

*Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional?*, ed. A. Nuri Yurdusev (New York, 2004), book review

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*Ottoman Diplomacy* explores some aspects of Ottoman diplomacy from the point of *how* it was formulated and conducted. This is a much needed book, since the subject of Ottoman diplomacy in terms of the institutions, methods and procedures employed by the Empire to carry out its policies or its conduct of external relations, has been neglected.<sup>1</sup> Diplomacy has been defined as ‘a system and art of

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<sup>1</sup> See J. C. Hurewitz, ‘Ottoman diplomacy and the European state system’, *MEJ* 15: 2 (1961: Spring), 141–52, 142. Diplomacy is not discussed in the sense of Ottoman foreign relations for which there has been an extensive literature of a forty-year long historiographical tradition: see for example, Th. Naff, ‘Ottoman diplomatic relations with Europe in the eighteenth century: patterns and trends’, in *Studies in eighteenth century Islamic history*, ed. Th. Naff and R. Owen (Carbondale, 1977), 88–107; R. H. Davison, ‘Ottoman diplomacy and its legacy’, in *Imperial legacy. The Ottoman imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East*, ed. L. C. Brown (New York, 1996), 172–199; *Studies on Ottoman diplomatic history*, ed. S. Kunalalp (Istanbul, 1987); V. H. Aksan, *An Ottoman statesman in war and peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi 1700–1783* (Leiden, 1995); S. Faroqhi, *The Ottoman empire and the world around it* (London, 2004); D. Kolodziejczyk, *Ottoman–Polish diplomatic relations (15th–18th century): an annotated edition of ‘ahdnames and other documents* (Leiden, 2000); Th. Stavrides, *The Sultan of vezirs: the life and times of the Ottoman Grand vezir Mahmud Pasha Angelovic (1453–1474)*, (Leiden, 2001), 208–57; F. A. K. Yasamee, *Ottoman diplomacy: Abdülhamid II and the great powers, 1878–1888* (Istanbul, 1996); De L. Jensen, ‘The Ottoman Turks in the sixteenth century French diplomacy’, *The sixteenth Century Journal* 16 (4) (1985), 451–70; on diplomats’ accounts, see *The Turkish letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, Imperial ambassador at Constantinople 1554–1562*, tr. E. S. Forster (Oxford, 1927); H.J. Kornrumpf, ‘Zur europäischen Diplomatie im Jahre 1821. Eine osmanische Handschrift als Ergänzung der Reichshistoriker Cevdet und Lutfi’, *SF* 45 (1986), 63–87; idem, ‘Vier osmanische Botschafter 1882/1883 für Wien: Edhem Pascha, Server Pascha, Ârifî Pascha, Sadullah Pascha’, *WZKM* 84 (1994), 117–132; on diplomatic protocol, see N. Itzkowitz and M. E. Mote, *Mubadele – an Ottoman – Russian exchange of ambassadors*, tr. N. Itzkowitz (Chicago, London, 1970); on Ottoman envoys in the classical period, see F. R. Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri (Ottoman Ambassadors and their Sefâretnâmes)*, ed. B. S. Baykal, 3rd ed. (Ankara, 1992); see also the account of a French embassy in 1631 in A. Hamilton, ‘To divest the East of all its manuscripts and all its rarities’. The unfortunate embassy of Henri Gournay de Marcheville’, in A. Hamilton, M. H. Van den Boogert, B. Westerweel (eds.),

communication' between states aiming at negotiation.<sup>2</sup> Based on the fact that the Ottoman diplomacy was non reciprocal and the Empire did not establish permanent embassies in any European capital until 1793, it has been argued that there was no such thing as diplomacy. The book argues against the background of those assumptions which normally define diplomacy, the so-called 'conventional' assumptions of diplomacy – the reciprocal exchange of resident ambassadors, detailed rules of protocol and procedure, immunities and privileges for the diplomatists, a diplomatic corps, rules of ranking and precedence, professional training and recruitment– which view the institution of Ottoman diplomacy in dismissive terms. In their opinion, Ottoman diplomacy represents a 'reversal' – what is represented by the term 'unconventional' used by the author – of what has become the normal in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in diplomacy. Thus the enquiry, by focusing on some of those 'unconventional' notions of Ottoman diplomacy to which attention has been often drawn -- that the Ottoman Empire did not establish resident ambassadors abroad until 1793, it did not recognise the principle of the equality of sovereignties until the 18th century, the capitulations<sup>3</sup> were unilateral rather than bilateral instruments, a body of

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*The republic of letters and the Levant*, (Leiden, 2005); on ceremonial, see R. Blackburn, *Journey to the Sublime Porte. The Arabic memoir of a Sharifian agent's diplomatic mission to the Ottoman imperial court in the era of Suleyman the Magnificent* (Beirut, 2005); on ceremonial meal, being part of the reception of foreign ambassadors at sultan's court and embassy reports, see D. Kolodziejczyk, 'Polish embassies in Istanbul or how to sponge on your host without losing your self-esteem', in *The illuminated table, The prosperous house. Food and shelter in Ottoman material culture*, ed. S. Faroqhi and Ch. K. Neumann (Würzburg 2003), 51-8; on an account of gifts to Ottoman court by a German embassy in 1578-8, see H. Reindl-Kiel, 'East is East and West is West, and sometimes the twain did meet diplomatic gift exchange in the Ottoman empire', in *Frontiers of Ottoman studies; State, province, and the West*, ed. C. Imber, K. Kiyotaki & R. Murphey (London, 2005), 113–23. For a discussion of presuppositions to be considered for undertaking research into the subject, see C. Constantinou, *States of political discourse, Words, regimes, seditions* (London, New York, 2004), 88–92.

<sup>2</sup> *Ottoman diplomacy*, 10.

<sup>3</sup> The capitulations were commercial privileges for foreign merchants. They were intended to stimulate trade with the West and were instruments of regulating the relations between foreign merchants and the Ottomans. They were unilateral but included reciprocal clauses. See *EI2*, 3, 'Imtiyāzāt' (H. Inalcik), 1178–89; M. H. Van den Boogert, *The capitulations and the Ottoman legal system: qadis, consults and beraths in the 18th century* (Leiden, Boston,

professionally trained diplomatists did not seriously begin to emerge until the mid-nineteenth century and others helps to clarify this problem of the nature of diplomacy and proves that the practice of Ottoman diplomacy was more complex than these divisions and that it combined both 'conventional' and 'unconventional' characteristics.

The book covers the period from the early years of the Empire until the reign of the reforming Sultan Selim III (1789–1807)<sup>4</sup> and his attempt to bring the system of nonreciprocal diplomacy to an end and introduce reciprocal diplomacy, that lasted from 1793 to 1821. In this book the reader will become familiar with how nonreciprocal diplomacy worked – not policy but practices and processes – and will learn that the Turks were integrated into the European system before Selim III. The study demonstrates, contrary to the conventional view, that there have been extensive interactions between the Ottoman Empire and the European states, it challenges perceptions of the Ottoman contempt for European diplomacy, Ottoman religious conservatism and prejudiced attitudes of diplomacy subject to a process of "otherisation" of how Europeans saw the Ottomans.<sup>5</sup>

In Chapter 1 Yurdusev examines the attitude of Ottoman Empire towards diplomacy. He argues that the theory that holds that the Ottoman Empire had a negative attitude towards diplomacy due to its 'Islamic character' and the concern to wage  *jihad*  and conquest is based upon a misconception with regard to the Empire and diplomacy. He points out that the Empire was not an Orthodox Islamic State: its government and administrative affairs were indeed guided by Islamic law where the principles of  *Dar al-Harb* <sup>6</sup>,  *Dar al-Islam* <sup>7</sup>,  *Dar al-Sulh* <sup>8</sup>,  *amān* <sup>9</sup> (safe-

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2005); for the state of capitulations in the 18th century, see Naff, 'Ottoman diplomatic relations', 100–3.

<sup>4</sup>  *EI* <sup>2</sup>, 9, 'Selīm III', 132-5; Th. Naff, 'Reform and the conduct of Ottoman diplomacy in the reign of Selim III 1789-1807',  *JAOS*  83/3 (1963), 292–315; for an overview of the classical period (1299-1789), see N. Çelik, 'Muslims, non-Muslims and foreign relations: Ottoman diplomacy',  *IRTS*  1.3 (2011), 8-31, 15-23; for the years of permanent diplomacy –modern period (1789-1856), see Çelik, 'Muslims, non-Muslims', 24-6.

<sup>5</sup> See for example Nicolson's downgrading views about Turkish, Ottoman and Oriental diplomacy, in Constantinou,  *ibid* , 92-4; A. N. Yurdusev, 'Perceptions and images in Turkish (Ottoman) – European relations', in T. Ismael and M. Aydın (eds),  *Turkey's foreign policy in the 21st century: a changing role in the world politics*  (New York, 2003).

<sup>6</sup>  *EI* <sup>2</sup>, 2, 'Dār al-Ḥarb', 126.

<sup>7</sup>  *EI* <sup>2</sup>, 2, 'Dār al-Islām', 127-8.

<sup>8</sup>  *EI* <sup>2</sup>, 2, 'Dār al-Ṣulḥ', 131.

conduct) and *dhimme*<sup>10</sup>, regulated its relationships with other nations<sup>11</sup> but were also pragmatic and followed rules for expediency. It did not follow a policy of permanent war and there was a permanent state of interaction between Europeans and Ottomans from the fifteenth century. In addition, the Ottomans worked on common rules, institutions, treaties<sup>12</sup>, and capitulations with the Europeans. The observance of international law, safe conduct and immunities for merchants and foreign envoys and the sending of envoys to European and other courts is an additional element of the Empire's favourable attitude towards diplomacy. The author tells us that the source of the Ottoman sense of superiority was partly Islam and had to do with its imperial nature. The Empire was an imperial system whose influences derived from Islam, the Byzantine Empire and a synthesis of pre-Islamic Turkic and nomadic traditions with claims to universal rule and self-sufficiency.

Chapter 2 examines the nature of early Ottoman diplomacy during the *ad hoc* period. It was non-reciprocal and was used up to the establishment of residential ambassadors in the eighteenth century.<sup>13</sup> However an informal diplomatic protocol and tradition was in use: it consisted of capitulations, the employment of envoys<sup>14</sup> such as the dragomans<sup>15</sup>, and an elaborate court ceremonial and protocol. Despite the

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<sup>9</sup> *EI*<sup>2</sup>, 2, 'Dhimma', 231.

<sup>10</sup> *EI*<sup>2</sup>, 'Amān', 429-30.

<sup>11</sup> See Hurewitz, 'Ottoman diplomacy and the European state system', 146 who argues that 'the Ottoman state had inherited only rudimentary practices for conducting external relations'.

<sup>12</sup> For the term *ahdname*, which refers to the peace treaties and capitulations being the main instruments that formed the legal basis of the diplomatic and commercial relations between Ottomans and other powers, see Z. Bostan, *An analysis of the ahdname practice of the Ottoman unilateral diplomacy* (MA arts, Univer. Leicester, 2011).

<sup>13</sup> Çelik, 'Muslims, non-Muslims', 8-31, 15-23.

<sup>14</sup> On envoys, see *EI*<sup>2</sup>, 8, 'Safīr' (A. Ayalon), 812-3; *EI*<sup>2</sup>, 2, 'Elci' (B. Lewis), 694; M. İpşirli, 'Elçi' ('envoy'), in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi (The TDV Encyclopedia of Islam)*, XI (Istanbul, 1995), 3-15; for a list of envoys of the *ad hoc* period, see Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri*, 221-36; Faroqhi, *The Ottoman empire and the world around it*, 181-7.

<sup>15</sup> *EI*, 4, 'Terdjumān', 726.; A. C. Sturdza, *L' Europe Orientale et le Rôle Historique des Maurocordato, 1660-1830* (Paris, 1913); D. Pippidi, 'Sur quelques drogman de Constantinople au XVIIIe siècle', *Revue des études sud-est européennes* 10/2 (1972), 227-55; B. Tuncel, 'L' âge des drogman', in *Istanbul à la jonction des cultures balkaniques méditerranéennes, slaves et orientales, aux XVIe-XIXe siècles* (Bucharest, 1977); G. Hering, 'Panagiotis

fact that there were no professional diplomats, the handling of diplomacy both at home and abroad was successful, giving diplomacy a unique character.

Chapter 3 examines the *ad hoc* experience of the mission and agreement between the Pope Innocent VIII (1484-1492) and the sultan Bayezid II (1481-1512)<sup>16</sup> on Djem Sultan (d. 1495)<sup>17</sup> in the late fifteenth century and suggests that Ottoman diplomacy was not carried on the basis of religious conservatism. According to the sources, the event of the sending of Djem Celebi to the Pope in Rome by the Grand Master of Hospitalles in Rhodos<sup>18</sup> was a means for sultan Bayezid II to establish friendly relations with the Pope. There was an initial conduct of a complex diplomacy in Rome between the Pope, the Mamluks (1250-1517)<sup>19</sup> and the French who each had their own interests in Djem, and the Pope contemplated using Djem in a crusade against the Ottomans. Mediation between the Sultan and the Pope was offered by the Grand Master of Hospitallers in Rhodos and led to negotiations. A sworn agreement (*ahd u misāk*)<sup>20</sup> was reached in 1491 with Bayezid II's embassy to the Pope: it guaranteed Djem's Papal custody and the offering of peace. The exchange of ambassadors continued the following year. The sultan sent to the Pope the requested amount of 40,000 gold ducats and gifts of valuable relics, including, an iron head of the lance which pierced Christ's side at the crucifixion. Both the Pope and the sultan through diplomacy agreed about Djem's custody and keeping the peace.

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Nikousios als Dragoman der Kaiserlichen gesandtschaft in Konstantinopel', *JÖB* 44 (1994), 143-78

<sup>16</sup> *EF*<sup>2</sup>, 1, 'Bāyazīd II', 1119-1121.

<sup>17</sup> Bayezid II's younger brother who had claims to the sultanate. *EF*<sup>2</sup>, 'Djem', 529-31; H. Inalcık, 'A case study in Renaissance diplomacy: the agreement between Innocent VIII and Bayezid II on Djem Sultan', in Yurdusev, *Ottoman diplomacy*, 66-88.

<sup>18</sup> It was where Djem had taken refuge after his defeat by Bayezid.

<sup>19</sup> *EF*<sup>2</sup>, 6, 'Mamlūk', 314-31.

<sup>20</sup> V. Panaite, 'Peace agreements in Ottoman legal and diplomatic view (15th-17th centuries)', in *Pax Otomana. Studies in memoriam Prof. Dr. Nejat Göyünç*, ed. K. Çiçek (Ankara, 2001), 277-308; on the diplomatic document in the Ottoman Empire, see *EF*<sup>2</sup>, 2, 'Diplomatic' (J. Reychman and A. Zajackowski), 313-6; see also, P. Fodor, and G. David, 'Hungarian-Ottoman peace negotiations in 1512- 1514', in G. David and P. Fodor (eds.), *Hungarian-Ottoman military and diplomatic relations in the age of Süleyman the Magnificent* (Budapest, 1994), 9-45.

Chapter 4 examines the diplomacy conducted in 1698 at Karlowitz (Karlovo Selo in modern Yugoslavia)<sup>21</sup> and analyses the procedure of negotiations and agreement of peace which was made between the Habsburg Kaiser and his allies (Poland, Muscovy and Venice) and the Sultan. Until 1683 war had been the only way for the Ottomans to settle disputes with their enemies. In 1697, after 14 years of war, the Ottoman armies were utterly defeated at Zenta and the Sultan resorted to peace: it was the first time that a multilateral document was acknowledged to sustain a peace treaty. The author argues that despite the absence of former apparatus for diplomatic communication, the Karlowitz mission, consisting of the *Reisülküttab* (chief of the Secretaries) Rami Mehmed Efendi (d. 1707)<sup>22</sup>, and the Chief Dragoman Iskerletzade Alexander, known as Mavocordato (d. 1709), was a success. Based on the principle of *uti possidetis* —unless specified no part of Muslim held territory was negotiable— the mission not only did not compromise the interests of the Sultan, but it demonstrated the ability of the Ottoman envoys to negotiate on precedents and practices which were acknowledged by both parties.

Chapter 5 analyses the ‘unconventional’ mechanisms of Ottoman diplomacy, the Capitulations, the *sefāretnāmes*<sup>23</sup>, and the dragomans, in the diplomatic relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the diplomatic system of Europe and suggests that the Empire was integrated into the European diplomacy before the reign of sultan Selim III (1789-1807). The Ottoman government, although it did not establish permanent ambassadors and consuls of its own abroad, admitted permanent European envoys in Istanbul from the sixteenth century. Capitulations, which were granted to European merchants from Venice, Genoa, France, the Dutch republic and England were not just commercial privileges but instruments of regulating the relations between the Empire and the other states and led to consular establishments. The system of ‘unilateral’ (non-

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<sup>21</sup> *Eİ*<sup>2</sup>, ‘Karlofca’, 4, 657-8.

<sup>22</sup> *Eİ*<sup>2</sup>, 6, ‘Meḥmed Pasha Rāmī’, 999-1000.

<sup>23</sup> See Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri (Ottoman Ambassadors and their Sefāretnāmes)*, On reporting on European embassies, see Faroḡhi, *The Ottoman empire and the world around it*, 187–91; see also, R. H. Davison, ‘Vienna as a major Ottoman diplomatic post in the nineteenth century’, in *Habsburgisch-osmanische Beziehungen. Relations Habsbourg-ottomanes Wien*, 26.-30. September 1983. *Colloque sous le patronage du Comité international des études pré-ottomanes et ottomanes* Herausgegeben von Andreas Tietze (Wien, 1985), 251-280; J. M. Stein, ‘Habsburg financial institutions presented as a model for the Ottoman empire in the sefaretname of Ebu Bekir Ratib Efendi’, in *Habsburgisch-osmanische Beziehungen*, 233-41.

reciprocal) diplomacy did not prevent its developing a degree of diplomatic activity between the Empire and other European states. For example, it is estimated that between 1384 and 1600, 145 envoys were sent by the sultans to Venice alone.<sup>24</sup> It was after Karlowitz that envoys were being sent in a systematic way, e.g. to Paris, Vienna, Moscow and Poland, for the purpose of obtaining information from Europe; all sent back *sefāretnāmes* to Istanbul. Berridge argues that the adoption of unilateral diplomacy by the Ottomans was not simply a naive reaction but a system with diplomatic and political advantages: it suited the Ottomans in a number of ways. In the first place the permanent ambassadors in Istanbul were used as mediators and direct negotiators between the Ottomans and the Europeans and as sources of information on the thinking and conditions of Europe. Direct negotiations with were carried out by the dragomans; they were part of the diplomatic corps, not just translators or interpreters. The system also suited the Europeans: European ambassadors became well-accustomed to dealing with the Porte; despite the hostage status attached to them they were able to perform as diplomats based on the good behaviour of their states; and were given immunities and important privileges under the Capitulations. With regard to Europe, the prejudiced attitude towards the Turks, the demonology in popular mythology and the fear of ‘making mischief’ for their foreign governments did not encourage the establishment of permanent Turkish envoys in their countries. Selim III with the establishment of permanent embassies abroad brought to an end the non-reciprocal diplomacy in the end of the eighteenth century.

Chapter 6 outlines the adoption and use of permanent diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire in the late eighteenth century. It is argued that diplomacy developed very little until the late eighteenth century. Under Selim III, the Ottomans, being at war with Austria and Russia and facing the prospect of their joint offensive, were made aware of the significance of diplomacy – a treaty of alliance was signed in 1790 with Prussia, a

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<sup>24</sup> H. Inalcık, ‘An outline of Ottoman–Venetian relations’, in *Venezia, centro di mediazione tra oriente e occidente (secoli xv-xvi): aspetti e problemi*, ed. H.G. Beck, M. Manoussacas and A. Pertusi, vol. 1 (Florence, 1977); E. R. Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople. Nation, identity, and coexistence in the early modern Mediterranean* (Baltimore, 2006); S. Faroqhi, ‘The Venetian presence in the Ottoman empire (1600-1630)’, *JEEH* 15 (1986), 345-84; D. E. Queller, ‘How to succeed as an ambassador: a sixteenth-century Venetian document’, *Studia Gratiana* 15 (1972), 653–71; H. Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian diplomatics: the ‘ahd-names, the historical background and the development of a category of political-commercial instruments together with an annotated edition of a corpus of relevant documents* (PhD Diss., 1991).

first Ottoman alliance with a non-Muslim great power.<sup>25</sup> The establishment of resident embassies in 1793 was another step towards diplomacy. This development encouraged the reciprocal exchange of ambassadors. Diplomacy became *ad permanentum* instead of *ad hoc*. London was the first to receive a permanent Ottoman ambassador.<sup>26</sup> However, the first Ottoman ambassadors abroad were not successful. A number of reasons, such as their lack of knowledge of diplomatic and international affairs and foreign languages, high financial costs of the organising of the embassies, and the weak state of affairs at home, made the sultan withdraw the ambassadors in 1802. Mahmud II (1808-39)<sup>27</sup> introduced a series of reforms to promote diplomacy such as the establishment of the *Umur-u Hariciye Nezareti* (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The establishment of the *Tercüme Odası* (the Translation Department) in 1823 served as a school for future diplomats and dealt with the foreign language deficiency of the early Ottoman ambassadors. Finally he reinstated residential diplomacy in 1834. In this period, the Greek Independence war in 1821–1830 was the first major military success against the Ottoman Empire, and set an example for other nations in the Near East and the Balkans. Diplomacy had to cope with a number of developments, sometimes successfully, such as the Lebanon settlement in 1861. It was in the mid 19th century in the Paris Treaty of 1856 after the Crimean War (1853) — which the Ottomans had won against Russia — that the Ottomans were accepted as part of the European states system.

Chapter 7 discusses the role and development of the institution of *dragmanat* or *dragomanat* in the British embassy in İstanbul, and early nineteenth century attempts to anglicise it. The dependency on native dragomans from 1583 who were used as more than interpreters, — as message-bearers, intelligence-gatherers, negotiators of routine matters or even as advisers in the British Embassy — led to the institution being reformed.

Chapter 8 provides a review and an introduction on the primary sources available for the study of Ottoman diplomacy: the Ottoman archives which are divided into the Archives of the Prime Ministry and that of the Topkapı Palace; the *sefāretnāmes* (or *sefāret takrirs*), the

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<sup>25</sup> For background information, see M. Sicker, *The Islamic world in decline: From the treaty of Karlowitz to the disintegration of the Ottoman empire* (London, 2001), 79–82.

<sup>26</sup> M. A. Yalçınkaya, *The first permanent Ottoman embassy in Europe, The embassy of Yusuf Agah Efendi to London (1793-1797)* (Istanbul, 2010).

<sup>27</sup> *EF*<sup>2</sup>, 6, ‘Maḥmūd’, 55-61, 58-61.

*Vekayinüvis* or *Vak'a nüvis* histories; memoirs, biographies and letters of Ottoman statesmen and members of the sultanate, biographies, memoirs, letters of foreign ambassadors and statesmen, travelogues of European travellers and statesmen and archival sources for Ottoman diplomacy outside Turkey.<sup>28</sup> Referring to the *sefāretnāmes* they were reports of the envoys which contained observations and perceptions of the countries they visited during their missions. Their importance lies in the information they provide on protocol, methods and rules of diplomacy. In the 18th century in particular, when the Ottoman Empire was in decline, the *sefāretnāmes* contributed to its process of Westernisation through the knowledge they supplied on European states. The majority of those extant were written in the 18th and 19th centuries.

*Ottoman Diplomacy* is a comprehensive study of the problematic which characterises the study of the subject and provides useful information into the nature of the institution of diplomacy, its mechanisms and rationale. By shedding light especially on the early period's methods, techniques, agents, procedures, the book clarifies and puts into perspective issues of the 'system and art of communication' employed in the empire's conduct with the European powers. In this sense it is a fresh start into this line of enquiry and complements studies which addressed similar questions e.g. Hurewitz (1961). Moreover by addressing key issues of the nature and function of diplomacy in the context of conventional or unconventional views it shows that Ottoman diplomacy was in a process of development and continuous transformation and that it should not be interpreted in terms of 'conventional' or 'unconventional' but it combined both characteristics. The complexity of the Empire and its historical practice should be taken into account in such approaches. *Ottoman Diplomacy* is a valuable tool for future researchers of the subject — the extensive bibliography and the selection of important primary sources serve as a foundation for further research and a guide to issues of diplomacy. Moreover it facilitates our understanding of modern Turkish diplomacy, an institution which began with the Ottoman Empire and still enjoys high prestige today.

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<sup>28</sup> For examples of extracts on the themes of negotiations and receptions drawn on a variety of sources for the Ottoman period, see B. Lewis, *A Middle East mosaic. Fragments of life, letters and history* (New York, 2001), 136–60; on archival information for Ottoman history, see Suraiya Faroqhi, *Approaching Ottoman history. An introduction to the sources* (Cambridge, 1999), 58–81.