regime, the Republic regime sought its legitimacy from the bottom up. Wooing such classes, within offering the Free Education would reinforce the republic regime's legitimacy.

Education was dedicated and used as an instrument in the hand of the state for the sake of building nationalist and socialist identities. This process is known as "political socialization", whereby the state behaves as an agent of socialization to gain influence on its individual's political opinions. Education, one of many instruments that when people are introduced to as they grow up, can affect their political views.

Despite offering free education, the ratio of illiteracy was not sharply decreased, it was still high. As Abdul Latif Fouad Ibrahim shows, the percentage of illiteracy among males, from 1947 to 1960, decreased only 9.63%, in 1947, it was 66.01%, and in 1960, it dropped to 56.47%. Among females, the percentage of illiteracy, during the same period, only dropped to 4.95%, it was 88.02% in 1947, then decreased only to 83.75% in 1960.⁴² In spite of broadly building schools in many villages and suburbs, such statistics indicate that the free education was ineffective. The reasons behind this unintended result could be summarized as following: First, although the revolutionary regime assiduously endeavored to build schools throughout Egyptian villages, those buildings were not enough to receive all pupils aged from six to twelve. In 1963, only 71.6 per cent of that age could be accommodated by the buildings' capacities. In 1968, this percentage decreased only to 71.9 per cent. It means that from outset there was about 30 per cent of compulsory age of schooling had not been enabled to go to schools.⁴³ Second, according to the statistics presented by Housing and development Foundation, there were thousands of students dropped out during first, second and third grades. During the period from 1956 to 1967 the number of students who were in the level primary school was about 6.56 million, 321 thousands of first grade leaved, 721 thousands dropped out after entering second grade, 1.3 million stopped schooling in the third grade. The total of the students who leaved the school during the first three years was 35 per cent.⁴⁴ Finally, the educational standard was modest. It was proved that some students who completed six grade were not educated as should be, they lacked the basic of reading and writing. Some teachers were incompetents holding only primary certification.⁴⁵ There was another reason that had ensued after issuing agrarian laws will be revealed in the following section.

IV. Nationalism and Agriculture in the Egypt's Nasser:

This section concerns mainly with answering the questions have been already raised, revolving around redistributing the national wealth fairly to Egyptians, and eliminating feudalism and capitalism. Through responding such questions, this paper will reveal three matters, first, as this study determines that the ideas and resources as the two ways to helped to seized exclusively power (the single-party regime). The ideological ideas have been gauged through education system; the agricultural field could be used to explain resources. Second, it examines how Nasser understood the democracy issue through his nationalist and socialist reforms in agricultural field. Third, thus, this section attempts to sets out social differentiation that the revolutionary regime focused on at the expense of the political reform.

To illuminate the context within which the following arguments over nationalism and socialism developed grossly post-revolution, it entails exposing, at least briefly, two things, how capitalism and feudalism formed in Egypt, and how, in return, nationalist and socialist reforms took place early twentieth century. This will help understand if the July 23th was the first attempt brought new nationalist and socialist reforms, thereby knowing to what extent the revolution played a significant role in social changes.

Beginning with forming feudalist and capitalist class in Egypt dated back to Muhammed Ali Pasha reign (r. 1805-1948). He created Egyptian capitalism, when he formed upper-class of landowners to bolster him in ruling Egypt.⁴⁶ This, as some historians regarded, was the real core of Egyptian feudalism and capitalism that being strikingly formed its dimension and countenances since the 1850s and 1860s.⁴⁷ Such class made up of rural and Bedouins leaders, government personnel, and Imams of mosques.⁴⁸ Additionally, it included several big merchants descended from Turkish and European origins who had closely relation with the Khedives (Muhammad Ali's dynasty). Commercial class, including Turkish and Europeans, comprised of some members of royal family, and some civilians who served for the state. They ultimately constituted the vast majority of big capitalist landowners.⁴⁹ What is more, the growth in the size of feudalist and capitalist class had been accompanied by fading local merchants and artisans whether in village or in city. This led to two outcomes, first, handicapping the growth of middle class who was working in industrial and commercial domains, second, thus, creating new social construction compounding the gap between big landowners and small peasants.⁵⁰ In short, as one observer notices, the wealth and prestige of the Egyptian upper class, before the revolution, were measured by landing property.⁵¹ At the turn of twentieth century, foreigners possessed about 23 percent of agricultural areas.⁵²

This growth of upper class at expense of middle and low classes had absorbed some Egyptian reformers, who were either intellectuals or parliamentarians. They considered in adopting socialist order rather than feudalist, but there was a difference between their presentations. Yet, it could be said that Egyptian society had experienced socialist ideas since early twentieth century. Such ideas had been exhausted through the intelligentsia's writings. In 1913, Salama Moussa authored *al-Ishṭirākīyah* (Socialism), aiming to illuminate the public opinion, defending the socialism and providing successful examples of socialist applications occurred in Europe and the United States. Moussa wanted to convince his leaders that by the socialists' endeavors the laborers reached their welfare. In two years later, Mustafa Hassanein al-Mansuri, the schoolmaster of Ṭūkh (طوخ) published *Tārīkh al-madhāhib al-Ishṭirākīyah*, (History of Socialist Creeds). Almansuri called for socialist solution to develop agricultural field. He based his notion on the principle saying "the land for who plants it", and called for redistribution of land.⁵³

However, those calls were confronted by British interests in Egypt at that time. It could divide the reformation of land into three patterns. The first presented by the British government in the 1910s. They called to retain small ownership, and to abolish peonage system. The British administrators, such as Cromer (d. 1917) and Kitchener (d. 1916), saw dwindling small ownership as a great threat for the British interests in Egypt, because if the small landowners converted to destitute agricultural laborers "they would be prone to wicked socialist notions", Cromer said.⁵⁴ This reform was encountered by the big landowners. Second pattern emerged in the 1920s. It adopted by the national bourgeoisie, they were influenced by the British tendencies, albeit their criticism against the British policies. For instance, Khalil Siri, in his book, *al-Malakīyah al-rīfīyah al-ṣuḡhrá*, 1938, (The Small Rural Ownership), criticized the big landowners and the British policies, but when he presented his notions over the agriculture, he called to broaden the small ownership. Furthermore, Siri used the same logic of the British administrators, he said "losing of small ownership would lead small owners to be agricultural proletariat, who migrated to the city, then they would be prey of dangerous socialist notions". The bourgeoisie proposed limiting the landownership to 50 feddans (1 *feddan* = 1.038 acres = .42 hectare), but the Senate rejected this proposal in 1947.⁵⁵ The third pattern was supporting by radicals. They adopted Marxist notions, demanding to reduce the ownership to 50 feddans, and then expropriating the excess lands, after that redistributing the expropriated lands, without charge to the small peasants and without compensation to the big holders. These notions emerged during in the 1920s. As other patterns, however, the radical orientation fell on deaf ears; the Egyptian government crushed the radical leaders.⁵⁶

As for parliamentarians, who were mostly descended from upper class. Their perspectives differed from what Egyptian intellectuals presented on the agricultural reform. Instead, the parliamentarians associated agricultural reform with the national interest. They called for unifying big holders and small peasants in hierarchal pattern. They depicted the nation as a big family consisting of fathers and members. Their perspectives on the agricultural reform could be discerned from the parliamentary debates. In her argument on *The Egyptian Upper Class*, Magda Baraka argues that the national interests in the 1930s were, by upper-class, figured out at two levels. First it was that nation was depicted as one big family. In this sense, “landowners and tenant, or capitalist and laborer were to be viewed with equal sympathy, both being members of the big family”. The idea was that workers and capitalists belonged to one family. However, at the second level is dividing this family into two unequal categories: members and fathers, small tenant and big landowner. The relationship between them was described, thus, as “a fatherly”. Baraka quoted the Ali al-Manzalawi Bey’s words, a leading landowner, “trust entirely that the landowner treats the small tenant as a father treats any members of his family”. Seen from this perspective, it could be understood the hierarchical classification order the landowners maintained, they presented themselves as the guarantors of the social stability and as a protection against chaos and conflicts. As one deputy put it “big landowners ... constitute the main pillar of this country, and under their umbrella and protection live the majority of small peasants. Therefore, if this pillar crumbles, every construction in this country will crumble with it”.⁵⁷ In short, as Doreen Warriner points out, before the revolution, any attempt to agrarian reform “is bound to be contentious”, thus the big holders had never previously experienced any encroachment on their interests. They viewed any reform as a “catastrophic”.⁵⁸

This meta-relationship ostensibly was destroyed by the Agrarian Reform Law (ARL) enacted under the revolutionary regime in September 1952. Under this rubric, the revolutionary regime came to implement agricultural reform on ground rather than sweeping aside it, and came to elevate the financial and social status of small peasants rather than putting them under the mercy of big landowners. This law seemingly endeavored to meet two purposes: first was to reduce the main resources of big-size proprietors through the distribution of ownership. Under article 1 of the ARL, “no person may own more than 200 feddans”.⁵⁹ Second was to back the middle and low classes though redistributing small land. This was endorsed by the ninth article of the ARL saying that the small peasants have a right to have small ownership is not less than two feddans and does not exceed five feddans.⁶⁰ The intended consequences would be to sap the domination of feudalists and capitalists, and to create socialist society. It could be, from this judging, said that reducing resources of the feudalists

and capitalists enabled the revolutionary leaders to seize the power exclusively. Logically, therefore, it was not surprised that Nasser conceived that “the democracy basically is that the rule is not a monopoly of feudalism and capitalism, but the rule [should be] in favor of the entire Umma”.⁶¹

To bolster this point of view, revolutionary leaders needed for political mobilization. As Migdal notes, state leaders need for a set of strong state agencies, as well as to be able mobilize support among these peasants and workers. Migdal explains that this political mobilization is invalid unless there is “already-established channels to the population that induce mobilization though a viable mix of rewards, sanctions and symbols”.⁶² The revolutionary regime created a number of its own agencies, such as Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) *Majlis qiyādat al-thawrah*, Liberation Council *Hay'at al-Taḥrīr*, Nationalist Unional-*Ittiḥād al-Ishtirākī*, and Arabic Socialist Unional-*Ittiḥād al-Ishtirākī al-'Arabī*, most of them were military, and in turn, abolished all political parties. The ARL was the first initiative the revolutionary regime took after the revolution. It apparently indicates that the ARL used to mobilize the marginalized strata during the monarchical regime era to be against the old feudalist order through redistributing small lands to the peasants. Abdul Fatah viewed that the purpose of expansion of the base of small ownership constituted as the fundamental base of the revolutionary regime to confront the feudalism.⁶³

However, the ARL had faced harsh criticism asserting that the small peasants, after enacting ARL, were no better off. It could be divided the standpoint of disinterested critics into four expressions. First, some critics claimed that there were vague charges of waste and mismanagement on the part of the authorities. Second group viewed, based on their hostility, that the reform was Communism. Third critics asserted that the financial and social status of peasants did change, the peasants only have changed masters. The final group expressed by the students of Cairo University, saw that the reform had not done enough.⁶⁴

To be sure, however, the ARL was far from communist notions. Rather, by comparison with the three patterns of agricultural reform presented prior revolution, the law was closer to the reform presented by the bourgeoisie and the British administration that supported the small ownership and rejected eliminating totally the big-size property. The ARL, additionally, differed from the communists in allowing the owners of expropriated land to receive compensation. Under article 5, the owners of expropriated lands have a right to be compensated at the rate of ten times of rental value additional to the value of static installations and trees.⁶⁵ Believing in maintaining private ownership was laid down in *The National Charter* “the social Arabic implementation in terms of agriculture does not believe in nationalizing the land and converted it to public ownership... instead it believes in individual

ownership within limits do not allow feudalism to be existed".⁶⁶ In his speech Nasser affirmed that the regime" is not against completely private ownership. We are, [Nasser said] against the exploitation, if we were against completely the private ownership, we would confiscate all possessions, and we would not give compensations... we banned private ownership if it oriented to exploitation. We were saying that the ownership is social function, if it oriented to the exploitation, it deviated from its function".⁶⁷

However, this does not mean that the revolutionary regime was no deserved to be criticized. The reformatory initiatives in connection with agriculture could be criticized within three processes, lack of social participation in supervising the implementation, distribution and compensation. Revolutionary reforms should be considered due to it focused on only social and economic reforms, suggesting that the social reform had not been accompanied by political reform. This caused in failing these initiatives. Under Article 12 of ARL, put entire authority in the hands of the state's apparatuses to implement the law on the ground. When the state issued the ARL, there were no social debates whether preceded or followed the ARL. The state did not allow local organizations or masses to participate in implementing the ARL.⁶⁸ The law laid down establishing a supreme committee, requisitioning the excess lands and supervising the distribution process. This committee comprised of the Minister of agriculture as a head, the deputies of Ministries of Agriculture, Social Affairs, Economy, and Public Works.⁶⁹ There was no political program. This led, as one observer puts it, to emerge new bureaucratic groups making up of new rich formers, technocrats, officers, who replaced the big landowners. They controlled virtually the means of production under the name of state.⁷⁰ Consequently, it could be easy to notice the faults of the law particularly in connection with distribution and compensation issues.

Beginning with distribution, the following two charts compare between agricultural ownership before and after the ARL. As the two charts show, limiting the ownership to 200 feddans after 1952 did not change the percentage of small size-land ranged from three to five feddans, the percentage constituted the vast majority whether before or after agrarian laws, they were 94.3% and 94.5% respectively. The change could be noticed in was in disappearing the owners who owned more than 200 feddans after ARL. The ARL give the big owners the right to sale or concede the excess lands to their families or relatives. In turn, the ARL allowed destitute peasants or who owned less five feddans to benefit from distribution system. This led to the problem, as we shall see, of fragmentation of the land, where the percentage of small size-area increased dramatically from 35.4% to 57.1%. This indicates that more than half of the cultivated lands were owned by small peasants who owned less than 5 feddans. It came at the expense of the big owners. In turn, there was a slight drop in the percentage of the big property owned by the owners who owned from 100 to 200 feddans from 7.3 %

to 6.5%. Nevertheless, after the ARL the percentages big size-area is arranged from 50 to 200 feddans, and medium size-area is arranged from 10 to 50 feddans, which constituted 12.6% and 20.8 respectively, and equaled 33.4% of the total. This helped the big and medium owners to be remained as effective producer. In turn, the small peasants, who owned less than 5 feddans, suffered from the problem of fragmentation of land. As a result, they were forced to sign an unfair contract with the big or medium owners.

Distribution of agricultural ownership before 1952.⁷¹

Size-Ownership (feddan)	No. of owners (thousands)	Size-Land (1000 feddans)	Percentages %	
			owners	lands
Less than 5 feddans	2642	2122	94.3	35.4
5-10 feddans	79	526	2.8	8.8
10-20 feddans	47	638	1.7	10.7
20-50 feddans	22	634	0.8	10.9
50-100 feddans	6	430	0.2	7.2
100-200 feddans	3	437	0.1	7.3
More than 200 feddans	2	1177	0.1	19.7
Total	2801	5984	100%	100%

Distribution of agricultural ownership, 1960 (after ARL).

Size-group (feddan)	No. of owners (thousand)	Size-land (1000 feddans)	Percentages %	
			owners	lands
Less than 5 feddans	3032	3692	94.5	57.1
5-10 feddans	78	614	2.4	9.7
10-20 feddans	61	527	1.9	8.2
20-50 feddans	29	815	0.9	12.6
50-100 feddans	6	392	0.2	6.1
100-200 feddans	4	421	0.2	6.5
More than 200 feddans	---	---	---	---
Total	3211	6462	100%	100%

Continuing with distribution issue, the socialist solution, presented by the revolutionary government, was aiming at extension of the small ownership, and this contradicted with the Marxist notion, although it was purposed to eliminate the feudalist order. The theme of extending small ownership was seeking to increase the number of owners to break the exploitation. Nasser declared that “the revolutionary confrontation sought to increase the number of the owners to resolve the land problem... this was the aim of agrarian reform laws having been issued in 1952 and 1961”.⁷²

According to the ways of distribution, the law in article 9, laid down distributing the requisitioned land among small peasants, in holdings of not less than two feddans and not more five feddans per family on condition they possessed less than five feddans.⁷³ The owners of more than five feddans were not eligible to receive land. However, under Article 4, big landowners were permitted, for five years dating from the issue of the law, 1952, to sell or transfer ownership of land in excess of the legal maximum (200 feddans), to their children or relatives. The owner must not exceed 100 feddans in disposing land to their sons or relatives. Have the excess lands not been disposed over five years, the state would requisition and supervise the distribution process.⁷⁴ Five years were enough to dispose the excess lands to the sons and relatives. This contributed to deprive numerous small peasants from benefit. For this reason, as Abdul Fatah points out, that from the outset about two millions of small peasants were excluded from benefiting from agrarian reform laws.⁷⁵

Compensation issue also played a role in strengthening the vestiges of old feudalist order. The ARL incurred payment to the big landowners of expropriated land at ten times the rental value, assessed at seven times the basic land tax. The payment lasted twelve years beginning from the date of decree issue, September 1952. The big landowners exploited the compensation to maintain their political and economic influences. For instance, in 1966, fourteen years later of the revolution, the revolutionary regime, under Nasser, established Supreme Committee of Eliminating Feudalism (SCEF), because they discovered that the feudalism had not been gone. In public conference held in Damanhur city on June 15, 1966, Nasser stated

... the first thing had been done after the revolution was Agrarian Reform Law limiting legal ownership to 200 feddan ... and in 1961 issued the second Agrarian Reform Law limiting the ownership to 100 feddans... in order to eliminate the feudalism ... now after fourteen years we ask, did the feudalism and exploitation surrender? Although I was saying to you that we eliminate the feudalism, but we did not eliminate the feudalists.⁷⁶

Seemingly these laws did not completely eliminate the feudalism. In Damanhur's conference, Nasser explained why he ordered to establish SCEF. The revolutionary leaders discovered unintended consequences. They found that the relations between landowner and peasant did not change dramatically. The revolution contributed to issue laws in order to elevate the social status of small peasants, but the social hierarchy had not been fissured, particularly in rural areas. Nasser himself acknowledged, after fourteen years of revolution, that "the old social relationships that were existing in countryside ... were based on exploitation ... there were masters and slaves... today [Nasser asked] those social relationships, can we eliminate them in a day and night, or in a year or ten years? No

[Nasser answered] ... After fourteen years, we find examples of the old social relationships... we eliminated feudalism through laws, but feudalists are existed".⁷⁷

Besides, new small farmers manifested and replaced some old big landowners. They became affluent, thanks to new network that had been ensued after revolution. For example, Tallawy family replaced Sultan family in Minya Governorate. As Nasser said:

We distributed the Sultan's land, but [the person, Nasser meant Tallawy] who was working for Sultan family did not own the huge land as Sultan did... [Rather] he owned very small land but when the Sultan family's clout ended, he thought that he had a right more than anyone to inherit the Sultan family... Tallawy family [Nasser continued] was not owning big property, they [Tallawy family] succeeded in owning big land, because they committed tyranny, oppression and criminality more than what the tyrant's family [Nasser meant Sultan] was doing.⁷⁸

There were some reasons behind remaining feudalists and continuing their influences. The reports of the SCEF showed that some landowners eluded laws in connection with agrarian reforms. Evading laws was facilitated through conniving some officers with landowners. In many cases, the reports revealed that some executive apparatuses working for the revolutionary regime connived with some feudalist families. For instance, according to the report concerning with Feki family dated by July 1966, under the clause 2, the government accused some governmental apparatuses served in favor of feudalists.⁷⁹ This indicates that there was coordination and cooperation between some landowners and some officers. This explains how the big landowners and rich farmers were presented themselves as representatives of small peasants in many committees. As a report showed that Nawar family in Damanhur center, owned hundreds of feddans, exploited its high social status to evade the laws. Eight members of Nawar family succeeded in joining the Socialist Union as representatives.⁸⁰ The defect underlain, as Abdul Fatah notes, with absence of public political participation. Abdul Fatah points out that when the government formed SCEF, it excluded public participation. The government depended entirely on its apparatuses and police procedures.⁸¹

It could be said that focusing on social reforms through socialist projects, and in turn, refraining from reforming political process led to lack of democracy. This resulted in poring small peasants to be, once again, under the feudalists' mercy. Although the ARL contributed to increase agrarian production obviously, the small formers were forced to sign unfair contracts with landowners. The revolutionary concentrated in limiting ownership, this policy was myopic view. Distributing small lands to peasants did not cover the peasants' needs. Fifty seven per cent of lands were fragmented ranging from five to three feddans per peasant. This played a negative role against the peasants per se. As a result, peasants

compelled to rent their lands to the landowners, and thus, they worked inevitably for those landowners in their lands.⁸²

Under hard circumstances, the small peasants lived, they could not develop their financial status. Therefore, they needed their children to work with them in the plantations. Consequently, this played a role in dropping out of school.⁸³ Thereby, the free education was not effective, under this circumstance, in decreasing the rate illiteracy, it remained high particularly in rural areas.

In conclusion, the Egyptian revolution led by the Free Officers, as discussed above, produced new exploiters to be replaced old feudalists and capitalists. They succeeded in breaching the ARL. The revolution eliminated the feudalism on the paper, but, on the ground, the revolution could not uproot feudalists. Lack of real democratic system resulted in political corruption, in which caused in evading laws. Nevertheless, although new exploiters could be deemed as the most beneficiaries of the revolution, it is difficult to see the revolution only as coup military. Despite of the July 23rd revolution was conducted by young Free Officers, some observers deem that the “revolution came to Egypt in the form of a coup d’état”.⁸⁴

V. Conclusion:

Twentieth century really witnessed emergence of Arab nationalism. The nationalist revolution of Egypt conducted on July 23rd 1952 was one of most significant historical events reflecting not only nationalist sensation but also nationalist belonging to the Arab world under political unity. Demanding political independence was the main impulse for emerging Arab nationalism.

As I see, such two tendencies, political and revolutionary, contributed to produce single-party state ruling out other political parties from political participation. There are some factors strengthening the authoritarian regimes in Arab world. The most important one is a blend of state and government concepts. The ruling regime presented itself as the sole representative both society and the state. Ordinaries do not distinguish between the two concepts. The political consciousness of people was primitive. In Egypt, the revolutionary leaders reduced the task of the state to the government within abolishing all political parties and bearing all political and social responsibilities.

Nasser professed that political freedom is the democracy, and the social freedom is socialism. They are the two wings of real freedom. However, through education and agriculture fields, this paper found that Nasser did not adhere to his vision. Through education, Nasser planned to create socialist society to confront the old feudalist and capitalist order, but there was no political program. Furthermore, he interdicted educational institutions in intervening in politics. Instead, Nasser

encouraged university men to provide Egyptians with socialist interpretations. The revolutionary regime sought to cultivate the socialist ideologies through educational system.

In agricultural field, the revolutionary regime enacted socialist laws. They issued Agrarian Reform Law after having immediately succeeded in overthrowing monarchical regime. On other hand, the agricultural reform had not been accompanied by political reform. The government under Nasser depended completely on its own instruments to implement the agrarian laws. The absence of political reform helped to emerge new interest groups composing of some of old feudalist families, revolutionary officers and certain of new beneficiaries. Consequently, the agrarian laws had been breached, because the revolutionary nationalists attempted to fly by social wing, whereas the political wing had been broken by the single-party regime itself.

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المستخلص

"الثورة القومية وتأثيرها على الديمقراطية السياسية والاجتماعية: النظام التعليمي والزراعي في عهد عبد

الناصر، 1952-1970"

فارس بن متعب المشرفي

وفي 23 يوليو 1952، ثار الضباط الأحرار ضد النظام الملكي في مصر، ونجحوا في إقامة نظام جمهوري بدلاً من النظام الملكي. هذا الحدث التاريخي المعروف باسم "ثورة 23 يوليو" كان بمثابة نقطة تحول في تاريخ مصر المعاصر. بعدما يقرب من عقد من الزمن على يوم 23 يوليو 1952، أعلن الرئيس جمال عبد الناصر أن "الحرية" لا يمكن أن تتحقق بدون الديمقراطية والاشتراكية. علاوة على ذلك، وبنفس القدر من الأهمية، أكد عبدالناصر على الوعي الثوري للحصول على الحرية. وتشير جميع المصادر التاريخية المتعلقة بهذا الحدث إلى أن هذه الثورة كانت ذات دوافع قومية بالدرجة الأولى. وهذا يجعل هذه الورقة تتساءل عما إذا كانت الثورة القومية قد أنشأت بالفعل حياة ديمقراطية سليمة. بمعنى آخر، هل حافظت هذه الثورة القومية على جناحي الحرية، السياسي والاجتماعي؟ كيف فهم القادة الثوريون الديمقراطية والاشتراكية؟ ولكن قبل الإجابة على هذه الأسئلة. تهدف هذه الورقة إلى استكشاف كيفية استخدام القومية خلال فترة الخمسينيات والستينيات في مصر لبناء دولة الحزب الواحد الوطنية. سيكشف هذا السؤال الرئيسي أيضاً كيف تم استخدام القومية لاستبعاد المنظمات السياسية والاجتماعية الأخرى بدلاً من تشجيع المشاركة المتعددة. يحاول هذا السؤال أيضاً شرح دور القومية في تشكيل العلاقة بين الدولة والمجتمع، ويمكن تفسير هذه العلاقة من خلال مجالين: التعليم والزراعة.

الكلمات المفتاحية: القومية – الاشتراكية – الديمقراطية – مصر – الحرية – الثورة – التعليم – الزراعة

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