

Tricky and Scurrilous: On the Creation of Games

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Abstract : This paper presents a brief game-theoretic study of José Saramago's *Blindness* (1995), and Elizabeth Moon's *The Speed of Dark* (2002). The two novels discuss the resilience of decision-making in the face of sudden epidemics like blindness and genetic disorders like autism. By applying a group of game-theoretic notions and strategies such as (cooperative games, non-cooperative games, stag-hunt, prisoner's dilemma and incomplete information), the paper aims at revealing the mechanism of choices in the individual/ society games under the constraints of distrust, uncertainty and ableism. To achieve this, this study interprets each novel as a game and its characters as the players who control the game. Also, it highlights factors that affect rational choices in the social context, represented in Richard Thaler contributions about the constraints of decision-making such as self-control, bounded rationality and social preferences. In conclusion, by merging the firm rationality of game theory and the bounded rationality of Thaler's theory, the study hopes for suggesting a realistic interpretation of choices in the two novels.

Key words: Game Theory, Behavioral Economics, Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag-hunt, Bounded Rationality, *Blindness*, *The Speed of Dark*, Disability, epidemics, Autism

المخلص العربي: تتناول هذه الورقة البحثية دراسة موجزة لنظرية الألعاب في روايتي العمى للكاتب جوزيه ساراماجو (١٩٩٥) وسرعة الظلام للكاتبة إليزابيث مون (٢٠٠٢). تناقش الروايتان مرونة وقوة الاختيار في مواجهة أحداث جسيمة كإنتشار الأوبئة مثل العمى أو عطب جيني مثل التوحد. تهدف هذه الورقة البحثية في المقام الأول لإزالة الغموض حول آلية عمل الاختيار في اللعبة المجتمعية ما بين الفرد والمجتمع في وجود معوقات مثل الشك والريبة والجهل والنفضيل القائم على التمييز بين الأقوياء والضعفاء من خلال إبراز بعض ألعاب وأفكار نظرية اللعبة مثل: الألعاب التعاونية وغير التعاونية ولعبة مطاردة الأيل ومعضلة السجين والمعلومات المعطوبة ، التبذورهابإمكانها شرحالمشكلاتالمجتمعية. لتحقيق ذلك ، تتعامل الدراسة مع الروايتين من خلال عالم نظرية الألعاب حيث كل رواية هي لعبة في حد ذاتها وشخصياتها هم اللاعبون المتحكمون في استراتيجيات اللعب. تلقى الورقة البحثية الضوء أيضاً على المؤثرات التي تحد من عقلانية الاختيارات بوجه عام متمثلة في اسهامات ريتشارد ثالر حول معوقات صنع القرار مثل مشكلات التحكم ، العقلانية المستباحة والنفضيلات الإجتماعية. تأمل الدراسة بوجه عام في اقتراح تفسير واقعي وحقيقي للاختيارات في الروايتين.

كلمات مفتاحية: نظرية الألعاب ، الاقتصاد السلوكي ، معضلة السجين ، لعبة مطاردة الأيل ، العقلانية المستباحة ، العمى ، سرعة الظلام ، التوحد ، الإعاقة ، الأوبئة

Introduction

So far, decision-making has always been a concern for authors, philosophers and economists. In the past, narratives, plays and poetry were filled with decision dilemmas and the barriers which the characters' face regarding sticking to their choices. Recently, contemporary fiction condenses its interest to include an extensive coverage of the actual essence of human choices. Economists, as well, fixate on noticing the human decision-making and its constraints. From this point emerged the interconnection between fiction and the economic theories as economists find their sought-after responses in the literary works. In this regard, Michael Watts explains how literature illustrates "human behavior and motivations more eloquently, powerfully or humorously than economists typically do" (377). Among economists, game theorists were likely to apply their notions on contemporary fiction. Watts states, "Game theorists have frequently analyzed literary characters, plots, and situations. Brams lists 22 plays, ... novels and mysteries that have been the subject of such studies, including works by ... Puccini, Poe and Conrad" (380). Mainly, game theory is "the science of strategy, its formulas tell you what choices to make to get the best deal you can get when interacting with other people" (Siegfried iv). The actual birth of game theory is John Von Neumann's and Oskar Morgenstern's book *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* in 1944. The book promulgates hypotheses about economic behavior and

social inquires in the light of game theory. Furthermore, it investigates the perplexing structure of providing mathematical analysis to economic theories, presenting several applications of game theory in the field of economics. In core, game theory is a pure mathematical tool that is designed to solve the deadlocks of choices under risk and uncertainty by using rational strategies that achieve the best outcome for the decision-makers. However, in the recent era, game theory has witnessed an evolution from a mere mathematical strategy to a platform for many branches such aspragmatics, literature and social sciences.

Game theory's essential two rules which lend themselves readily for application on fiction are: "there must be two players" and "each player must act rationally according to the necessary relations of consequences" (Wainwright 28). Also, it assumes that each player owns the perfect information that enables him to predict the moves of the other player. In game theory, the decision-makers are called players. The "player can be individual or a group of individuals". In order to pick out the best alternatives, the players have to embrace "strategies". Those strategies, in turn, diverse into numerous choices called "moves". To prefer a strategy over another, this is exactly what pinpoints the outcome of the game. In all cases, strategy can be replaced by another or demolished when the player fail to attain the desired outcome (Zagare 11). The major perspective that game theory offers in examining decision-making is: that humans choose

according to their own interest in the first place and this requires them to: act clearheaded away from the social or the sentimental consideration. Thus, for each player, in order to obtain the perfect outcome, rationality is crucial per se. To a great extent, the choice of each player depends upon the moves and the benefits of other players. Sometimes the players reach an agreement and obtain the perfect outcome and that is the essence of cooperative games. Sometimes, uncertainty and distrust breaks the cooperation and this automatically causes loss for the players – in which is known as non-cooperative games. Among various games and notions that descend from game theory, this paper focuses on two popular games: the prisoner's dilemma and stag-hunt. Stag-hunt and prisoner's dilemma are considered to be the perfect example that embodies the constraints of choice in the actual context. In general, Stag-hunt and prisoner's dilemma games handle the conflict between the person's benefit and the group's benefit. Joachim I. Krueger and Melissa Acevedo maintain, "In the prisoner's dilemma, self-interest clashes with collective interest" (593). If the players cooperate, they are able to gain a better profit. In theory, their cooperation is associated with their strategic thinking, but in practice their cooperation depends on their social experience, beliefs and preferences. Herbert de Ley explains how the deadlock of choice works in the prisoner's dilemma game:

Prisoner's Dilemma posits that two criminals, accomplices in crime, are arrested and held without possibility of communicating with each other.

Each criminal knows that if both remain silent, their individual and collective punishment will be relatively slight. However, each criminal also knows that if he informs on his accomplice his personal punishment will be diminished, and that conversely, if his accomplice confesses, his own punishment will be increased. (37)

The choices of each criminal are affected by a group of social hindrances: whether he is able to trust the other player and keep silent or not, whether he has the perfect information that allows him to predict the behavior of other player or not and whether his solid rationality is to be broken under threats or not. Thus, all the choices regarding human behavior can be investigated using prisoner's dilemma games.

As for stag-hunt, it is a fable by "Rousseau" about hunting the deer or the hare, which converts deliberately into a competition. It is considered a sample for the societal law in practice. In the fable, the question revolves around: whether trailing the deer is much better regarding personal merits than the collective participation of catching the hare. In the game, no player can chase except the deer, thus, the outcome belongs to the probability of cooperation between "hunters" to trap the hare (Skyrms 4). Stag-hunt game is fundamentally a conflict between safety and profit, as "Everyone prefers a stag to a hare, and a hare to nothing at all", thus, "mutual cooperation takes on the highest value for each player; everything is fine as long as the other player does not defect" (Fang et al. 451). To a great extent, prisoner's

dilemma and stag-hunt revolve around the same concept of trust and the deadlock between the personal benefit and the collective benefit of the group. Yet, prisoner's dilemma is much popular and familiar among mathematicians and sociologists. On the other hand, stag-hunt game presents the clearest, and in many occasions, the closet explanation of the social dilemmas.

In the game of choice, uncertainty and mutual trust are not the only elements that influence the rationality of the players. Rather, strategies like incomplete information and threats are the most capable principles to express the misty circumstances surrounding the process of rational choice. Threats work as a pressure factor upon the players, by using social apprehension to affect their rationality. In the games of incomplete information, "there are some uncertainties about the actions of players, the moving sequence of the game or the pay-offs" (Geckil and Anderson 18). Therefore, the player's decision is not ultimately successful because he lacks the required information that enables him to predict the behaviors of other players or calculate the loss. Thus, in many ways, game theorists consider that incomplete information and threat are the main hindrances that impede the player's ability to choose rationally and strategically.

Notably, the rational necessity of game theory, in one way or another, clashes with the sentimental complexity of fiction. Thus, in order to solve its inefficiency, game theory should be entwined with behavioural economics

– as game theory treats pure rationality regarding decision-making while behavioural economics discusses the sentimental and the social interface that limits the rationality of human choices. Richard Thaler – one of the behavioural economics' founders – argues, "We human beings do other things economists think are weird ... I am hardly the first to criticize economics for making unrealistic assumptions about behavior" (4). Thaler means the assumption of game theory about the absolute rationality of people. Contrary to game theorists, Thaler's theory "pointed out that individuals are ... influenced ... by their social preferences ... and that they will knowingly make decisions that are detrimental to themselves" (Duignan). Thaler establishes a visional groundwork, providing a well-developed perspective of human behaviors into the field of economics. He attributes the violations that influence decision making to "bounded rationality", "self-control problems" and "social preferences" ("The Prize" 2). Thaler's bounded rationality or quasi rationality "suggests a category of behavior somewhere between the full rationality of the normative decision and irrational behavior" (Heukelom 15). In other words bounded rationality "is perhaps best understood as the failed attempt of people to be rational" (Heukelom 15). Besides bounded rationality, Thaler sheds light on the factors that seize rationality such as self-control and social preferences. In his view, "when things get complicated, Humans can start to flounder" (Thaler 256). Overall, Thaler believes that "Eons do not suffer from self-

control problems, and so temptation is not a word that exists in the economists' lexicon" (Thaler 257). Thus, he attacks the economic postulates that deny the human nature in which social temptations (laws) play on the individual's rationality.

Much like the original game theory that revolves around choice, the social laws also rely upon the masses' decision. Despite the common ground between game theory and the social laws, on one hand, choice is tethered to rational moves and maximum profit in game theory. On the other hand, choice serves as a pivot for the social law under social variables and deadlocks. Notably, the social power obliges the individual to consolidate his connection with the societal norms in exchange for social acknowledgment. Thus, it is the individual's duty to follow the laws of his society, for better or for worse. Even within the times of social decline, still, the social preferences, albeit unreasonable, dictate whatever the individual chooses. Thus, in order to win the society/individual game, the individual cannot trespass the social order. He, though, may be able to choose strategically, but often this is related to whether the strategy is a social axiom or not.

In all cases, cooperation occurs since there is an agreement among the individuals to choose according to the society's options. But what happens when terra incognita incidents like blindness and autism control the choices in the game? Will the characters be able to maximize their profits under the

threat of unknown epidemic as is the case in José Saramago's *Blindness*? Can they blot out the social legacy of distrust, egoism and greed as is exemplified in Elizabeth Moon's *The Speed of Dark*?

In his novel, *Blindness*, Saramago actualizes Thaler's theory about self-control and bounded rationality through embodying unbearable incident which robs individuals' control, making their behaviours unworkable. The novel's structure seems to borrow notions from game theory such as credible threat, imperfect information and prisoner's dilemma as its characters lose the ability to see and judge. As for *The Speed of Dark*, it thoroughly discusses the society of ableists as a credible threat that affects the individuals in the game of deciding. Also, it focuses on choice disability, blaming human immorality for the defection of decision-making. Notably, the novel sways between the notions of prisoner's dilemma and stag-hunt where the protagonist's safety clashes with his interest with society. Society, however, utilizes a behavioral economist's element which is the social preference of abelism to beat the protagonist.

Similar to fiction and real life, game theory examines the resilient decision-making in different social circumstances such as risks and uncertainties. It rather insists on achieving utilities even in calamities. The paper at hand investigates how choices work under credible threats, applying a group of game-theoretic notions and strategies like (prisoner's dilemma, stag-hunt, cooperative games, non-cooperative games, incomplete

information) along with some of Richard Thaler's constraints of decision-making – represented in self-control, bounded rationality and social preferences—on the two novels mentioned above.

Blindness: Seizing Sights and Choices

Saramago's *Blindness* discusses the social alternatives and transformations of an unnamed community amidst a shocking epidemic as the novel presents a country where individuals sequentially go blind except for one woman who is capable of seeing. By shielding the blind together, the government attempts to thwart the infection, yet, eventually blindness spreads among the whole population. Unlike the original darkness that marks blindness, the community was caught up in an uncanny white blindness that eliminates them from both the sighted and the blinded world. In the face of this unwelcomed disaster, the characters slowly lose their visions, resilience, and hence their capacity for decision-making.

From the perspective of *Blindness*, sight indicates choice as the characters' ability to decide vanishes after they forcefully go blind due to a mysterious infection. The misery unfolds when a man stops the gear of his car because he suddenly goes blind, begging for someone to take him home. Although turning blind and contrary to the darkness of blindness, this man felt like "falling into a milky sea", seeing "everything white" (5). With such an unexpected incident, the unnamed blind man had no choice except

grabbing ahold the arm of the first person who offered help among the crowds. It seemed like the volunteer drove safely to the blind man's apartment. However, the blind man sooner learnt that his decision was fatally irrational when his wife assured that this volunteer stole their car, stating, "He took advantage of your confusion and distress and robbed us" (12). In the light of this crisis, the blind man's wife suggested consulting an ophthalmologist. In the doctor's surgery, the blind man clarified how he unexpectedly went blind. The doctor, though, did not detect the problem as the blind's man eyes seemed ordinary, with no defect, confirming, "I cannot find any lesion, your eyes are perfect" (15). Since white blindness is something infrequent as the blind man, "was plunged into a whiteness so luminous, so total, that swallowed up rather than absorbed, not just the colours, but the very things and beings ... making them twice as invisible", the ophthalmologist did not oblige a treatment (8). In a parallel scene, the car thief who accompanied the blind man faced the white blindness. Strangely, the doctor, and patients who visited the surgery went blind as well.

By the time the white blindness spread, the government detached the injured in an old mental asylum "to avoid any further cases of contagion, which once confirmed would multiply more or less according to what is mathematically referred to as a compound ratio" (36). When the ambulance arrived to deliver the doctor to the quarantine, the doctor's wife decided to

accompany her husband, assuming that she has "gone blind in the very moment" (35). Although the government prepared a place with special qualifications that fit for blindness like offering a "thick rope stretched from the entrance to the main door of the building", and ropes to locate right and left, the necessary demands for the blind were absent (38). The narrator describes, "no peroxide, no iodine, no plasters no bandages, no disinfectant, nothing the water from the tap was dirty, it took time to become clearer. It was lukewarm and stale, as if it had been putrefying inside the pipes" (49). Facing the sudden epidemic, the government could not help but promote rules to control the population. Therefore, its plan covered fifteen principles for regulation in the residence, including: a) death for those who leave the building without permission, b) laundry is the blinds' mission, c) telephone is used for emergencies like demanding supplies, d) food is served in the entrance three times a day, e) no firemen or doctors intervenes in the case of fire and illness, and f) the residents take over burying the corpses in the yard of the building. These rules outlines that the blinds must take a grip of themselves to find their way in the asylum. Thus, they formed a row of six members to examine the place as follows: the boy with squint, the girl with dark glasses, the thief, the blind man, the doctor and finally the doctor's wife.

Mainly, in epidemics, the individual's choice always determines the cooperation/non-cooperation of the others. In this case, it is *requisite* for

each individual to embrace every rational action to enable himself and the others to survive. But this is probably hard to apply regarding the social behavior which is barely characterized by rationality. As the thief sexually attacked the girl with black glasses, his irrational attempt was costly per se. His lead urged the girl with black glasses to hurt him, causing deadly wounds. Thus, the doctor reported to the authorities, "A person who has injured his leg has an infected wound, we urgently need antibiotics and medicines". However, "the orders are crystal-clear ... the only thing" allowed "is food" (60). If the blind were about to adapt with the shortage in washing products and medical care, the thief's behaviour complicated the situation. As the blind had to obey the instructions, they were compelled to bury the corpse of the thief, increasing the obstacles.

Unfortunately, the blind kept flowing in, hence, the wards were filled beyond its capacity. Thus, indignity befitted the blind and survival became a matter of life or death. To this effect, for the first time the doctor's wife – the only sighted person in the novel – realized the outcome of her choice. Hence, she "wished that she too, could turn blind, penetrate the visible skin of things and pass to their inner side, to their dazzling and irremediable blindness" (56). Chaos, assault, and onslaught have replaced the former being-in-a-row strategy. That is when the war broke out. The residents fought over beds and food with no shame. Their hunger blinded them against the fact that the asylum got dirtier every day. Sanctity disappeared

because men and women were jammed in the ward, that, it was impossible for anyone to move. Residents had no option except sharing the same toilet with no consideration of privacy. The narrator describes how the doctor struggles in such humiliated atmosphere, "he knew he was dirty, dirtier than he could even remember having been in his life. There are many ways of becoming an animal, he thought, this is just of them" (89). Ironically, the residents discovered that what happened was not their worst dream. Unfortunately, flagrant decisions were about to be taken, that was when the blind oppressors confiscated the food containers which the soldiers left in the entrance. Firstly, those oppressors demanded money in exchange for food, then they haggled food in exchange of women. Since "human reason and unreason are the same everywhere" in the novel, men of the ward agreed to sacrifice women for food. Thus, eight women including the doctor's wife volunteered. "For hours they had passed from one man to another, from humiliation to another, from outrage to outrage, exposed to everything that can be done to a woman while leaving her still alive" (137). This brutality caused the death of one of the volunteers, therefore, the doctor's wife finally neglected her abidance, delegating her sight to kill the leader of thugs. The blind, in turn, burn the asylum, escaping to the sighted world.

Outside the mental building, the world acted in no better position.

The whole country turned blind. The narrator maintains, "there are blind

people everywhere gaping up at the heavens, slaking their thirst There's no difference between inside and outside, between here and there" (221-229). Games of hunger which invaded wards in the asylum, was the least harmful compared to the whole country. The blind attacked shops, malls and supermarkets, then, they emptied the stands of food. Buses and vehicles were crashing on road sides. The streets were filled by rubbish and the shreds of humans. Dead corpses were dumped on the land. The narrator illustrates, "a pack of dogs is devouring a man's corpse. He must have died a short while ago, his limbs are not rigid, as can be seen when the dogs shake them to tear from the bone the flesh caught between their teeth" (248). In this ultimate chaos, the doctor's wife was able to pack up some food, heading to her house with six residents: her husband, the girl in black glasses, the old man, the boy with squint, the blind man and his wife. At home, she revealed to the residents that she can see. After washing up their faults and their bodies, the white blindness departed the eyes of the firstly blinded man, then the rest regained their sight with the same order they have lost it, then the whole community regained its sight, but probably, their vision remained blind.

Blindness: Gamesome Threats

Blindness generates a game of incomplete information between all the characters with a common factor: that all the players are blind. On the face of it, we think that infection is baffling the moves of the players in the game

as "the catastrophic plague of white blindness that befalls an unidentified region is frequently explicated as figuration for the irrational organization of contemporary societies" (Vieira 2). However, it is not true that blindness is the game's credible threat. Such weakness may lead to the game's defection, however, in the novel play is clung to the characters' ignorance towards dealing with the unforeseen. To prove it, Saramago released one of the characters from the abyss of blindness, "the ophthalmologist's wife, who for some inexplicable reason has retained her eyesight" (Nashef 210). Saramago's sighted woman has the privilege of withdrawing the game, predicting the moves of other players, and casting away loss. "Through her eyes, we are able to see what transpires within the walls of the asylum, a disintegration of the community and the dehumanization of the inmates" (Nashef 211). Nevertheless, because the community of blindness rests upon ignorance, neither sight nor blindness is prerogative. As the game progresses, it is curious to discover that the sighted woman has a singular defection for being the frail amongst players.

The first choice of the blind man, emanating from the unchosen blindness, draws the post decisions of the whole players in the novel. What follows is a paragon of the game between the blind man and the thief. Under the influence of blindness, the coveted game-theoretic logic resembles nothing. Thus, the thief took advantage of the other player's impotence and stole the car. The narrator explains, "if it's true that opportunity does not

always make the thief, it is also true that it helps a lot" (17). As the reader delves into the novel, he cannot excuse the blind man for his choice. In theory, blindness is a tense incident that impairs rationality, but in practice, the blind man has got different options up his sleeve like calling the police but he "pleaded", "Please, will someone take my home" (4). Another alternative is "the woman who had suggested a case of nerves was of the opinion that an ambulance should be summoned to transport the poor man to hospital, but the blind man refused to hear it" (4). According to his choice, the first blind man later is mortified by the fact that he is robbed. In the game, by offering help, the thief beheads the blind man's move, and with the support of complete information – sight – the thief is supposed to win the game. However, unbeknownst to him, the thief developed an infection.

The previous game controls all the upcoming outcome in the world of the narrative, using new inputs and threats. This time, all the characters lack information and sight, hence, playing a prisoner's dilemma game in which the person's rationality clashes with the group's rationality. Notably, the spread of blindness among characters, regardless of their positions and circumstances, confronts the reader with the fairness of such play. Equally, after turning blind, the characters are sheltered in the same asylum, struggling from food shortage and obscurity. Even the doctor, being a specialist, cannot gain a credit in the game due to the unfamiliarity of white blindness. He states, "a blind ophthalmologist is not much good to any one"

(18). As "blindness does not spread through contagion like an epidemic", the doctor hesitates to take responsibility of assuming that confidential matter (30). Yet, relying on his knowledge, he decides to "inform the health authorities, to warn them of this situation which might turn into a national catastrophe", an act which resembles the first and the last rational move the doctor adopts in the novel (18). The doctor's investigation takes one form: "the fact that I am now blind is because I examined a blind man" (33). According to this simplified description, "The ministry wanted to know the identity of patients who had been at" the doctor's surgery (33). Even in disasters, still, there must be rules for minimizing the damage; therefore, the government decides to limit the infection by setting a strategy. The narrator explains, "until such time as a treatment and a cure might be found ... all people who had turned blind, as well as those who had been found in physical contact or in any way close to the patient should be rounded up and isolated" (36). By doing so, the government chooses to cooperate with the population in a stag-hunt game, hoping for decreasing the damage of infection.

In the quarantine, advanced games apart from the original one arise between the whitely blinded players. The authorities have already established fifteen rules to regulate the communication between the blind. Yet, what really matters in applying a strategy is how players will engage rationally to it. Considering the threats of distrust, morals and human greed,

the characters construct a prisoner's dilemma game. Indeed, all of them want to obtain the best outcome, which is, surviving the epidemic before its spread peak. The doctor states, "We all heard the orders, whatever happens now, one thing we can be sure of, no one will come to our assistance, therefore we ought to start getting organized before this ward fills up with people, this ward and the others" (44). Then, without fail, they need to cooperate despite being trapped in the game. Here, the alternatives are infinite. One can cooperate, but not in active act. Some can choose non-cooperation, yet performing a reticent cooperative community serves their behalf. In such challenging game-theoretic sample, the player has to cooperate with the others in order to achieve an optimal outcome.

In the novel, the sentimental rejection towards the epidemic led the six blind men in the ward to fight instead of cooperating especially when the first blind man met his robber. Keeping in mind the trust dilemma that accompanies every game, the first blind man refused to cooperate. Although theft is a moral ignobility that cannot bring players to the table of cooperation, the characters, including the blind man, choose to cooperate at the end in a stag-hunt game. Now, perfect information supports the game, therefore, the players decide to discover the place and "locate the toilets" and "at last, they were all in a line" (47-48). Unlike the other cooperative members, the thief seized the opportunity to harass the girl with black glasses. That is why "the girl gave a backward kick as hard as she could.

The heel of her shoes ... pierced the flesh of the thief's bare thigh", causing his death in the end. For the thief, desire interferes with his rational calculation of the current problem. In the game-theoretic principles, irrationality violates the game, thus, the thief's behaviour invites the other players to break the cooperation.

In *Blindness*, it is ignorance – inside and outside the asylum – that dominates the game. For the characters and the government, though, blindness itself is unfortunate stance that undertakes decision-making. Their long-lasting capacity as a community is only threatened when the contagion of blindness appeared. In this deadlock, keeping your sight is the goal to be, that, by having the vision, you own the choice. Thus, apart from the six blind in the asylum, the remained nation and the government still have the excellence of perfect information in the game. Also, they can widen their options, changing the forced game, and invent possibilities.

In large, the governmental accommodation of infection was prominent at the outset, yet, lacking. The narrator explains, "the government was confident that it was possible to circumscribe the disease by confining the blind ... within specific area" (117). Nevertheless, the government left the blind in the mental building, providing neither clinical care nor medical supplies. As "Blindness was spreading ... like an insidious infiltration of a thousand and one turbulent rivulets", the government "hastilised medical conferences, especially those bringing together and neurologists", but in

vain (116). For the rest of population, ignorance and disobedience of warnings defy their chance to survive the epidemic. The narrator clarifies, "The worst thing is that whole families, especially the smaller ones, rapidly become families of blind people, leaving no one who could guide and look after them" (117). Even the only sighted woman did not try to use her skill to put herself on the top of the game. Because "the doctor's wife realizes that watching without being watched is essentially unethical. She rejects this position of power and embodies a vision opposed to that of the panopticon" (Vieira 10). Thus, her sight works against her as she was not able to cease the panic of sight. She tells her husband, "If only you could see what I am obliged to see, you would want to be blind" (127). Here, sight overlaps the game and blindness is a perfect strategy.

Completing the contradictions, the ward's capacity to contain the blind quickly reaches its limit, compounding the threat for all the characters. Notably, the increasing number of the blind in the ward from six to eleven to forty drives the game to its worst. The doctor's wife mentions, "the promised hell is about to begin ... these were the blind, driven like sheep, bumping into each other, crammed together in the doorways" (64). Impressively, each increase weighs against all players and deliberately expands the dilemma of distrust. Also, it subverts the rational order that regulates the fragile communication in the asylum. No drop of reason can stand the strain of hunger per se, a threat that kindles a game among fifty

residents in the asylum. The play turns into a stag-hunt as in this game, blindness matches no obstacle, manifested in the information that blind acquire about each other in the ward. Besides, the blind have openly accepted their fate for many reasons: a) they escape social judgment, b) their fear of infection diminishes over time, c) they are used to blindness unlike the newly blind and e) their blindness is an advantage that enables them to get their food in time. Having these gifts, cooperation achieves the best outcome for characters and "Errors can be avoided with an inclusive strategy that adds altruism to the context of communication" (Garbayo 11). However, a significant characteristic of stag-hunt games is, that cooperation is not dominant. Then, if the blind need to get an equal share, they must elect a group to manage the food supplies. At this point, some of the characters evoke chaos to take over the food supplies. The soldiers, in turn, shoot them. The narrator illustrates, "bodies lying in a heap, the blood wending its way sinuously on the tiled floor where it spread" (81). Since the players choose to move, albeit chaotically, cannot we regard this act cooperative? The short answer is unless the moves are rational, profit is unachievable, that the stag-hunt is more or less "a trust game ... in which it might be costly to signal to cooperate to others who do not want to cooperate at all" (Garbayo 119). Still, after knowing the result of their choice, the chaotic blind stick to their irrationality, they were "like hunted animals that await for opportunity to attack" (96).

Previously, the reader may forgive the characters' failure to adapt and choose strategically since no one can bear the threats of blindness, fear, hunger, dirtiness, lack of medicine, and isolation. The narrator reveals, "It would not be right to imagine that these blind people ... proceed like lambs to the slaughter ... There are some who cannot stop crying, others who are shouting in fear of rage, others are cursing" (105). According to game theory, *Blindness* is a game that plays on the character's' ability to cooperate and form strategic solutions despite the fact that they are blind. In the novel, if the government sets the rules of the game, then the perfect solution for the blind is electing a group to negotiate with the government. The government is already regulating food serving; therefore, hunger does not control the game as the blind think. In the actual context, the false legacy of greed urged soldiers to shoot the residents in a tit-for-tat game. The worst part is when the soldiers left the remained food containers at the entrance of the asylum. Now the threats vanished. This means, the end of the game. At this stage, what should be a breakthrough of the unfair game became a yard where vulgar games are played among the blind. Instead of putting a strategy to escape the asylum, two parties have been formed: the blind and the blind oppressors. The blind oppressors possessed the food supplies and adjusted new rules for communication. The narrator illustrates, "blind oppressors ... prefer to allow the food to go bad rather than give it to those who are in such great need" (154).

Supposedly, by owning sight, the doctor's wife has the advantage to obtain food, to save her husband and to escape the asylum especially after the soldiers who control the wards in the asylum left. Nevertheless, the doctor's wife agreed the blind thugs' deal which bargained the blind on money in exchange for food. The narrator mentions, "No great fortunes were discovered, but some watches and rings came to light ... The blind thugs received the payment with threats of harsh reprisals" (158). Here, game-theoretic questions arise regarding the choice of the blind. They possibly learn some lessons from their previous choices in the asylum, and they were in no pressure to participate in the game. Their refusal meant the ideal decision. Yet, they surprisingly accepted the deal with no sense of rational order. Although money enabled the blind to get food for a while, the blind found themselves trapped in another deal as the blind thugs suggest offering food in exchange of women. The narrator states, "After a week, the blind hoodlums sent a message saying that they wanted women. Just like that, Bring us women ... Unless you bring us women, you don't eat" (159). With incomplete information unraveled between the blind and the blind thugs, the game was modified into a prisoner's dilemma in which the personal benefit clashes with the group's benefit. In terms of moral dignity, undoubtedly, rape is inadmissible. According to game theory, it is strategically cracked, causing a catastrophic loss for the player. In the game of food/women, thugs may not share food even if women sacrifice

themselves. Furthermore, thugs must be warned about the blinds' revenge. Later, eight women including the doctor's wife accept cooperation with the thugs for the gain of food to the whole ward where "they passed from man to another, from humiliation to humiliation" (173). Besides abasement, failing the game was not the exclusive result for the women's irrational submission. Food shortage, brutal death, and ward's stigma cut the fruitfulness of their choice.

In recap, the very strategy that all characters abide by is blinding themselves by irrational choices. Although the variables of incidents create many alternatives for players to turn the game into their behalf, they committed illogical decisions. These flaws put the characters on the same levels, including those who own sight. In *Blindness*, the cooperation/noncooperation pattern is meaningless as the whole community enjoys a high level of ignorance. Notably, with sewing up vision, the sighted woman stands for a vivid symbol of the choice defection. Thus, we consider her the most irrational player amongst the blind.

Gouging the Berm of Knowledge: Herd's blindness

According to behavioural economics which is completely aware of the rational distinctions between judgment and real world unlike game theory, it is not surprising that the novel's characters opted for irrational moves. Much of the novel's development is based on the blind decision to

join the ignorant herd. With this thought, the doctor's wife chooses to accompany her husband to the asylum despite being disinfected. Her fear of violating the social contract represented in: women should sacrifice for their husbands makes her to step into the world of blindness. A social preference that grows on the land of sympathy and loyalty. In this case, the doctor's wife successfully followed the social law unaware of the hazards of such a choice.

In *Blindness*, the most explicit way to judge the validity of decision-making is the outcome. What distinguishes sympathy from irrationality is the proceedings of emotional control under risk. At the point of epidemic, as players, the doctor's wife so do the families of the blind need to create boundaries outside the game. As sympathy is a short-lived alternative in the face of disasters, to attain the perfect strategy, self-control is paramount for all the characters. In other words, the characters ought to prevent the spread of infection by saving themselves, furthering profit for themselves and the community. Nevertheless, since sympathy is a common-sense option in disasters, how could rational order rule? As a woman who follows the social preference of sympathy, the doctor's wife was reluctant to leave her blind husband alone in the asylum despite troubles. The doctor's wife comes under the concept of bounded rationality in which her rationality is bound to social limitations rather than optimization. For her, her husband's blindness is "a situation where it is impossible to optimize, or where the ... cost of

doing so seems burdensome", therefore, as a "decision-maker", she "may look for a satisfactory", albeit defected, "rather than optimal, alternative" (Simon 295). As a sighted woman, she satisfied the social duty by dressing, feeding and soothing her husband in the quarantine. She even bore "observing the behaviour of a number of human beings who did not even suspect her presence" (62). Also, she suppressed her rage regarding the asylum's dirtiness and the lack of human services. Moreover, against her will, she buried the thief's corpse after failing to cure his wounds. In this regard, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein suppose that "People adopt different strategies for making choices depending on the size and complexity of available options" (103). What the doctor's wife has not taken into account is using her sight to realize how defeated she is. She repeatedly overestimated her chance to escape just to remain part of the herd.

At this stage, the reader may ask: has the doctor's wife exercised her choice rationally?, and would the doctor consider the sacrifice of his wife? The answer is, in the doctor's view, his wife's sacrifice serves the needs of his blindness in a way or another, yet, it does not satisfy his masculinity. That is why he had an affair with the girl with black glasses. The narrator maintains, "lying on the narrow bed, they could not have imagined that they were being watched", that moment when the doctor's wife reveals her ability to see, telling the girl "I can see" (166-167). In our view, the doctor wife's defection stems from her first irrational choice to join the blind. The game

begins when the doctor's wife chooses blindness and "if you want to be blind, then blind you'll be" (122). After forgiving her husband, the doctor's wife accepted humiliation, rape and stigma. Her blindness fully takes shape when she killed one of the blind thugs.

In the time of catastrophes, the former social procedures are the obvious reference to decision-making architect. To this effect, the novel's government draws on "the ancient practice, inherited from the time of cholera and yellow fever, when ships that ships that were ... suspected of carrying infection has to remain at sea for forty days" (36). Turning to the current infection, the government offered a place that has "a perimeter wall", and "two separate wings" a residence of the blind. Also, the government prevented the direct communication between them and the services' providers. Nevertheless, because eyes reflect choice and because blindness is a social handicap, the government guessed that the blind were in no need of tidiness, water, beds or medicine. This theory, in turn, has ignited clashes over services among the blind in the asylum instead of cooperation.

Having authority, "governments can use the power of social influence to promote many good (and bad) cause" (Thaler and Sunstein 78). As blindness spreads, "members of the Government ... defend the idea that it was up to families to keep their blinds outdoors" (117). Dealing with infection, the behaviour of the population was a reduplication of the

authorities'. Rumors about blindness by sight, offense, chaos, accidents, food wars, monopolism, all these were the crowds' preferences. The doctor's wife states, "there is no water, there is no electricity, there are no supplies of any kind, this must be what chaos is" (241). So far, even within loss naturally "people follow one another", that one favors irrational nudge: turning blind together, than rational order: seizing the infection (Thaler and Sunstein 72). Notably, social preferences sometimes break into the easiest, least discomfiting solution for choice dilemmas. They magically rationalize the fallacies and legalize the deviation through illusions of familiarity and social laws. When a preference emerges, it automatically grabs another. In the novel, food as a human necessity activates the masculine preference of flesh. For social considerations, when the blind thugs bargain food for women, men in the ward find no wrong in sacrificing women as dignity will not fill the plates. Their act stems from the unwritten law of community that promotes women's abuse. They even ashamed the girl with dark glasses who used to work in prostitution, using stigma to convince her. The narrator illustrates, "Everyone in the ward thought it was nothing more than an act of charity that the girl with black glasses should have offered herself" (165). As for the other women, men's silence confirmed "the social background and personal disposition of the women who were rightly indignant" (160). To this effect, "the men tried to justify themselves ... it was only because costume demands that volunteers should be asked to come forward in

difficult and dangerous situations, and this one is undoubtedly is, We are all at risk of dying of hunger" (160). One of the married men declared that dignity has no price and his wife is not for sex. This manly pride disappeared when the volunteers decided to withdraw after a woman has died. Men in the ward urged the women to go again to the place where they have been humiliated and bring food for them and "some of them even came around to think that when all is said and done all women are bitches" (177). After all, by wearing the social law, men vindicate themselves from being lousy players.

The Speed of Dark: Threat's Appeal

Moon's *The Speed of Dark* elucidates how disability, especially autism, devalues the choices of the individuals, thereby limiting their roles in the community of ableists. The narrative tells the story of Lou, a high-functioning autistic who is desperate to gain awareness in a society where disability is a stigma. According to the community, autistics are considered freaks who need treatment. To this effect, doctors develop an experimental cure of autism, offering Lou a solution to leave the world of the disabled. Disability, though, resembles no burden for Lou. The fact that autistics do not belong to the standards of normalcy sets a greater barrier per se. Thus, the novel moves from a mere embodiment of autism to a severe choice dilemma in which Lou has to select between powerful disability or powerless normality.

From the first scene, the novel's plot distills into how to create a decision, inclined to nothing but social recognition. In response to the normal world, Lou, the main autistic character, struggles over winning the society's acceptance and the desire to maintain his specialty. As a high-functioning autistic who is able to see and solve patterns of bioinformatics, Lou targets superiority where he works. Thus, in exchange of this complicated job, a good salary, a car, an apartment, and psychiatric sessions are generously offered by the company. Lou mentions, "The symbols I work with are meaningless and confusing to people. It is hard to explain what I do, but I know it is valuable work, because they pay me enough to afford the car, the apartment" (6). To the community, autism, being a ground of abnormality, is a significant defect that necessitates monitoring. This desperate interest, however, is linked to the social disgrace of those who cannot get along with the society's rules rather than treating the syndrome.

Notably, the narrative's conflict grounded in the abnormality of autistics – is reflected in many occasions. Although acknowledging the varying aspects of autism, Dr. Fornum, Lou's psychiatrist, accustomed to social judgment, labels Lou as a retarded person. Lou illustrates, "She knows that I work on computer, she knows that I went to school, but she has not caught on that this is incompatible with her belief that I am actually nearly illiterate and barely verbal ... She talks to me as if I were a rather stupid child" (2). Similarly, the psychiatrist acquaintance and the society's

unawareness interact with autism, depending on one and only background of social norms. From the normal people's perspective, Lou's behaviours are subject to disorder even if they are normal like listening to music, falling in love, resting his muscles or fencing in the gym.

In some cases, it does not matter how much you behave like normal people, it is a must to be one of them. Facing the improper syndrome, the company reports Lou and his autistic colleagues about the new untested autism treatment. Mr. Aldrin, Lou's senior, states, "Lou, you need to know ... There's an experimental treatment that may reverse adult autism ... Our company bought the research Crenshaw wants all of you to try the new treatment" (43). According to the law, autistics are not obliged to experience the cure. Therefore, the local autism society holds a meeting to examine the consequences of this urgent matter. The autistics decide to refuse the treatment, explaining that they can manage their life the way they are. The autistics' rejection was not applauded by the company's president, Mr. Crenshaw who prefers enforcing the treatment. He explains his point of view, "you are not normal. You are autistics, you are disabled, you were hired under special provision ... You have to adapt ... You can't expect to get special privileges forever" (83). Crenshaw's confrontation is the primary threat Lou realized in his list of: reasons to be normal. Mr. Grensahw is careful not to mess with the law, hence, he "said he would be willing to keep" the autistics "on without the treatment if" they "gave up the support

services" (136). The essential goal Mr. Crenshaw aims at is proceeding the cure into an economic toll where publicity achieves profits as much as gains from donations. To this effect, the autistics decide to hire a lawyer, defending their civil rights. Unlike Mr. Crenshaw, Mr. Paul sees better benefits in firing Lou and his colleges because of their handicap, ordering the Human Resources to "arrange leave time" (160). Meanwhile, the company recommends Mr. Ransome to explain the treatment's function. He illustrates "What we're going to do is normalize the autistic brain, and then train it in an enhanced and faster version" (164). Since the data regarding treatment is fragmented, Lou realizes that, for the society, autism as a disability, is connected to inability to decide, hence the doctor wasn't quite concerned to explain the cure in detail. With limiting the options, the doctor and Mr. Crenshaw unsound the capacity of choice Lou has. That is when he asks how it looks like to be normal like others. Fearing rejection, being in the category of freaks according to the society's view, Lou decides to try the treatment. He tells, "I wonder if some of the people who came did not come because they wanted to be healed, themselves, but because other people wanted them to do so, to be the less of burden" (273). The company extends full compensation during the time of treatment, including promotions and credits. Lou, in turn, signs a contract of agreement regarding the cure. In the midst of the novel, Lou's questionable existence as an autistic is traced, after the treatment, that is, when he is finally able to formulate questions.

The Speed of Dark: Choice Rapidity

By and large, *The Speed of Dark* epitomizes the constraints of choice through two games: the prisoner's dilemma and the stag-hunt. The undeclared game between the autistics and the normal people is not actively played in the novel, but it underlies the players' moves. In this game, neither perfect information nor credible judgment governs decision-making and each party is the other's threat. While autism symbolizes nothing except a brain disorder, autistic people are often viewed as dangerous to society, retarded, and psychopaths. In view of the authority of society, the autistic lacks the will to participate as a decision maker, hence, his role is confined to being a façade for the game. On the other hand, the autistics believe in the abelists' inability to accept difference. Thus, non-cooperation remains the cyclic outcome of the game regardless of variables. In the novel, the exchange of information between Lou and the company, required a stag-hunt game where cooperation obtains the perfect outcome for Lou and the company.

Since the company needs to further its profit by converting the autistics into normal, gaining publicity and decreasing the economic load, it starts the game. Moreover, it calls for the players, offering the advanced cure for autism as an outcome. This profit is issued to Lou's deficiency of relating to the normal society. Thus, in terms of bargaining, Lou decides to enter the game. His high functioning autism puts him at the advantage of

extracting the maximum profit from such a deal. In any game, perfect information equalizes the profit portions among players. Each player can use this rule to choose strategically, whether by sharing or blocking information from the other players. In the novel, Mr. Crenshaw provides Lou with insufficient information about the treatment and its consequences, notifying him that the treatment is tested only on apes. Lou maintains, "I did not know apes could be autistic, but what they said was that autistic apes become more normal when they had this treatment" (143). Indeed, if Lou wants to make his line into the game, the whole truth about the cure should be exposed. Therefore, he examines the presented data from the company and Cambridge researchers, requesting more information from the charged doctor. However, the doctor responds, "I don't think that's a good idea, Lou. This is still proprietary – very confidential. If you want to know more you can ask me or your counselor questions and you can look at the slides again" (247).

So far, Lou's cumulative knowledge, that autistic perceives, curbs his strategy to share his thoughts with the doctor. As the doctor is utterly certain that autistic people cannot own a consciousness, he does not expect Lou to read books about the function of brain. To this effect, Lou senses the thin authorization regarding the cure. He illustrates the reaction of the doctor, "He sounded satisfied. I think he is glad I did not say I understood it" (247). To Lou, the doctor's behaviour is a reflection of the whole society

which oppresses the autistics. He maintains, "It reminds me of those therapists in the last century who thought they knew what words someone needed to know ... Some of them told parents not to let children learn other words, least it impede their learning of the essential vocabulary" (250). In view of circumstances, the rational order requires Lou to refuse the deal. That is when Mr. Grensahw bombs Lou's decision by the card of credible threat. The company expressed its desire to save money, hence, terminating the handicapped. Regardless of the threat, Lou is still able to survive by consulting a lawyer. The lawyer explained "the regulations that govern hiring and firing of handicapped employees", but Lou "did not know that the company got a tax credit for hiring ... dependent on the percentage of disabled workers" (287). This means that the company will try to complicate the game by suggesting new threats for the players.

Ironically, Lou's autistic role in the society adheres to rationality. He believes that his disability represents no obstacle for others, giving him the right of normal treatment. At the same time, his tension of being abnormal foils his willingness to decide strategically. He states, "Mr. Crenshaw thinks I am a burden to the company, but I do not believe this is true". He adds, "I am not lying beside a pool begging people to carry me into it. I am trying to keep them from throwing me into it. I do not believe it is a healing pool anyway" (273). Therefore, regardless of the company's announcement "that Mr. Crenshaw acted wrongly" and "that ... jobs are completely safe" (284),

Lou decides to try the cure. The fact that Lou is fed up with being abnormal, and frightened by what others think, makes rational thinking helpless at this point. To make a decision, no matter sensible or not, was Lou's primary concern. This kind of profit urged him to cooperate with the stag-hunters in the society. He maintains, "I think I may want to try this treatment. I think I am beginning to want to because maybe, if I change, and if it is my idea not theirs, then maybe I can learn what I want to learn and do what I want to do" (303). The welfare of decision-making and joining the universe of normality were dreamlike for Lou upon which he acted in the game. To our surprise, regardless of threats and compulsive play, in terms of profit, Lou's strategy works in the end of the novel, achieving a cooperative equilibrium.

Darkness: The Speed of Social Influence

In *The Speed of Dark*, we trace the society's persistent assertion, that, normality is the license for social recognition. Notably, the solid social order is entitled to set the standards of normality, represented in doing what others do, wanting what others want, and acting like others. In this light, Lou's autism does not qualify him to be on the ladder of social acceptance. Ensclosed in the category of abnormality, Is Lou really inadequate for the social qualifications? To the best of our knowledge, Lou works for a distinguished Pharmaceutical company, on the field of patterns. He is strict, systematic, honest and hard-working employee. His salary enables him to cover his personal needs, including laundry and grocery. He exercises,

listens to music, and obtains medals in the fencing club. Moreover, he has friends and colleagues. Still, these normal activities prevents Lou from belonging to the community of normal people. As an autistic, every act Lou embraces is socially unwelcomed form the ableist community. Even Dr. Fornum, being a specialist in the field of autism, forces Lou to behave like "a trained dog" (4). His abnormality irritates her, that, he mentions, "If she notices that I'm moving my head back and forth she makes a note in my record ... It is called stereotypy when I do it and relaxing her neck when she does" (3). Mainly, the vicious theory of the psychiatrist as well as the whole society – that autistics are illiterate, unstable, and socially inefficient – is grounded in the social preference of ableism. Following the social law that empowers the normal, Dr. Fornum's goal is confirming her superiority as a normal person rather than treating the deficit. Thus, her questions always revolve around endorsing the disability of autistics as Lou illustrates, "My sex life is none of her business. She is the last person I would tell about a girlfriend ... But she doesn't expect me to have one; she just wants to document that I do not" (4).

In fact, the society rejects disability with the premise that it grants the autistics effortless advantages, unlike the abelists. Compared to Lou, the chances of getting an apartment, a car, and financial insurance fade gradually if you are not an autistic person "gym, and private office ... music, and ... ridiculous decorations – you can be normal and there's no

need for that" (83). By offering these privileges to the autistics, we might misunderstand the company's generosity of: autistics' empowerment. Yet, hiring the handicapped decreases the tax credit. The underlying strategy of the company aims at profit, hence utilizing the disabled, whether by promotion or experimental subjugation. To save money, Mr. Grensahw suggests an untested autism treatment to the autistics, stating that "It's supposed to fix the fundamental deficit, make them normal. If they were normal, they wouldn't have an excuse for those luxuries" (15). Crenshaw's decision has a reference to the opportunist social heritage. During Lou's journey, doctors and researchers exploit his disability as well. He maintains, "My parents decided that the group was more interested in doing research papers to get grant money than in helping children" (47). Just like the researchers, Mr. Crenshaw tears Lou's rationality by threats of termination and social stigma.

At many levels, we used to record Lou's apathy towards social interaction and involvement, then how society defiles his rationality? According to behavioural economics, social influence, only, is required to limit the capacity of decision-making, which is known as bounded rationality. Under the social nudge, Lou developed a desire to follow others. He mentions, "I try to imagine myself as a child, a normal child, chattering away with family and teachers and classmates that someday I would be able to do what everyone else did so easily ... The only role I play is

normal" (151). One might think that the social element, cannot, in any possible way, shapes choice especially if Lou owns the alternatives to exit the game. Yet, preferences are a complex base of social leverage that exercises pressure through layered variables. Sometimes, it works through degradation by empowering ableism over disability. Sometimes, it is masked by determinism like those who convinced Lou that "disabilities were God's way of giving people a chance to show their faith" (176). The reader may argue the religious interpretation of autism to be among the threats that constructs Lou's choice. Yet, Lou never acknowledges his disability as God's grant or punishment. Conversely, he is fully aware that autism is a reform of mishaps. He clarifies, "I do not think I am autistic because God thought my parents needed a challenge or I needed a challenge. I think it is like if I were a baby and a rock fell on me and broke my leg. Whatever caused it was an accident" (176). Since "normal people care for normal people", one can conclude that Lou's participation in the experiment, stems from his willingness to join the party of winners. The party which asks questions, sets decisions, and points the finger at abnormal. Thus, he invested his choice in the circle of society, having the weapon of normality and preference.

Conclusion

Generally, in *Blindness and The Speed of Dark*, the outbreak of diseases whether epidemical or syndromic often puzzles the crux of decision-making. Under risk, rationality is ruined by elements of panic and non-strategic management. In *Blindness*, the characters discovered that delusion occurred because of their ignorance rather than infection. Thus, they missed the opportunity to construct fruitful choices. Armed with social preferences, they tied up the loose manacles of the game and while solutions were lucid, they blinded the strategies and failed to surpass the conflict. In *The Speed of Dark*, The main character's choice is centralized on the avoidance of social judgment. He saw the negative side of being an autistic in a society where autism is retardation. Therefore, knowing that he has no future in such a community, he accepted participating in the social game. Although Lou achieved the perfect outcome, the advantage he gained is confined to evading the anxiety of abnormality. Since social preferences are used out to overthrow the doctrine of choice by offering temporary gains, Lou only proved the efficiency of the cure, but autism remained a lag.

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