

الملف الوثائقي

موقف الأردن من انفصال الجمهورية العربية المتحدة ١٩٦١م "قراءة في الوثائق البريطانية"

أ. د. عبد الحميد عبد الجليل شلبي

أستاذ التاريخ الحديث والمعاصر - جامعة الأزهر

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تعد الوحدة المصرية/السورية (١٩٥٨-١٩٦١م) أحد أهم التجمعات الوحدوية التي شهدها العالم العربي في التاريخ المعاصر ، وما إن لاح فجر هذه الوحدة حتى حيكت ضدها المؤامرات ، وخاصة من بعض القوى التي كان يزعمها التوسع في النفوذ المصري ، وحينما ظهرت التجاوزات في دولة الوحدة ، تعاوتت تلك القوى مع القوى المعادية للوحدة في الداخل من أجل إجهاضها وتقويضها ، حتى جاءت اللحظة التي أُعلن فيها الانفصال المصري السوري ليلة ٢٨ سبتمبر (أيلول) ١٩٦١م.

وكانت عدة تنظيمات سرية في الجيش السوري قد تكونت للعمل على إنهاء الوحدة عددها البعض بأربعة تنظيمات هي: تنظيم حيدر الكزبري ، وتنظيم عبدالله الشيخ عطيه ، وتنظيم أكرم ديري ، وتنظيم عبد الكريم النحلاوي ، وقد استطاعت جماعة من الضباط القيام بالحركة الانقلابية ليلة ٢٨ سبتمبر (أيلول) ١٩٦١م وكان على رأسهم عبد الكريم النحلاوي ، وحيدر الكزبري ، وقبل أن يحل مساء ذلك اليوم أُعلن رسمياً عن خروج سوريا من الجمهورية العربية المتحدة.

وكان للمملكة الأردنية الهاشمية بقيادة الملك حسين بن عبد الله موقف من قيام الوحدة عام ١٩٥٨م ، وآخر من الانفصال عام ١٩٦١م، وقد تأثرت تلك المواقف بالإطار العام الذي تحكم في العلاقات المصرية الأردنية في تلك الفترة وهي ما يمكن أن نطلق عليها فترة الحرب الباردة العربية ، إذ قامت الأردن وبإيعاز من الغرب بتأسيس ما يعرف باسم الاتحاد الهاشمي بين المملكتين الهاشميتين في الأردن والعراق وذلك رداً على قيام ج.ع.م. ، ولكن سرعان ما قامت الثورة العراقية في يوليو (تموز) ١٩٥٨م واعتراف ج.ع.م. بها مما أدى إلى إفشال الاتحاد الهاشمي ، وبالتالي إلى التوتر في العلاقات المصرية الأردنية.

وعبثاً جرت عدة محاولات لتتقية الأجواء بين مصر والأردن منذ عام ١٩٥٩م وحتى عام ١٩٦١م تخللتها أزمة اغتيال رئيس وزراء الأردن هزاع المجالي في إبريل (نيسان) ١٩٦٠م ، حيث اتهمت المملكة الأردنية ال ج.ع.م. بتدبير الحادث ، ومع

بداية عام ١٩٦١م حدثت إنفراجة جديدة في العلاقات بين البلدين سرعان ما تدهورت بسبب أزمة الانفصال .

ومما لا شك فيه أن مظاهر الود والتقارب التي كانت تشوب - أحياناً - العلاقات المتوترة بين مصر والأردن كانت تُخفي وراءها تحركات وتحركات مضادة من كلا الدولتين ، كان من أبرزها تحرك الأردن ضد دولة الوحدة ومحاولة إفشالها بحجة أن مصر تتدخل في السياسة الأردنية ، وقد رصدت الوثائق البريطانية - عن طريق السفير البريطاني في عمان - الموقف الأردني من الوحدة ثم الانفصال ، فأشارت إلى أن رئيس وزراء الأردن "هزاع المجالي" قد ألمح في يوليو عام ١٩٦٠م أن الأردن سوف تستمر في مهاجمة ج.ع.م. حتى تتوقف الأخيرة عن الهجوم عليها ، وأن الأردن في مجال الدفاع عن نفسها "سوف تضرب عبد الناصر في أكثر الموضع المأ بالنسبة له " ، - وهو يلمح إلى ضرب مصر في سوريا - وبذلك يتضح أن فكرة ضرب عبد الناصر في سوريا لم تكن وليدة عام ١٩٦١م.

كما كشفت الوثائق محاور الدعاية الأردنية ضد حكم عبد الناصر في سوريا وحددتها في ثلاثة محاور ، أولها الدعاية ضد الحكم العسكري المصري الظالم الذي يقبض على سوريا بيد من حديد مستخدماً رجالاً مستهترين كأداة لتحقيق ذلك ، وثانيها الدعاية بأن عبد الناصر أصبح - دون أن يدري - أداة للشيوعية ، أما المحور الأخير فهو التأكيد على أن خط القومية العربية الحقيقي بدأ منذ قيام الثورة العربية وليس بادعاءات عبد الناصر الكاذبة منذ ثورة يوليو عام ١٩٥٢م المصرية ، وركزت الدعاية على فكرة سوريا للسوريين ، وكانت الدعاية الأردنية تردد عبارة موجهة إلى السوريين تقول : "تذكروا أنكم عرب، تذكروا أنكم أحرار" .

وفيما يخص اتصالات الأردن المباشرة بالانفصاليين ودعمهم بالأموال فقد أشارت الوثائق إلى معلومات متضاربة بهذا الشأن ، فبينما تشير بعض التقارير إلى أن الملك حسين لم يكن لديه معلومات عن طبيعة الحركة ولا الأشخاص المتورطين فيها ، أشارت تقارير أخرى إلى أن الملك حسين قد اتصل بقيادة الانفصال فور وقوعه ، وهذا يعني معرفته المسبقة بمن قام بهذا الانقلاب.

وعقب وقوع الانفصال عقد الملك حسين اجتماعاً في ٢٩ سبتمبر مع عدد من الشخصيات الأردنية على رأسهم بهجت التلهوني "رئيس الوزراء" ، ورئيس الديوان ، وقائد القوات المسلحة ، وأشارت الوثائق البريطانية إلى هذا الاجتماع ، وذكرت أن الملك حسين أعرب عن سعادته لرؤية الشقيقة سوريا وهي تستعيد وضعها الحقيقي كقلب للعروبة ، ورائدة للقومية العربية الحقيقية. ، وقد قررت الأردن في هذا الاجتماع الاعتراف بالحكومة السورية الجديدة.

وعن رؤية وتقدير السفير البريطاني للموقف الأردني من الانفصال وخاصة الاعتراف بالحكومة السورية الجديدة ذكر السفير البريطاني في عمان أنه توقع اعترافاً أردنياً سريعاً بالوضع الجديد في سوريا معللاً ذلك بأن الطائرات الأردنية كانت تمر بالأجواء السورية ، وأن هناك مصلحة أردنية في هذا الاعتراف، وقد ناقش السفير البريطاني مع المسؤولين الأردنيين، وعلى رأسهم الملك حسين ورئيس وزراء التلهوني، أمر اعتراف الأردن السريع بالانفصال فأكد له التلهوني أنه اتصل بالحكومة السورية الجديدة واقتنع أنهم سيطرون تماماً على الأوضاع ، أما الملك حسين فقد ذكر للسفير أن اعترافه السريع بالوضع الجديد في سوريا لم يكن بأسرع من اعتراف عبدالناصر بانفصال الاتحاد الهاشمي عام ١٩٥٨م حينما اعترف بالثورة العراقية .

وكما ساندت الأردن الانفصاليين بالفعل ساندته أيضاً بالقول وبإصدار البيانات المؤيدة للانفصال، فتشير الوثائق البريطانية إلى أن الملك حسين قد ألقى خطاباً في أكتوبر (تشرين أول) عام ١٩٦١م كرس معظمه للثناء على الانقلاب وتأييده ، ومما قاله في هذا الشأن : " إن هذه الخطوة التي حدثت من جانب سوريا تعبير حقيقي للحرية ، للشهداء الذين أراقوا دماءهم ، هؤلاء الشهداء لم يقدموا أرواحهم وحياتهم من أجل بعض الأشخاص الذين يؤلهون أنفسهم ، رأينا في سوريا معنى حقيقياً تجاه الوحدة العربية التي لم تقم على الخوف والإرهاب" ، وهو يعني بذلك أن الهاشميين الذين قدموا أرواحهم من أجل سوريا منذ الثورة العربية الكبرى عام ١٩١٦م لم يقدموها لكي يأتي عبدالناصر وأمثاله ليتصرفوا فيها كأهنة.

أما الدور الأخطر في الموقف الأردني من الانفصال فهو التحرك العسكري

الأردني على طول الحدود مع سوريا ، حيث تسلمت الخارجية البريطانية معلومات موثقة بأن وحدات من الجيش الأردني قد تحركت جهة الشمال تجاه الحدود السورية ، وأن السفير البريطاني حينما استفسر عن ذلك تلقى معلومات من الجيش الأردني مفادها أن قوات قد تحركت صوب الحدود مع سوريا ، وأن مهمتها دفاعية بحتة ، وأن مقاتلتين أردنيتين تقومان بدورية كل ساعتين بطول الحدود الأردنية ، وكانت وجهة نظر الملك حسين في هذه التحركات أنها تخدم الثورة السورية ، وأن هذه التحركات تعتبر رادعاً مهماً للقوات المصرية إذا حاول عبد الناصر استخدام القوة لإعادة الوحدة مرة أخرى ، وأعلن الملك حسين أنه على استعداد لمساعدة السوريين إذا استدعت الضرورة ذلك .

وبعد نجاح الانفصال تشير الوثائق إلى أن الملك حسين قد أرسل مبعوثاً من لدنه إلى قادة الانفصال فنقل إليهم المبعوث رغبة الملك في قيام اتحاد بين سوريا والأردن ينضم إليه العراق في المستقبل ، وأوضح الملك حسين للسفير البريطاني أن السياسيين السوريين شغوفون لعقد علاقات وثيقة مع الأردن ، وأن هناك مباحثات جادة من أجل عقد وحدة فيدرالية بين الأردن وسوريا ، ولكن لم تكن هذه المحاولات سوى مجرد اجتهادات من الملك حسين الذي لم يستطع الحصول على ثقة الانفصاليين .

ولم يتوقف الدعم الأردني للانفصاليين عند هذا الحد بل قامت الحكومة الأردنية وعلى رأسها الملك حسين بالدعاية لهذه الحركة وحث القوى الغربية وعلى رأسها الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وبريطانيا لتأييد هذه الحركة، فيذكر السفير البريطاني في عمان أن الملك حسين قد استدعاه ونظيره الأمريكي ليخبرهما بأمر الانقلاب ، وأن الثوار قد سيطروا على حلب ، وأنه يتوقع إعلان الحكومة الجديدة في تلك الليلة - ٢٨ سبتمبر - وحثهما على ضرورة إعطاء الثورة التأييد والمساندة. وظل الملك حسين يلح على السفيرين في هذا الأمر موضعاً لهما أن اعترافهما بالنظام الجديد في سوريا من شأنه أن يؤدي إلى بناء الثقة داخل سوريا نفسها ، وأن ذلك سوف يساعد الحكومة السورية الجديدة ، كما أن موقف بلديهما سوف يشجع الدول الأخرى على أن تحذو حذوهما في الاعتراف بالوضع الجديد في سوريا .

وعلى أية حال فإنه على الرغم من هذا التأييد الأردني اللامحدود للانقلابيين في سوريا إلا أن السفير البريطاني في عمان والذي كان على اتصال شبه دائم بالملك حسين إبان الأزمة يصف العلاقات السورية الأردنية بقوله: "أنه من الصعب أن نصف العلاقات السورية الأردنية بأنها ودية".

وإذا كانت لنا كلمة في هذا الشأن فنقول بأن الابتهاج الأردني بالانفصال كان له ما يبرره على الأقل بالنسبة للحكومة الأردنية حيث كانت تمني النفس بأن يفتح الانقلاب الباب أمام التعاون الأردني السوري في كافة المجالات وخاصة المجال الاقتصادي ، وأنه - أي الانقلاب - كان من الممكن أن يُحي فكرة سوريا الكبرى ، أو فكرة الهلال الخصيب كحل لمستقبل الأردن السياسي .

ويمكن القول أن الموقف الأردني من الانفصال قد تأثر بعوامل عدة لا يمكن إنكارها أو إنكار بعضها على الأقل ومنها:

- الأطماع الأردنية (الهاشمية) في سوريا .
- التوتر في العلاقات المصرية الأردنية.
- تلاقي المصالح الأردنية مع نظيرتها الغربية لأن ج.ع.م. كانت تشكل خطراً وتحدياً لدولة إسرائيل حليفة الغرب.

والله من وراء القصد

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTF

DEPARTMENTAL
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Norris

No. 576
July 13, 1960D. 11.28 a.m. July 13, 1960
R. 12.17 p.m. July 13, 1960

VJ1036/12

CONFIDENTIALAddressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 576 of July 13.
Repeated for information Saving to Washington Cairo
Jerusalem

Your telegram No. 111 Saving: Jordan/U.A.R.

I saw the Jordan Prime Minister on July 12 and spoke accordingly.

2. Hazza had received a letter reporting Sir Roger Stevens' conversation with the Jordanian Ambassador. He took the line that the Jordan Government was the aggrieved party because Nasser's Alexandria speech had torpedoed the truce proposal. They would, therefore, continue to attack the U.A.R. until the U.A.R. stopped attacking them. The Jordan Government had no intention of intervening in Syria, but one means of defending themselves was to hit Nasser where it would hurt most; so long as the U.A.R. continued in their propaganda to promote Palestinian separatism and incite Jordanians to murder the King, the Jordan Government would continue their broadcasts to Syria.

3. When I asked whether he foresaw the campaign of mutual abuse continuing indefinitely, he said they proposed to seek a show-down at the Arab League Foreign Ministers' meeting next month. They would begin by attacking Hassoona who, if he were a real Secretary General of the Arab League and not an instrument of U.A.R. policy, should have intervened to settle this quarrel. They would denounce the U.A.R. concept of Arab solidarity which left the U.A.R. alone free to interfere in the affairs of other Arab States, and he expected that Jordan would be supported by Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and the Sudan. Although Jordan had no diplomatic relations with Iraq, he expected the Iraqi Government would also support this view.

/A. S. Hazza

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAmman telegram No. 576 to Foreign Office

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4. Hazza said that the enthusiastic reception of King Hussein on his recent tour of the provinces, and the demonstrations against Nasser which they met with, showed that Nasser was failing to stir up trouble here. On the other hand, the fact that the U.A.R. Government were asking Mr. Hammarskjöld and the Americans to intervene to stop the propaganda war (as Hazza claimed they were doing) showed that the Jordanian counter-attack was hurting Nasser.

5. As you can see, the Prime Minister has an exaggerated idea of the effectiveness of Jordan propaganda and thinks that he is winning the war. The Syrian border was closed for a few hours last week ostensibly on account of military manoeuvres, but even this does not seem to have reminded the Jordan Government of what they have to lose if the U.A.R. Government re-imposed sanctions.

6. The United States Ambassador has, without any special instructions, deplored the propaganda war to both King Hussein and the Prime Minister during the last two weeks, but with no more encouraging response in either case.

Foreign Office please pass saving Washington as my telegram No. 78.

[Repeated as requested]

DISTRIBUTED TO:

Levant Department
 Eastern Department
 African Department
 Arabian Department
 Information Policy Department
 Information Research Department
 News Department

P P P P

CONFIDENTIAL

(10312/347)



British Embassy,

AMMAN, UJ1034, 1161

November 14th, 1960.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Department,

In view of Arthur's minute enclosed with Wright's letter No. 1012/60 of October 18 to Beith, we think it may be useful to give you an idea of the tone of Jordanian radio propaganda and in particular that against Syria.

2. The general propaganda against Nasser takes three lines. The first is that he is an ambitious Egyptian military tyrant holding Syria in a grip of steel, using unscrupulous men as instruments, and prepared to stoop to almost any means to hold his position, with the undertone that he himself may be honestly devoted to Egypt's interests. The second line, a favourite one of the King and the Prime Minister, is to argue, more in sorrow than in anger, that Nasser has become an unconscious tool of communism; and the third is to emphasize that the legitimate line of Arab nationalism descends from the Hashemite inspired revolt of 1917 and not, as Nasser falsely claims, from the Egyptian Revolution of 1952.
3. In the programmes specifically intended for Syria the whole emphasis is on the dignity of Syria as an independent Arab country and on exposure of the present subordination of Syria to Egyptian interests. The programmes are essentially factual, picking out an individual instance of tyranny every day: for example, the taking of protection money by Egyptian appointed provincial governors (names, dates and actions of victim given) or regulations which have the effect of making only Egyptians eligible for government and teaching posts and the like. Jordanian propaganda contains no suggestion that Jordan is working for a Hashemite Greater Syria; it appears to be directed towards the emergence of a Syrian Syria with a government friendly but not necessarily subservient to Jordanian interests: hence the reiteration of the theme "Remember that you are Arabs, Remember that you are free". The word "Hashemite" simply does not occur in the main programme to Syria.
4. Jordanian propaganda programmes are couched in very correct Arabic. They use about three stock terms of abuse, though even these would not cause raised eyebrows in polite circles, and in general their language contrasts very favourably with the language of the gutter used by their opponents. Jordanians who would prefer to have their government remain silent make this distinction. Many Jordanians also single out the programmes addressed to Syria as more effective than the others.
5. We are sending copies of this letter to Chancery, Cairo and to the Regional Information Office, Beirut.

Yours ever,

CHANCEY

Levant Department,
The Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Henniker Major

No. 798

September 29, 1961

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES
29 SEP 1961

P. 1.25 p.m. September 29, 1961

R. 1.52 p.m. September 29, 1961

IMMEDIATE

EJ 1072/6

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 798 of September 29.
Repeated for information to Cairo (priority),
and Saving to Washington.

Following is text of statement issued by official Jordan Press Bureau.

Amman, September 29, King Hussein presided over a meeting held at the Royal Diwan this morning. The meeting was attended by Prime Minister Bahjat al-Talhouni, the President of the Upper House, the President of the Lower House, Sayid Said al Mufti, the Rais of the Royal Diwan, members of the Cabinet and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. After the meeting the Prime Minister declared that His Majesty, the King had given full attention and consideration to reports received regarding the blessed revolution in Sister Syria. The Prime Minister added "the King, Government and people of Jordan are pleased to see Sister Syria reassuming her genuine position as the heart of true Arabism and the pioneer of true Arab Nationalism". The Prime Minister concluded his statement by saying "in accordance with directions of His Majesty, the King and after perusal of the detailed statements broadcast by the Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command in Damascus, the Council of Ministers decided to recognise the national revolution in Syria and to send telegrams of congratulations and support to the Revolutionary Command and to the new Prime Minister".

Following is the text of the telegram sent by Prime Minister Talhouni to the Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command in Damascus:

"Jordan, which has always considered immortal Syria as the stronghold of Arabism and whose leader and King has devoted himself to the service of the glorious Arab nation, is pleased to see her valiant Sister reassuming the status which it has maintained for long periods and becoming, as it should be, the song of glory and of the
/true

ARABIC TELEGRAM NO. 137 TO WASHINGTON

-2-

true pride of the Arabs and the pioneer of true Arab nationalism. While expressing to you sincere congratulations and wholehearted support, I wish to convey to you the fact that Jordan takes pride in your blessed revolution and gives her absolute support to Sister Syria. May God give you success and grant our Arab nation strength and eternity".

(Sgd) Bahjat al Talhouni Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Following is the text of the telegram sent by the Prime Minister to the new Prime Minister of Syria.

"Dr Ma'Moun al Kuzbari, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence, Damascus.

Now that the revolution of the Arab people and victorious army of Syria has succeeded and that immortal Syria has reassured her genuine status as the pioneer of true Arabism, it gives me the pleasure to convey Jordan's official recognition of your Government to Your Excellency and to wish you and your colleagues every success, your noble people and army everlasting strength and invincibility, and the Arab nation glory and sovereignty".

(Sgd) Bahjat al Talhouni, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Washington as my telegram No. 13.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Lord Privy Seal
Sir F. Hoyer Miller
Sir R. Stevens
Head of Eastern Department
Head of H.E.A.D.
Head of News Department

(10316/20)

CONFIDENTIAL



29 OCT 1961

EI 1073/2

British Embassy,
AMMAN.

October 14, 1961.

My dear George,

I still remain a bit puzzled by the King's rather extraordinary volte face over our attitude towards the recognition of the Syrian Government which I reported in my telegram No. 875. He was certainly pleased by your message, and probably even more so because the Americans announced recognition without even informing their Ambassador in advance; Macomber was told the news by the Prime Minister at a cocktail party. But this, nevertheless, does not explain everything.

2. He took the line with the American Ambassador, when he talked to him after the event, that this was a matter over which the Jordanian and American Governments had disagreed. No harm had come of this in the event and it was better to forget it and look to the future. To me he merely said that he thought we had done very well. I think that, as I suggested in my telegram, he may have been pleased that we had given no vestige of an excuse for Nasser to be provoked, and that Nasser's withdrawal of his troops from Kuwait immediately after our departure should therefore open our eyes to his true character. In part, I think, the King's reaction was in keeping with his nature. He was, when I went to see him, most excited by a new crisis over Kuwait, and this had largely expunged the previous one from his mind. Moreover, in this new crisis he was likely to want to work closely with us, and he was not going to let a difference - which, as it turned out, had been unimportant - impair our relations over this problem. There may also, if he did at any time even have any vague thoughts of taking his troops out of Kuwait, have been an element of guilty conscience.

3. I do, however, permit myself the hope that he may even have realized that we were wise, and that the advice which the American Ambassador and I gave him on the first night of the Syrian crisis, namely, that the best way of helping the Syrian Government might not be to 'step into a public embrace, had some force. It is perhaps also not by us alone that he will be given some lessons in wisdom. It seems to me that Dr. Husbari's attitude and actions, which appear to have been eminently wise, may also have given him pause. After all, the Syrian Government's first action vis-à-vis the Jordanians was to ask them to "take their nasty troops away", and there are other indications that the Syrian reaction to Jordan's first joyous overtures was not so warm as the Jordanians had hoped. I have, furthermore, been told that when the Jordanians proposed sending a delegation to congratulate the new Syrian Government in Damascus, the latter replied that they would much rather that they did not do this, but would, in their turn, send a delegation to Jordan.

4. I have detected in the King's attitude a hint of uncertainty

/su

G.F. Miller, Esq., D.S.O.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.

as to whether the Syrians were as pleased with him as he thinks they ought to have been. He has frequently said to me, in the hope I think of getting reassurance, that he is sure that they are very grateful to him. There is also some slight evidence that the King may be coming to see things in rather a new light.

5. The first Jordanian reaction to Dr. Kuzbari's speech setting out his 14 points concerning unity between the Arab States does not seem to have been favourable. But when I referred the matter to the King the other day, he said that he thought that the speech was in fact a very wise one. It was true that he at first reacted unfavourably to references to non-alignment and co-existence which are anathema to him, but he had realised the wisdom of the Syrians in steering a careful course to avoid the accusation that they had jumped out of Nasser's clutches into the embrace of "Imperialists". This shows just a ray of hope that the King may be becoming a little more aware of the political facts of life in this part of the world than he has shown himself hitherto.

6. As regards Dr. Kuzbari's speech, my Head of Chancery happened yesterday evening to meet a delegation of German journalists who had just come from Damascus, where they had been in close touch with the new Minister of Health who was educated in Germany and who has a German wife. He told them that the reference in the 14 points to closer federation with another state was not, in fact, intended to refer to Jordan at all, as is, I think, confidently supposed here, but to Iraq.

7. I am sending copies of this letter to Chanceries in Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo and Damascus.

James

John Humphreys Major


(J.P.E.C. Hepfifer-Major)

CONFIDENTIAL



(10316/23/61)

My dear Leonard,



British Embassy,
Amman.

December 2, 1961.

There is much talk in Amman, heavily laced with Schadenfreude, about the failure of the attempt by King Hussein and his Government to win the friendship of the new régime in Syria. It is being said, and of course with justification, that the eager offers of support and assistance, and in particular the gratuitous (and unwanted so far as the Syrians are concerned) offensiveness of Jordanian anti-Nasser broadcasts on the subject of Syria have embarrassed the Syrians and forced them to be more unfriendly than they would otherwise have been. They were ready to be friendly with all Arab countries, but when the régime in Jordan sought to identify itself with the revolution, the Syrians had to demonstrate their independence by being ostentatiously cold and even unfriendly.

2. A story which has gained much currency here is that Colonel Naider Kuzbari has been arrested; and that this with what is supposed to be the dismissal of his brother as Prime Minister, represents a defeat for a pro-Jordanian group in Syria. Whatever the truth of these rumours, there is one incident that has certainly caused strain in relations between the two Governments. An Amman merchant of Syrian origin, called Subhi Halabi, has been travelling a good deal between Amman and Damascus since the coup. He is well connected with Talhouni and possibly King Hussein; (I gather that he left money in the past to King Talal); and when Mahmoud Kuzbari visited Amman last summer, it was in connexion with a lawsuit in which he was acting as Halabi's lawyer. Delati, the former UAR Counsellor here, who has just come back as Syrian Ambassador, says that he met Halabi in Kuzbari's office a day or two before his return to Amman. Subsequently, - this was about two weeks ago - Halabi was arrested by the Syrian Army in Deraa whilst travelling from Damascus to Amman. He is still in custody, and enquiries made by Delati at the instance of the Jordanians have only elicited the reply that in due course the Syrian Army will hand him over to the civil authorities and prefer charges against him. The only possible reason for Halabi's arrest (other than a deliberate intention to offend the Jordanians) that we have heard is that he has in the past had links with Colonel Sarraj. Whatever is behind it, the incident has irritated Talhouni.

3. Incidentally, the latter told the Ambassador the other day he thought Baathi influence amongst the younger officers in the Syrian Army was strong; but that he reckoned that, if Kuzbari were not elected President, Nazim el Qadai was the most likely candidate.

4. So far as we know, the Jordanians have stuck to their policy of non-intervention in the Syrian elections. However, without warning to the Jordanian security authorities, the Syrian-Jordan frontier, as well as the Syrian-Lebanese frontier, was closed yesterday on election day. This seems to indicate suspicion on the part of the Syrians that Jordan interference was expected.

5. I am copying this letter to Guy Clarke in Damascus.

W. Morris
W. Morris
 (W. Morris)

L.C.W. Figg, Esq.,
 Eastern Department.

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(EJ 1022/9)

Foreign Office,
London, S.W. 1
December 11, 1961

We have been somewhat disturbed at the indications we have received that the Jordanians were proposing to pursue a forward policy in Iraq, e.g. John Henniker's letter of November 5 (1013/163) to me. It seems to us that:

- (a) the Jordanians' activities to which I refer in my Top Secret and Personal letter of today's date to you are likely to become known to Qasim;
 - (b) although Qasim enjoys little positive support he still has a strong security apparatus and may continue to last;
 - (c) there is little support for the Hashemites in Iraq.
2. There seem to be two dangers in the situation:
- (a) the risk that Qasim may think that we and the Americans are in collusion with the Jordanians and may as a result take an even tougher attitude towards Western interests in Iraq;
 - (b) the risk that any Jordanian action will be ill-conceived or bungled, with unfortunate, even disastrous, consequences:
 - (i) Jordanian covert action now is probably more likely to help Qasim than to encompass his downfall;
 - (ii) a Jordanian overt intervention in Iraq following on a coup could provoke a major Middle Eastern crisis and might even cause some form of Russian active intervention;
 - (iii) Jordanian overt intervention in Iraq might, if not immediately successful, open the way for an Iraqi attack on Kuwait, especially if the Jordanian force in Kuwait advanced into Iraq. The Iraqis would probably have their hands too full to think of attacking Kuwait but one cannot entirely discount this risk.
3. In earlier discussion with the Americans about possible developments in Iraq (see correspondence resting with my letter of March 5 to you) we had come to the conclusion that our objective in the event of disturbances in Iraq should be to try / to enforce

D. J. Speares Esq.,
British Embassy,
Washington

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to enforce a policy of non-intervention by outside powers, although an exception might be made in the case of intervention by Arab powers if the communists looked like gaining the upper hand in a civil war in Iraq. Despite the suggestion in Baghdad telegram No. 1591, there seems at present little danger of this and we remain strongly in favour of a hands-off policy.

4. It seems to us that we and the Americans should pursue four objectives:

- (a) as part of our general policy of non-involvement to be completely neutral towards any plans which King Hussein may have for some form of Arab confederation of states within traditional or conservative rulers;
- (b) to dissociate ourselves as completely as possible from Jordanian activities directed at Iraq, even at the cost of some loss of intelligence about Jordanian intentions;
- (c) to try to convince King Hussein of the advisability of not intervening in any way in Iraq whether before or after a coup. This action could be taken either if the King broached the subject or on the two Ambassadors' own initiative if they thought it desirable. We must, however, expect that such exhortations may have little effect on the King;
- (d) to consider what means of pressure are open to us to restrain King Hussein if a coup takes place and he is tempted to send troops into Iraq. In doing so we must, however, bear in mind the need not to forfeit King Hussein's goodwill in connexion with the defence of Kuwait.

5. We will have to be careful in the arguments which we use with the Jordanians since we do not at this stage want to become involved with them in any discussion of the balance of power in the Middle East or of the internal situation in Iraq, and still less of contingency planning in relation to Iraq. It looks therefore as though we must confine ourselves to:

- (a) saying to King Hussein that we are firm believers in a general policy of non-intervention since we think this offers the best hope of promoting peace and stability in the area; we can add that one lesson we can draw from Nasser's experience is that the meddling by one Arab country in the affairs of another is liable to be counter-productive;
- (b) speaking to him in general terms of the very grave Middle Eastern and probably world crisis which the armed intervention of one Arab country in a civil war in another would provoke; this would have been applicable to the case of Syria, as well as to Iraq.

6. If a revolution followed possibly by a civil war took in Iraq we would have to use more concrete arguments and would feel less inhibited in doing so than at present. The following seem some of the arguments we might use:

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- (i) para 5 (a) above: There is little support for the Hashemites in Iraq. Jordanian intervention might rally the Iraqis behind Qasim (cf. the harm which Nasser did himself in Iraq during the period after the Baghdad revolution when he was actively meddling in Iraqi affairs) or behind the left-wing faction if Qasim were no longer there; military action against Iraq would be difficult and a setback disastrous;
- (ii) para 5(b) above: such a crisis might easily cost Hussein his throne, if not his life.

We would, however, probably have to rely on pressure as well as argument to deter the King.

7. We should be grateful if H.M. Ambassadors at Amman and Baghdad would telegraph any comments they may like to make. We should particularly welcome Henniker's assessment of:

- (a) the likelihood of the Jordanians actively pursuing a forward policy, as distinct from just talking about it;
- (b) the means of pressure open to the Americans or ourselves which are likely to be most effective in restraining King Hussein if the need should arise.

In the light of these comments we will probably ask you to have an exchange of views with the State Department. We should like this to be restricted to the problem of how to restrain the Jordanians if necessary, and we would prefer not to embark on a review of the internal situation in Iraq. I imagine this will be in line with the State Department's views (cf. para. 3 of Hood's letter of May 2, 1960, to Roger Stevens (1004/6/600) not to all.

8. We are bearing these problems in mind in connection with King Hussein's forthcoming meeting with Ministers in London but we will probably not take the initiative in raising them except perhaps in general terms.

9. I am copying this letter to John Henniker in Amman and to Roger Allen in Baghdad.

(G. P. Miller)

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FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sypher/OTF

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Henniker Major

VS 1014/73

No. 782
September 28, 1961D. 10.23 a.m. September 29, 1961
R. 11.00 a.m. September 29, 1961PRIORITY
SECRETAddressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 782 of September 28.Repeated for information to: Cairo Tel Aviv
Beirut Baghdad
P.O.N.E.C. (Cyprus)
Jerusalem Damascus
and Saving to: Washington.

Syria.

Events in Damascus seem to have taken Jordanians completely by surprise. I mentioned recent developments in Syria when I saw the King on September 24, but found him strangely ill-informed and apparently not very interested. He said that he could only sit and watch events. My United States colleague, who saw him later, found him more concerned, but not really excited.

2. I have been told by the Army that Jordanians are moving troops to frontiers purely as defensive and precautionary measure. Two fighters are on patrol every two hours well within the Jordanian frontiers and the Air Force is in constant readiness from dawn to dusk. Army Chiefs had a meeting this morning attended by King Hussein. The Army are naturally alarmed but seem quite calm.

3. I think that if coup is completely successful or a complete failure the Jordanians will stay out. If it is indecisive and there is fighting they will be sorely tempted to intervene, and if they are invited in, might find temptation almost irresistible, though their unpreparedness might make it difficult for them to do so in time.

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Japan telegram No. 782 to Foreign Office.

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4. I am in close touch with the United States Ambassador, who is asking to see the King later today. We shall decide in light of his interview whether I should also seek an audience.

Foreign Office please pass to Tel Aviv 67, Baghdad 101, P.O.H.E.C. (Cyprus) 87, Jerusalem 76, Damascus 15 and Saring to Washington 42.

[Repeated as requested]

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SECRETFROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cyphen/GTF

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTIONMr. Henniker-Major
No. 784
September 28, 1961D: 1.15 a.m. September 29, 1961
R: 1.28 a.m. September 29, 1961IMMEDIATE
SECRETAddressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 784 of September 28.

Repeated for information to:	Washington	Cairo
	Beirut	PONEC (Cyprus)
	Damascus	Baghdad
and Saving to:	Jerusalem	

My telegram No. 782, paragraph 4, and your telegram No. 6959-[✓]
to Washington.

United States Ambassador saw the King this afternoon, when the King was under the impression that movement had failed. He told His Majesty that he and I had discussed the situation and that he was speaking on behalf of both of us, since we did not have any information beyond that contained in Beirut telegram No. 834 and did not wish to disturb him separately. *10/1/58*

2. He found the King almost without any information about nature of movement and personnel involved. He thought that His Majesty, though disappointed with latest information from Damascus, was in a relaxed and sensible mood. The King said that he had cancelled precautionary move of troops towards the frontier, since this now seemed likely to serve no purpose. In response to Macomber's enquiry he said that if he did move troops it would be purely for defensive and policing purposes, and agreed that Ambassador could assure his Government to this effect.

3. After hearing later Damascus broadcast saying that rebels had assumed control, the King telephoned again to Macomber saying that he had again ordered precautionary move of his troops. He asked to be given any further information which might be received, and said that he found the situation very nerve-racking. Macomber's general impression was that the King was not anticipating any precipitate action.

4. I am reporting separately such information about troop movements as we have been able to get. Air Adviser tells me that Air Force has been stood down tonight and that he has no indication that any further action is contemplated.

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FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

C. Her/OTF

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITSHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Henniker Major

VG 1016/44

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No. 736
September 28, 1961

D. 3.18 a.m. September 29, 1961
R. 3.50 a.m. September 29, 1961

IMMEDIATE
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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 736 of September 28.

Repeated for information to: - Washington - Tel Aviv
- Bahrain - Ankara - Beirut
- Cairo - Baghdad - Tehran
- P.O.M.S.C. (Aden) - UKMIS New York - Kuwait
and Saving to: - Damascus - Jerusalem.

My telegram No. 736, VG 1016/63

The United States Ambassador and I had decided that no purpose would be served by my seeing the King tonight to urge restraint unless we had further information that Jordanians were contemplating action.

2. The King however summoned us to say that his information was that Aleppo had gone over to the rebels and that they were now in control of the whole country. Sarraj had, he understood, left for Switzerland, and he did not think that there was any serious prospect of Egyptian counter-action. In these circumstances he expected that a new government would be announced tonight, and he urged that they should be given encouragement and support.

3. We said that it was fortunate that this had not been brought about by outside interference, and that there had not even been any suggestion of this. We thought that precipitate public support and recognition would tend to counteract this impression. The King agreed and said that the Syrians appeared to have behaved with great restraint and self-confidence. He was still in the dark about the composition of the movement, but said that he understood that it consisted of Nationalist parties and was anti-Communist.

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29 SEP 1961

SECRETAmman telegram No. 786 to Foreign Office.

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4. I have little doubt that the King will in fact recognise any new régime quickly. It may indeed be difficult for him not to do so, since any aircraft coming to Jordan need to overfly Syria, and the land approach through Syria is still very important.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington 86, Ankara 8, Baghdad 103, Tehran 27, Bahrain 49, P.O.M.E.C. (Aden) 22, Tel Aviv 68, UNRIS New York 37, Kuwait 58 and Saving to Damascus 19 and Jerusalem 41.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Lord Privy Seal

Sir F. Hoyer Miller

Sir R. Stevens

Mr. Crawford

Head of Eastern Department

Head of E.S.A.D.

Head of News Department

Resident Clerk

VVVV

SECRET

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTF

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITTHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Henniker-Major

No. 782
September 29, 1961D. 2.21 a.m. September 29, 1961
R. 2.30 a.m. September 29, 1961EMERGENCY
SECRETAddressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 789 ofSeptember 29.

Repeated for information to:-	Ankara	Baghdad
	Bahrain	Washington
Beirut	Kuwait	Tehran
Cairo	P.O.M.E.C. (Aden)	Tel Aviv
U.K. Mission New York		
And Saving to:-	Damascus	
	Jerusalem	

My telegram No. 786 of September 28.

Having promised to exchange any further information with His Majesty I sent the First Secretary to see his Private Secretary tonight to discuss list contained in your telegram No. 1031.

2. The King was present, and told the First Secretary that he was at that moment trying to telephone the Revolutionary Command in Damascus. He proposed to tell them that he was ready to recognise their Government. He commented that he thought it of paramount importance that the revolt should not now falter, since this would create chaos in the area with everyone intervening.

3. He then withdrew only to return some minutes later to say that he had spoken to the Revolutionary Command. They assured him that their one desire was to maintain good relations with all other Arab States, and said that they were grateful that he should have been the first to contact them. They added that concern was being caused in the frontier area by Jordanian troop concentrations and that he could best help by withdrawing them. He undertook to do so, and assured the First Secretary that he had already issued orders to that effect.

4. The First Secretary took the opportunity to tell the King

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Amman telegram No. 789 to Foreign Office

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that, though we appreciated reasons for His Majesty's elation at the turn of events, he must realize that any speedy action in respect of recognition and encouragement for a new government would be difficult for us. His Majesty took the point.

Foreign Office please pass Priority to Ankara, Baghdad, Bahrain, Washington, Kuwait, U.K. Mission New York, P.O.M.E.C. (Aden), Tehran and Tel Aviv and Saving to Damascus as my telegrams Nos. 9, 104, 50, 89, 59, 38, 23, 28, 70 and 20 respectively.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Lord Privy Seal

Sir F. Hoyer Millar

Sir R. Stevens

Mr. Crawford

Head of Eastern Department

Head of N.E.A.D.

Head of News Department

Resident Clerk

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 FROM ADMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Henniker Major

No. 802

D. 10.11 a.m. September 30, 1961

September 29, 1961

R. 10.58 a.m. September 30, 1961

PRIORITYCONFIDENTIALAddressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 802 of September 29.


Repeated for information to:

Washington	Beirut	
Tel Aviv	Baghdad	
Cairo	FOMSC (Aden)	FOSEC (Cyprus)

My immediately preceding telegram. — ٧٩ (016)

As Samir Rifa'i was present at the meeting of elder statesmen held by the King to decide on the recognition of Syria, I called on him this morning to ask him for his views. When I suggested that recognition had been dangerously precipitate, Samir said that he had no doubt that it was the right course. He had not, in fact, been consulted since the King had clearly already made up his mind, but all the evidence seemed to indicate that the new Government was in full control of the country. He knew several of its members and regarded them as efficient, modern, and progressive and he thought it an excellent sign of stability and confidence that the military had handed over at once to civilians. He was quite confident that, unless he was mad, Nasser would not try to counter-attack.

2. His only criticism of the King was that yesterday's troop movements were theatrical and unnecessary, and he was glad that the first act of the new Syrian Government had been to ask him to take them away from the frontier. I asked him what he expected to happen if Nasser did counter-attack, and the Jordanians were asked for help. He said that neither he, nor, he thought, any responsible Jordanian politician, would think it right not to respond at once to such a request. He did not seem to see any danger in this since he felt that Nasser would have no / chance whatever

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Amman telegram No. 802 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

chance whatever of success. He said he had, in fact, ceased to worry about the Syrian situation and thought that the rigging of the elections (see my telegram 794) was a much more serious matter.

Foreign Office please pass Washington 92, Tel Aviv 73, Baghdad 107, POBEC (Aden) 26 and POBEC (Cyprus) 92.

[Repeated as requested]

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S E C R E TFROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITWALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Kenniker-Major

No. 816
September 30, 1961D. 4.12 p.m. September 30, 1961
R. 5.15 p.m. September 30, 1961IMMEDIATE
SECRETAddressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 806 of September 30.

Repeated for information to Kuwait	Beirut
Bahrain	Baghdad
Washington	FO/SC (Cyprus)
Tel Aviv	FO/SC (Aden)
Cairo	

My telegram No. 303 (not to all).

I had a long talk with the Prime Minister this morning. I said that I had been somewhat worried about the risks involved in immediate recognition of new Syrian Government. The Prime Minister said that he had been aware of a concern about these risks. He had, however, before agreeing to recognition been himself in touch with the new Syrian Government and had satisfied himself that they were in control and were reputable, moderate and representative. He knew many of them personally, and could assure me that they would have no inclination to turn to the Russians. Most of them were moderately right wing, and apart from the experienced politicians, the remainder were experts and technicians in various fields. He spoke particularly warmly of the Prime Minister and the new Minister of Finance, who are well known to him personally. He also knew some of the officers concerned, who were entirely non-partisan.

2. He had expected that the Egyptians would at least break off diplomatic relations with Jordan and was glad that they had not yet done so.

3. He added that he had been disturbed by reports of BBC broadcasts and of the attitude of the British Press on the situation.

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Amman telegram No. 806 to Foreign Office.

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These seemed to him to disparage the new regime unnecessarily and to show undue distress at the turn of events. He showed me a report in the Press to the effect that the BBC had indicated that the new Government might well turn to the Soviet Union. He said that he always admired our normal restraint and lack of emotion in such matters. He also fully recognised that any official comment had to be cautious and that we would have to move slowly and carefully over such matters as recognition. Indeed, he welcomed this because it provided no excuse for accusations of our complicity, but he thought that we should at least adopt a neutral and factual attitude. He was worried lest the Syrians should feel that they had to answer some of the BBC statements and that one of their first acts might, therefore, be to appear to quarrel with us. This might turn them in the wrong direction.

4. He added that he had also heard comment to the effect that Her Majesty's Government were worried about the effect of recent events on the force in Kuwait. He could not understand why we should be so worried. There were few Egyptian troops there and the position of the other contingents would be unchanged. Such statements merely caused uneasiness and might well have some disadvantageous effect on the force.

5. We ourselves have no means of (? gp. omitted) whether the Prime Minister's statements are justified, but we did hear yesterday a BBC commentary in English by Erskine Childers which seemed to us to err in the direction he suggested. A commentary on the General Overseas Service at 1109 hours today coupled fulsome praise of Nasser with a statement that "the Jordanian Government's precipitate decision to recognise the Syrian rebels might well lead to internal disorders in view of popular support for Nasser here." I, of course, told the Prime Minister that we had no control over the sentiments expressed by the BBC or Press.

6. I also took the opportunity of saying to the Prime Minister that I hoped that the Jordanians would not use this opportunity to re-start the propagan&a war with Cairo. Nasser's speech yesterday had indicated that he was prepared to accept the situation, and an attempt to answer the fairly mild attack on Jordan would only tend

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SECRETAmman telegram No. 206 to Foreign Office.

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to rub salt into his wounds and perhaps provoke him. The Prime Minister said that he entirely agreed and proposed to call the director of the broadcasting station in order to instruct him to moderate his comment which has shown some signs of becoming provocative. He agreed with me that Jordan could afford, in these circumstances, to adopt a reasonably generous attitude.

Foreign Office pass to Kuwait No. 61, Bahrain No. 53, Washington No. 94, Tel Aviv No. 76, Baghdad No. 109, FO&C (Aden) No. 28 and FO&C (Cyprus) No. 94.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Lord Privy Seal
Sir H. Stephenson
Mr. Marcet
Head of Eastern Department
Head of H.S.A.D.
Head of News Department
Resident Clerk

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