



بحوث قسم اللغة الإنجليزية



Clusivity Marking and Cognitive Frame Construction: a Critical Review

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Abstract

This is a theoretical overview of two of the most recent issues in cognitive linguistics. The first is an old term with new understanding; a new broadened concept which had been studied traditionally, but it has been given new horizons in cognitive linguistics and its applications on critical discourse analysis. This concept is clusivity. The second concept is cognitive frame construction. It is concerned with cognitive processes reproduced in the minds of text-consumers as a result of specific linguistic structures. Cognitive frame construction, as a linguistic tool, utilizes Tamly's (1988, 200) theory of force dynamics in order to figure out how specific linguistic structures are used to frame an event, phenomena or even any object. Both of these two concepts are the offspring of the recent developments in the relationship between language and cognition. While Functional Linguistics is considered "speaker oriented" and "process-focused", Cognitive Linguistics is "hearer-oriented" and "pattern-focused". Cognitive Linguistics is concerned with interpretation-stage analysis, rather than the previously widely used and appreciated description-stage, in CDA. The reader/ text-consumer was not theorized. In

cognitive linguistics, the reader/ text-consumer will be. The ideological mental representations, the reader/ text-consumer develops in response to specific structures in text, will be investigated.

الملخص

إشارات التضمنين وبناء الإطار المعرفي: مراجعة نقدية

تعد هذه الدراسة ملخصاً نظرياً لاثنتين من أحدث القضايا في علم اللغة المعرفي. يعد الأول مصطلح قديم ولكن يتم طرحه بفهم جديد وموسع، تمت دراسته من قبل بشكل تقليدي، ولكن تم إعطاؤه في الآونة الأخيرة آفاقاً جديدة في علم اللغة المعرفي وتطبيقاته في تحليل الخطاب النقدي. يتمثل هذا المصطلح في مفهوم التضمنين *clusivity*. يتمثل المفهوم الثاني في بناء الإطار المعرفي. يهتم هذا المصطلح بالعمليات المعرفية التي تحدث في أذهان قارئ النص وذلك نتيجة لتراكيب لغوية محددة. يستخدم مفهوم بناء الإطار المعرفي، كأداة لغوية، نظرية تاملية Tamly (1988، 200) لديناميكيات القوة Force Dynamics من أجل معرفة كيفية استخدام الابنية اللغوية المحددة لتأطير حدث أو ظاهرة أو حتى أي موضوع. يعد كلا المفهومين نتاج التطورات الأخيرة في العلاقة بين اللغة والإدراك. بينما تهتم اللغويات الوظيفية بمن ينتج الخطاب وتتركز على عملية إنتاج الخطاب، فإن اللغويات المعرفية تهتم بمن يتلقى الخطاب وتتركز على أنماط التلقي. يهتم علم اللغة المعرفي بتقديم التفسير، بدلاً من الوقوف عند مرحلة الوصف التي سبق استخدامها وتقديرها على نطاق واسع في مجال تحليل الخطاب النقدي. لم يكن قارئ النص جزءاً نظرياً في التحليل. ولكن في اللغويات المعرفية، سيكون لقارئ النص دوراً هاماً. سيتم دراسة التصورات العقلية الأيديولوجية، التي يطورها وينتجها قارئ النص استجابة لأبنية لغوية محددة في النص.

1. Introduction

Not too long ago, in Critical Discourse Analysis, Cognitive Linguistics has recently made great progress. But this Cognitive Linguistic Approach has been limited to Critical Metaphor Analysis, as in the works of Charteris-Black (2004), Koller (2004), and Musolff (2004). The main argument of Critical Metaphor Analysis is that metaphorical expressions in text reflect and effect underlying construal operations which are ideological in nature (Hart, 2011:269). Though, metaphor is just one type of construal operation known in Cognitive Linguistics (Croft and Cruse 2004, in Hart, 2011). Several others may also be ideologically significant and contribute to the realization of discursive strategies.

In Fairclough's (1995) model of discourse and discourse analysis, most attention has been given to description-stage analysis. Although Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics has provided the methodology for ideological research in text analysis, not enough attention has been given to interpretation-stage analysis (Hart, 2011:270). As Fowler (1996: 7) regards 'the reader simply is not theorised'. In this regard, O'Halloran (2003: 14) maintains that 'much of CDA suffers from a paucity of appreciation of language cognition'. Hart (2011:270) states that this gap in research becomes prominent as "the successful communication of ideology depends on cognitive processes reproduced in the minds of text-consumers". He

(2011:270) questions how Cognitive linguistics, which emerged around the same time as Critical Linguistics and clearly examines the relationship between language structures and cognition, was not widely used in critical discourse research until recently.

While van Dijk uses a cognitive perspective in CDA (e.g. 2001, 2002), Cognitive Linguistics is not considered a main characteristic of his approach. Cognitive Linguistics is not a single field. It includes of cognitive science and linguistics. It believes in many assumptions; including that grammar and semantics are both based on the same general processes as other domains of cognition, that linguistic knowledge is conceptual in nature and cannot be separated from non-linguistic knowledge, that meaning is based in experience, and that language serves to construe experience (Hart, 2011:270).

The Cognitive Linguistic Approach to CDA is concerned with investigating ideological patterns not only in text, but also conceptualization. Hart (2010) states that Cognitive Linguistics in CDA will go beyond Critical Metaphor Analysis to form a wider but coherent Cognitive Linguistic Approach which includes aspects of Cognitive Grammar, Mental Spaces, Frame Semantics and Force-Dynamics.

Cognitive Linguistics is mainly concerned with conceptualization. Conceptualization is a dynamic cognitive process through which meaning is constructed. While

Functional Linguistics is considered “speaker oriented” and “process-focused”, Cognitive Linguistics is “hearer-oriented” and “pattern-focused”. In this way, it can be said that Cognitive Linguistics is concerned with interpretation-stage analysis in CDA. Text-consumers are encouraged to develop ideological mental representations in response to specific structures in text, which define their perception of the phenomena described, and Cognitive Linguistics can model these mental representations. Furthermore, Cognitive Linguistics is interested in the same phenomena that are studied in CDA. For example, Cognitive Linguistics looks at how basic categories like space and time, situations and events, entities, actions and processes, motion and location, force and causation, and intention and volition are structured within language and cognition (Fauconnier 2006).

These categories structuring involves ‘construal’. The concept of construal refers to the fact that the same phenomenon can be conceptualized in many different ways. Linguistic structures in text consequently reflect the text-producer’s own conception of reality. The concept of construal in Cognitive Linguistics, then, is in line with CDA, according to which, representation in text is ‘always representation from some ideological point of view, as managed through the inevitable structuring force of transitivity’ (Fowler 1991: 85).

For Cognitive Linguistics, the concept structuring system is a number of ‘construal systems’ or ‘operations’, including metaphor and force-dynamics, which are

responsible for conceptualization (Croft and Cruse 2004). These concept structuring systems offer ‘a range of alternative structural characterizations, among which a speaker chooses so as to convey a particular conceptualization of a scene’ (Talmy 2000: 214). Construal operations, then, are indexed in text and invited in text-consumers to provoke ideological cognitive representations realizing discursive strategies.

Several typologies of construal systems have been proposed and different labels applied. Hart (2011) therefore presents a typology of construal operations drawn from Croft and Cruse (2004) and shows how they serve to realize three types of discursive strategy which he calls ‘identification’, ‘framing’ and ‘positioning’. The following table (1) summarizes the typology.

Process Strategy		Attention	Comparison	Perspective
		Identification / Framing	Construal operations	Profiling/ backgrounding
Metonymy				
Scalar Adjustment				
	Categorisation			
	Metaphor			
Positioning				Deixis
				Modality

Table (1) Construal operations and discursive strategies (Hart, 2011)

Identification strategies concern which social actors are represented (explicitly or implicitly), and in which roles. For example, those construal operations based in attention can de-focus or de-individuate certain social actors. Identification strategies, then, include those that fall under ‘mystification’ in Critical Linguistics (Fowler et al. 1979; Kress and Hodge 1979). They also include what Hart (2011) calls ‘scope of reference’ as categorization can be used to identify a certain set of social actors while excluding others as the subject of a predication.

Framing strategies concern how an entity, action, event, process or relation, through categorization and metaphor, is attributed particular evaluative qualities or structural properties. Framing strategies therefore include negative-Other presentation (van Dijk 1997).

Identification and framing appear in the same box because wherever there is explicit identification the choice of referring expression necessarily frames the actor(s) in some particular way by evoking associated evaluative scripts. And because identifying participants in particular roles assigns to them particular qualities.

Positioning strategies can be deictic, epistemic or deontic and concern the positioning of social actors/events in relation to one another (deictic) and the positioning of propositions in relation to one’s conception of reality (epistemic) or morality (deontic). Positioning strategies,

then, include proximization and legitimization as discussed by Cap (2006) and Chilton (2004).

2. Clusivity Marking

2.1 Introduction

The concept of clusivity refers to various aspects of inclusion and exclusion linguistically represented in discourse. It is a new concept. It has been the subject of a number of linguistic studies (Filimonova: 2005). These studies were mainly concerned with clusivity markers investigated in the different branches of linguistics as morphology, syntax, semantics, as well as, pragmatics and cognitive linguistics.

The majority of these traditional studies investigate clusivity as a grammatical category, thus limiting its scope. Wiczorek states that the new approach to clusivity is, however, greatly extended to include and examine cases of cognitively construed and linguistically represented association and dissociation, which requires an interdisciplinary approach coming from different fields, such as pragmatics, cognitive studies, sociolinguistics, psychology and sociology, all of which contribute to a better understanding of this concept (2013). This pragmatic-cognitive model will enable analysis and explain discursive representation of inclusion and exclusion in terms of conceptual location given to various discourse entities in discourse space (Chilton 2005).

2.2 The Foundations of Clusivity

Political discourse is a rich source of strategies as legitimizing self and delegitimizing other and enhancing polar opposites of “us” and “them.” Thus, positive self-image and negative-other image are to be found when there is a struggle for power. The construction of oppositions between “us-good people” and “them-bad people” is an inherent component of any discourse contains a struggle for power and “in which discursive representation of reality depends on positive self-image and negative other-image” (Wieczorek: 2013:1).

Wieczorek (2013) states that there are four main foundations to the notion of clusivity. A brief account of these foundations will be given in the following section. This will help to clearly understand this notion.

2.2.1 Legitimization and De-legitimization

Legitimization and de-legitimization are essential in the discussion of clusivity. Many researchers define legitimization as a process of attaining the state of legitimacy, i.e. the state of being commonly accepted on the grounds of abiding by the rules, norms and values shared within a given group (a society, a national minority group or a political party). The process of legitimizing makes a particular concept, idea, decision, etc. acceptable since it

provides an explanation to persuade people that what has been done or decided to be done is really “good” and “right” (Wieczorek, 2013:2).

Van Leeuwen (2007) provides a taxonomy of legitimation categories which accounts for how the concept of legitimization may be used in political discourse. Van Leeuwen (2007) proposes four categories i.e. authorization, moral evaluation, rationalization and mythopoesis. These categories are used strategically by the speaker as either fully separate mechanisms or in combination with each other in order to legitimize the speaker’s stance and decisions, as well as delegitimize those his opponents. These categories are

1. Authorization refers to legitimation achieved via “reference to the authority of tradition, custom, law and of persons in whom institutional authority of some kind is vested” (van Leeuwen 2007: 92).
2. Moral evaluation refers to legitimation achieved via “reference to value systems” (2007: 92), by means of discursive representation of the set moral values and ideology.
3. Rationalization refers to legitimation achieved via “reference to the goals and uses of institutionalized social action, and to the

knowledge society has constructed to endow them with cognitive validity” (2007: 91). It provides justification for the decisions taken and events “by reference to their goals, uses and effects” (2007: 91) and thus is often presented in terms of a cause-effect relationship.

4. Mythopoesis refers to “legitimation conveyed through narratives whose outcomes rewards legitimate actions and punish non-legitimate actions” (2007: 92) and whose potential is to provide comprehensible explanation, or an illustration of complex argumentation.

Chilton (2004) views legitimization as a broad concept which inherently includes coercive practices and provides the basis for legitimacy of particular actions and decisions. Coercion, in this way, is inherent in both the legitimization of self and in the de-legitimization of other. De-legitimization and legitimization are two extremes on the same scale. According to Chilton, these extremes are similar to the concept of face, i.e. they “may coincide with positive face (being an insider and legitimate) and negative face (being not only an outsider and thus not a legitimate member but also under attack)” (2004:46). De-legitimization assists the negative presentation of others. It will encourage exclusion by means of blaming, excluding, and attacking the moral character of some individual or group. Legitimization, on the other hand, assists the positive

presentation of self. It will encourage inclusion by means of positive self-presentation, and self-justification (2004: 47).

2.2.2 Social and psychological foundations

The need to belong is among the most essential human needs. Human social life depends on relationships with others as a way of looking for and keeping both belongingness and inclusion. But these relationships also force limits on people. These limits depend on inclusion of individuals, and exclusion of others.

Assigning in-group and out-group status to individuals is among the duties of social and political leaders who have the power to perform these actions. Hogg et al. state that leaders tend to distinguish between their subordinates “favoring some over others by developing more rewarding interpersonal [relationships] with some than with others” (2005: 197). Therefore, some in-group individuals have more peripheral while others more central positions in the group. In this regard, Abrams et al. (2005) state that social inclusion and exclusion is not directly connected to the evaluation of an individual’s personal characteristics, but rather to their characteristics expected in situations and cases of intergroup contact.

2.2.3 Exclusion

Wieczorek (2013: 12) states that both inclusion and exclusion are ways of creating, managing and maintaining relations inside and between groups. Exclusion depends on differences regarding geographical location, religion, or ethnicity. In this regard, Abrams et al. (2005, cited in Wieczorek: 2013:13) distinguish different levels of exclusion:

1. Societal Exclusion, where special individuals are consensually excluded from a society,
2. Institutional Exclusion, where institutions select specific groups to regulate standards for both group association and dissociation practices,
3. Intergroup Exclusion, where groups create strong separation lines to improve their distinctiveness from other groups, and
4. Intragroup Exclusion, where groups create standards by which members can define themselves as fully legitimate members.

2.2.4 Inclusion

Identification with groups contributes to the development of the sense of self, which leads to positive self-evaluation and affects individuals' perspective, values, feelings and actions, and relations with others. Hogg et al. suggest that the human need to be part of a group adds to the whole positive image of self and the in-groups, which

“provide one with a sense of certainty about who one is, how one should behave, and how others will react” (2005: 199).

All these foundations establish the basis for a linguistic analysis of pragmatic-cognitive mechanisms behind the representation of clusivity in political discourse. This multidisciplinary approach to the concept of inclusion and exclusion focuses on the identification of pragmatic vehicles that activate cognitive responses in the addressee’s mind. Linguistic analysis, consequently, should not be concerned exclusively with pragmatic aspects of discourse, but rather with pragmatic, cognitive, psychological and social dimensions of the concept of clusivity.

2.3 Approaches to Clusivity

Clusivity is a recently coined concept which is used to describe various features of inclusion and exclusion in language. It has been studied in different fields (morphology, syntax, semantics, pragmatics and cognitive linguistics). It has been considered as a separate grammatical category, e.g. aspect, case, definiteness, modality, mood, voice, etc. Most of these studies focus on markers of inclusion and exclusion: person marking and pronouns (e.g. Cysouw 2005), honorifics (Cysouw 2005), singularity and plurality (e.g. Levinson 2004), deixis (Brown and Levinson 1987; Levinson 2004; Adetunji 2006), and the imperative (e.g. Brown and Levinson 1987; Dobrushina and Goussev 2005). However, the majority of

these studies, especially on pronouns, concern languages other than English (Wieczorek: 2013:24-25).

Filimonova (2005) states that the terms inclusive and exclusive have been traditionally used “to denote forms of personal pronouns which distinguish whether the addressee(s) are included in or excluded from the set of referents which also contains the speaker” (ix). Filimonova (2005) distinguishes between inclusive and non-inclusive languages. Inclusive languages are those in which pronominal marking can determine the opposition between inclusive “we” and exclusive “we”. Non-inclusive languages are those which do not differentiate between these two. Some studies have been conducted to examine its manifestation in the different types of personal pronouns:

1. The First Person Plural Pronoun; the inclusive “we” associates the speaker with the addressees, and the exclusive “we” disassociates the addressees from the speaker. In this regard, Levinson (1983) states that the distinction between “we-inclusive-of-addressee” and “we-exclusive-of-addressee” is not directly expressed in English. According to Daniel (2005), the first person pronoun is traditionally called inclusive, since “it implicitly considers the inclusion of the speaker to be its primary feature, and the speaker to be the primary member of the group” (36). Chen (2006: 2) states that English makes no distinction between the inclusive and

- exclusive forms of the first person plural. Chen (2006) maintains that English can mark clusivity, but only on the level of pragmatic and cognitive analysis.
2. The First Person Singular Pronoun: Cysouw (2005) focuses on the first person singular pronoun. Cysouw (2005) defines the concept of clusivity as “a cover term for various forms in which languages express concepts that are traditionally called ‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusive’ first person” (239). He (2005: 239) asserts that the distinction between the inclusive and the exclusive cannot be made in English. However, there are many various ways of expressing the difference between inclusive and exclusive. All these ways are included in the concept of clusivity. It should be noted that Cysouw (2005) concentrates only on the morphological and semantic markings of clusivity.
 3. Other Types of Personal Pronouns: Simon (2005) examines the marking of the inclusive and exclusive in the second person. Also, Cysouw (2005) discusses the first, second, as well as third person, both plural and singular, in relation to clusivity. He argues that clusivity is an overarching term for various kinds of

inclusive-exclusive opposition as found in the marking of person in general.

Wieczorek (2013) states that most traditional studies deal with the concept of clusivity as a grammatical category. In this view, these studies limit its scope. She (2013) attempts to widen the scope of the concept. She (2013) extended the traditional approach to include case “of pragmatically constructed and cognitively construed inclusion and exclusion” (28). She (2013:28) maintains that this concept “refers to a number of linguistic means by which the speaker communicates (the lack of) belongingness of chosen elements in a particular speech situation”. So, this concept assigns roles of actors in a speech event, as well as the relationship between the speaker, and in-group and out-group members.

These traditional studies of clusivity focus on non-cognitive representations of inclusion and exclusion expressed in discourse. Wieczorek (2013) treats this concept “as a pragmatic and a cognitive phenomenon concerned with association and dissociation encoded via language and engendered in political discourse” (28-29). She (2013:29) maintains that these conceptual representations of belonging and lack of it depend on pragmatic and cognitive markers. These markers include among others, ideological polarization, positive self-presentation, negative other presentation, emphasizing power of the self, discrediting the other (Chilton 2004; van Dijk 2005).

It is essential to know that clusivity in discourse is not restricted to the grammatically inclusive or exclusive first person plural and other personal pronouns. In English, the use of pronouns in discourse should be analyzed on a pragmatic and cognitive level to effectively reveal relations of inclusion and exclusion existing in the analyzed discourse.

While investigating clusivity marking, it is essential to discuss the concept of the deictic center. For examining these bipolar relations, there should be a reference point through which relations of inclusion and exclusion can be recognized, and the deictic center works as such a reference point. Chilton defined the deictic center as the ‘anchoring point that utterers and interpreters construct or impose during verbal interaction’ (2004: 56).

The discursive positioning of speakers in a given communicative event occurs within and outside the deictic center. Entities may be located at the core of the deictic center, i.e. occupy the central, thus the most significant position, within the center but not at its very core, outside the center, or on the boundary in between (Wirth-Koliba, 2016:26). All these possible positions in the deictic center indicate that inclusion and exclusion is a dynamic construct and is characterized by degrees of (non)belongingness.

2.4 The Deictic Center

Many labels have been given to the concept of the deictic center. Goffman refers to it as the “social situation” (1972), Bühler as the “origo” or “deictic field” (1934), Zupnik as “discourse space” (1994), Glover as the “indexical origo” (2000), Hanks as the “deictic field” (2005) or the “the indexical ground” (Hanks 2009), Chilton as “deictic origin” (2005a, b), while Levinson (1983), Rapaport et al. (1994), Chilton (2004) and Cap (2004, 2006) refer to it “deictic center” (Wieczorek: 2013:102).

Wieczorek (2013:102) states that deictic center enables the conceptualization of any discourse situation in terms of in-group and out-group status designation. It, furthermore, enhances the establishment and preservation of various forms association vs. dissociation. So, this concept is essential to the construction and construal of inclusion and exclusion, in addition to the understanding of group organization, dynamics and preservation strategies.

Brown and Levinson (1987) defines deictic center as “the one where the speaker is the central person, the time of speaking is the central time, and the place where the speaker is [...] is the central place” (118). Wieczorek (2013:108) states that the deictic center is the anchor point for conceptualization of the speech situation, with the speaker as its central part. In this regard, Chilton (2004) defines the deictic center as the anchor point for the conceptualization of all discourse entities which relate to self of a given speech situation, i.e. the speaker (“I”) and, optionally, those allied (“we”). Also, Cap defines the deictic center as “a

geopolitical anchor or a reference point for all spatial conceptualization” (2008: 30).

Wieczorek (2013:108) argues that to explain the cognitive strategies that represent and establish inclusion and exclusion, it is essential to define the deictic center as “an underlying notion and a framework for conceptualisation in political discourse, largely dependent on the conceptual schemata of in-out orientation”. So, it becomes apparent that it is the speaker’s deictic center and the speaker’s perspective that constitute the anchor point for conceptualization of any speech event.

Chilton (2004) claims that understanding language and interaction rely on the spatial nature of human conceptualization and perception of the world. Chilton’s Discourse Space Theory (DST) contains the following:

- a) different objects in the discourse are represented in relation to the speaker,
- b) the speaker may establish and maintain common ground and identity with the addressees, and finally,
- c) actors in political discourse are “positioned” relative to their distance from the speaker, who is located “at the intersection that is conceptualized not only as ‘here’ and ‘now’ but also as ‘right’ and ‘good’” (2004: 204- 205).

Indexical or deictic expressions are linguistic means which simplify interpretation of several features of discourse. Comprehension processes include “positioning” of discourse entities in relation to self (the speaker). These entities are conceptually located discourse entities on the axes of space, time and modality, (Chilton 2004: 61). Giving specific locations to actors in the deictic center according to “space, time and rightness” may reveal ideological information about them (2004: 205). Chilton (2005) states that the deictic center is the anchorage for conceptualization of all discourse entities in the speech situation and thus constitutes the origin of the three axes: spatial, temporal and modal.

The spatial axis (the s-axis) relates to the distance of an entity from the deictic source (the speaker). It is related to the abstract metaphorical concept of distance. Chilton (2005: 93) states that the s-axis is “an abstraction of spatial representation”. In Chilton’s approach, entities are located in the s-axis according to their conceptual social distance depending on how close or remote they are from the center. At one end of that scale, there is the “Self”, while at the other end, explicitly or not, there is the “Other”. Discourse entities are seen as being close to or remote from the speaker. Regarding the direction, discourse entities may be represented as heading for or moving away from the speaker. Place deictics, among others, are used to distribute discourse entities along the s-axis.

Time is metaphorically represented in terms of an object in motion, moving either towards or away from self

(the origin of the deictic center). Discourse entities are distributed along the t-axis as either close to or remote from the center (Chilton 2005: 95). Discourse entities are viewed from the speaker's point of view, as either close to or remote from the center in the past/future. Present (the tense) is represented as close to self, while past and future as remote from self. Time deictics and other temporal expressions are used to distribute discourse entities along the t-axis.

The modal axis (the m-axis) is related to the degree of certainty of the utterance's proposition, as well as such aspects as obligation and permission. The modal axis founds "the origin of the epistemic true and the deontic right" (2004: 59). Epistemic modality is related to the level of certainty. Deontic modality is related to the level of obligation and permission. Both of them are understood in terms of scales. In the epistemic modality, at one end of scale, there will be "true" which is co-located with the self, while at the other end there will be "untrue" or "falsity" which is co-located with other. In the deontic modality, at one end of scale, there are the "right" and "good," concepts close to self, while at the other end the scale there are the "wrong" and "bad," concepts remote from self and close to other (Chilton, 2004: 59). Understanding these locations rely on intuitive judgment of modal auxiliaries, adjectives and adverbs. These locations reflect how the speaker evaluates discourse entities according to "their subjective truth value" depending on the speaker's perspective as

“certainly true,” “possibly true” or “certainly not true” (Chilton, 2005: 86-87).

Chilton (2010) has revised and renamed his Discourse Space Theory into Deictic Space Theory (Deictic ST). Wieczorek (2013:113) states that Chilton’s (2010) Deictic ST is mainly interested in deictic expressions that are understood in relation to the place and time of speaking, as well as other contextual information. Chilton’s approach (2010) includes features of context in the process of understanding.

The three dimensions of the Deictic ST are the d (distance), t (time) and m (modality) axes. They stem from the deictic center or from self. They are represented as three intersecting lines; each represents of a dimension. They meet in the deictic center where the self is located.

Wieczorek (2013:116) states that Chilton’s three dimensions combine linguistic and cognitive elements essential in the process of interpretation and offer a framework for the analysis of political discourse. Also, Chilton’s theory focuses on the role of the speaker as the one who naturally establishes the anchor point for conceptualization.

The dimensions of the deictic center are not enough for inclusion and exclusion. The spatial and temporal axes are central for every speech situation. The modal axis seems to deal with very small number of the belongingness and dissociation aspects in discourse. Inclusion and exclusion involve any social phenomena that could establish a source

for association with and dissociation from the in-group. So, Chilton's theory is integrated with Cap's (2006) STA (Space-Time-Axiology) model and the modal axis is replaced by the axiological axis, which includes all aspects of the context relevant to clusivity.

Wieczorek (2013:117) states that the deictic center is "a three dimensional anchorage for conceptualisation of the speech situation at which the axes of space, time and axiology intersect and from which they originate." She (2013:117) maintains that discourse entities are conceptually distributed along these three axes according to their spatiotemporal and socio-ideological "location." Figure (1) illustrates the deictic center and how discourse entities are conceptually distributed along the three axes.




Figure (1) The deictic center

Wieczorek (2013:118) states that it is very useful, in discourse analysis, to view the speech situation as entity distribution in a three-dimension system. In this regard, Chilton (2005:80) states this will allow the addressees to understand their own location and the speaker's location as within or outside the group. Lakoff and Johnson (198:122) states that categorization is "primarily means of comprehending the world". So, Wieczorek (2013:118) concludes that "the socio-ideological distance between the speaker and the addressees along with the speaker's relative control over the speech situation are key factors in interpreting clusivity-oriented political discourse".

Among the clusivity markers discussed in Wieczorek (2013), proximization is the most prominent maker (Cap 2008, 2010ab, 2012, 2013, Wieczorek 2013). So, it is selected together with the ideological square (Van Dijk 1993, 1997) as the key clusivity indicators (Wirth-Koliba: 2016). She (2016) maintains that "a pragma-cognitive perspective on 'us' and 'them' must be taken into account in order to analyze clusivity-related discourse in an appropriate and successful manner" (25).

2.5 Proximization

In 2006, Cap first proposed "Proximization" as a linguistic concept, which used cognitive pragmatics. At the beginning, the concept of "Proximization" did not exist. "Promise" and "Promising" go back to Paul Chilton (2004) who makes use of time, space and modality to establish a model to analyze political discourse. Chilton (2004) states

that discourse (language in use) is a process whereby readers and hearers set up discourse worlds (conceptual spaces) that carry a deictic “signature” for space, time, and modality, and relationships among them (138).

Cap (2006) develops Chilton’s model and coins the term “proximization”. In its most general and practical meaning, proximization is a discursive strategy of presenting physically and temporally distant events and states of affairs (including “distant adversarial ideologies”) as increasingly and negatively consequential to the speaker and the addressee (Cap, 2013:293). Cap (2008) added the time and value criteria based on the space approach proposed by Chilton, and presented the Spatial-Temporal-Axiological Proximization Model, which was used to analyze the war discourse of Iraq and showed its usefulness. Cap (2013) studied and analyzed related research and concluded that the proximization theory can be used as a tool for various types of discourse analysis, as war discourse rhetoric, and immigration discourse.

Proximization is defined as:

a discursive strategy of presenting physically and temporally distant events and states of affairs (including 'distant', i.e. adversarial, ideological mind-sets) as directly, increasingly and negatively consequential to the speaker and her addressee. Projecting the distant entities as gradually encroaching upon the speaker – addressee territory (both

physical and ideological), the speaker may attempt a variety of goals. (Cap, 2013:3)

Cap (2006) states that proximization is one of the most important pragmatic-cognitive strategies in achieving legitimization in political discourse. It depends on the speaker's ability to present the events on the discourse stage as directly influencing the addressee, in a negative or threatening way. More precisely, the ideological and physical space between "us" (the addressee) and "them" (the other/the threat) is understood as shrinking, which may result in a clash. The proximity of the threats necessitates instant response (Cap 2006: 4). To avoid this, the speaker demands legitimizations of preventive actions (Cap 2010: 120).

Through proximization political actors legitimate their future actions and policies by representing particular events and social actors as directly affecting a given audience. They chase this goal by creating a "discourse stage" on which apparently remote and insignificant events and actors are rendered as possibly having a negative effect on the speaker and audience (Cap 2010a: 392–393). In this way, political discourse requires that the speaker to "do lots of discursive work" to create mental representations for the audience of the "realities" that are not actually present at a given moment (Chilton 2004: 57). In proximization, the Us-Them conflict is the foundation for imposing particular worldviews concerning the existence of an out-group that establishes and poses an increasing and imminent threat,

and thus immediate reaction and response are required from the in-group (Cap, 2017b).

Since the out-group (Them/Other) is where the threat comes from, in Proximization Theory, in-group and out-group are located at a distance from one another in the Discourse Space (DS) which is re-arranged according to the movement of out-group towards in-group. This is shown in figure (2).




Figure (2): Proximization in Discourse Space (Cap, 2018:385)

Cap's model includes three axes that represent spatial, temporal, and axiological (modal in Chilton's terms) relations among and between social actors and different

actions and events. The spatial, temporal and axiological aspects of proximization defined by Cap (2006) conceptually compare the entities localized inside the deictic center (the so-called IDCs) with those outside-the-deictic-center entities (ODCs). In this way, proximization distinguishes between in-groups and out-groups.

In Proximization Theory, the threats posed by the Them/Other party include spatio-temporal and ideological aspects which explain the relationship between the IDCs and the ODCs. So, proximization is divided into three types: spatial proximization, temporal proximization and axiological proximization (Cap, 2011, 2015, 2018).

The space axis represents the “scale of relative distance from the deictic center,” and positions events and actors as relatively proximal to or distal from the deictic center and as moving toward or away from the center (Chilton 2004: 86). The ODCs entities and events (Them) are represented as physically intruding upon, and thus endangering the IDCs (Us). Spatial proximization shed light on the physically devastating nature of the ODCs and shows their effect as unavoidable, therefore the need for an immediate and direct response from the IDCs (Cap, 2013; Sowinska, 2013).

On the temporal axis, events are represented as significant to those occupying the deictic center by being rendered as “historical and momentous” and by being positioned as relatively close to or distant from the deictic center (Cap 2008: 6). It involves showing the current events and expected conflicts as historic, momentous and

significant to the IDCs, thus requiring protective action from the "Us" group (Cap, 2014, 2017; Sowinska, 2013). According to Cap (2018), "spatial and temporal proximization involve fear appeals and typically use various kinds of analogies...to conflate the growing threat with an actual disastrous event in the past, to endorse the current scenario" (385).

The axiological axis positions different, often antagonistic, ideological beliefs representing the dominant ideologies of the institutions and actors that occupy different positions in the discourse space. The axiological aspect suggests a clash between the system of values followed by the speaker and the addressee on the one hand, and, on the other, the values adhered by the ODCs. It involves an ideological clash between the beliefs and value systems of the IDCs (Self/Us) and those of the ODCs (Other/Them). The opposing and conflicting ideologies "will, or (at least) may, lead to a physical clash, that is the materialization of the ODC ideological threat within the IDC space" (Cap, 2013: 94). This clash can result in the events and actions defined in the spatial and temporal dimensions of proximization (Cap, 2012, 2015a, 2017b).

The spatial, temporal and axiological aspects "contribute to the continual narrowing of the symbolic distance between the entities/values in the DS and their negative impact on the speaker and her addressee" (Cap, 2015:315). This is because the ODC entities threaten and

endanger the IDC ones physically and/or ideologically as the ODCs enter the zone of the “Us” group, which is located in the deictic centre, spatially, temporally and/or axiologically. Because the threats posed by the “Them” group are presented to be consequential for the “Us” group, preventive measures are required from the IDCs (Us) and so is approval of these measures and policies (Cap, 2011, 2012, 2017b).

So, through proximization political speakers construct particular spatial, temporal, and axiological relationships between “self/us” and “other/them” in such a way as to promote their specific goals and policies. Entities inside the deictic center are understood as having a positive relationship to those occupying the deictic center. Those, outside the deictic center, are understood as having a negative relationship to those at the deictic center. In political discourse, according to Cap, actors occupying the deictic center are trying to persuade their audiences that ODC entities are invading and negatively influencing the deictic center. So, proximization acts to “alert the addressee to the centrality and relevance of the issue at stake and, thus, to justify and legitimate the prospective (re)action” (Cap 2008: 36).

2.6 The Ideological Square

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) helps to examine matters related to power, ideology, and domination. According to van Dijk (2001), CDA is defined as the study of the abuse of social power, inequality, and dominance in

the social institutions and groups and how power and ideology are used in the text. The institution or group that controls the discourse might also control the minds of people. Thus, CDA aims to find an answer to the question, who controls the public discourse and how it affects the actions of the less powerful people.

Fairclough (2001) argues that CDA finds an answer to how language is used as a tool of power for inequality in society and its use in the domination and exploitation of some people by others. CDA addresses varied issues that mainly include racism, gender, and media representation. CDA is to analyze a text but it takes a start from analyzing the social issues and problems (25-26). According to Wodak (2013) “CDA sees discourse – language use in speech and writing – as a form of ‘social practice’. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it” (186).

Van Dijk’s “Socio-Cognitive Approach” in discourse analysis investigates the relationship among discourse; society and cognition, while all other critical discourse studies only examine the relationship between discourse and society. Van Dijk’s (1993; 2001; 2005) socio-cognitive approach to CDA consists of three components: society, cognition, and discourse. At the macro level is the society which is concerned with power relationships. Social power is understood as a means of controlling the mind and action

of groups and people. At the micro level is discourse, which refers to various discourse structures (language) containing ideologies. The main point that makes van Dijk's approach different from Wodak's historical (2001) and Fairclough's socio-cultural notions of CDA (2001) is the mediating layer of cognition (ideology), which, as illustrated in Figure (3), lies between society and discourse.




Figure (3) The illustration of van Dijk's (1998) model

Van Dijk (1998) points out that the meaning of the text is embedded in the discourse by language producers. So, it exists and is represented in their minds. Accordingly, van Dijk (1993b; 2002) conceptualizes 'ideological square' as a framework through which discourse comprehension and production can be analyzed and linked to the context (society).

The understanding of message or text needs different cognitive structures as the text or message makes no sense without the socio-culture knowledge (van Dijk, 2002). This approach believes that power is exercised by manipulating and influencing the minds. In other words, dominance and discourses have a direct social cognitive connection which makes it necessary to critically analyze the (re)production of texts and also the way they are perceived and interpreted (van Dijk, 1993).

Van Dijk (2016) explains that in the socio-cognitive approach, the cognitive component deals with memory, mind while the cognitive process involved in the comprehension and production of discourse. The socio-cognitive approach finds the ideological representation and dichotomy of 'Us' and 'Them' and for this purpose, the socio-cognitive model emphasizes on the following categories:

- The political, historical, social context and the main actors in the discourse.
- The relationship of power and conflict in groups.
- The positive and negative attitude of 'Us' and 'Them' in the discourse.
- The selection of lexicons, grammar emphasizes or de-emphasizes the approach of various groups (van Dijk, 2008:61).

Van Dijk (2006) states that positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation is the general strategy to organize the ideological discourse. It is a theoretical and methodological approach that incorporates positive in-group and negative out-group strategies. Van Dijk argues that many group ideologies seem to be polarized in representing Self and Other, that is, Us and Them, in terms of “We are good and They are bad” (Shojaei et al., 2013). The “ideological square” operates to present a polarized image of in-group and out-group by portraying “Us” in a favorable way and “them” in an unfavorable way (Kuo & Nakamura, 2005). This strategy emphasizes the good things and de-emphasizes ‘our’ bad things and the opposite for ‘Others’. The ‘others’ bad things are presented with more exaggeration and good things are ignored.

The ideological square gets its label from the four dimensions that make it up. The square polarizes the in-groups and out-groups through both emphasis and mitigation: ideological discourses emphatically present the good *self* and the bad *other* and simultaneously mitigate the bad *self* and the good *other*. Van Dijk (1995) maintains that ideologies are often articulated and based on the ideological square. The ideological square

- A. Emphasizes positive things about us;
- B. Emphasizes negative things about them;
- C. De-emphasizes negative things about us;
- D. De-emphasizes positive things about them.

The Ideological Square Model focuses upon the polarizing the strategy of ‘positive self-representation and negative other-representation’ (Van Dijk 1998, 2004, 2006). Numerous recent studies (Reynolds 2018); (Adegoju and Oyeboode 2015); (Cabrejas-Peñuelas and Díez-Prados 2014); and, (Mazid 2008) suggest that this approach is very applicable and appropriate for analyzing the type of discourses in the political or media domains where there is a construction of ‘self’ and ‘others’ on the basis of ideological conflicts. In this regard, van Dijk (1998, 2004, 2006) states that this analytical tool is well suited for exploring and highlighting the polarization of ‘US’ vs. ‘THEM’, where the speaker and his allies are considered to be ‘us or in-group’, while his opponents are placed in the ‘them’ or ‘out-group’ category. In this regard, Wirth-Koliba (2016:29) states that Van Dijk’s ideological square “bears relevance to clusivity marking”.

3. Cognitive Frame Construction

3.1 Introduction

The integration of cognitive linguistics in critical discourse studies is recent (see Hart and Lukeš, 2007). For a long period of time this integration has been limited mainly in the study of critical metaphor analysis (e.g. Charteris-Black 2004; Koller 2004; Musolff 2004). The main hypothesis behind critical metaphor analysis is that

“metaphorical expressions in text reflect and effect underlying construal operations which are ideological in nature” (Hart, 2011:269). However, there are many other construal operations in cognitive linguistics. Metaphor is just one kind.

Frame construction or framing is among the different processes of social cognition. It is one of the most widely studied cognitive processes (Vliegenthart & Zoone, 2011, cited in Yang et al, 2016). In a very general sense, the internal, conceptual structure of human cognition is called a frame (Wendland, 2010). Framing is thus the process of constructing frames.

3.2 Cognitive Frame Construction

Lippmann (1922) states that the world outside is out of our reach, vision, and mind. He explained that, because of its vastness, it is difficult to experience the world directly; therefore, it should be “explored, reported and imagined” (29). Goffman (1974) said that “we tend to perceive events in terms of primary frameworks, and the type of framework we employ provides a way of describing the event to which it is applied” (24-25).

Entman (1993) argues that “what we ‘know’ about the nature of the social world depends upon how we frame and interpret the cues we receive about the world” (231). According to Gitlin (1980), frames are “persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual” (7).

Reese (2001) states that “frames are organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world” (11). Entman (1993) pointed out that through framing; some aspects of reality are highlighted and emphasized. He explained:

To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. (52)

Society is a series of possible realities, “any one of which can be readily evoked by altering the ways in which observations are framed and categorized” (Edelman, 1993:231). Van Gorp (2009) argues that framing has serious implications in the field of communication. As frames tell us that there are multiple ways of looking at events. Making sense of issues and events by communicators and by the audience is related to framing (Reese, 2001). Edelman maintains that, by using different frames, the meanings also change.

A frame is an interpretative schema that simplifies the world by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences and sequences of action (Snow & Benford, 1992), thus, organizing experience and guiding action by rendering events or occurrences meaningfully (Snow et al., 1986). It serves as a

psychological device that offers a perspective and manipulates salience to influence subsequent judgment (Rhoads, 2004).

Through “selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration,” media framing provides a context and explains what the issue is (Tankard et al. in Reese, 2001: 10). It is an essential instrument for journalists presenting complex issues in a manner that is understandable to audiences (Gans, 1979; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007).

Media framing plays an important role in informing a population and influencing public opinion about war and peace, particularly at the international level (Roach, 1993). Framing is a way to understand conflict (Goffman, 1974). Frames play an important role in creation of “us” and “them” in a conflict situation (Shinar, 2002). Frame analysis is a way to investigate the coverage of conflict (D’Angelo, 2002; McCombs & Ghanem, 2003).

The process of cognitive frame construction can be regarded as a ‘black box’. Communicators put the experiences and information they received into the box, and extract certain processed information from this box to help them perceive and make sense of the world (Johnston & Noakes, 2005). However, the content of the black box is not readily available to communicators. In order to understand what is going on in that box, linguists and communication researchers need to study its contents — the internal conceptual structures.




Figure (4). The process of cognitive frame construction (Johnston & Noakes, 2005, cited in Yang et al, 2016)

In media cognition studies, information inputs from news discourse are language-mediated. The saliency of certain linguistic expressions influences the cognitive frame of the news' readers by foregrounding salient information and trivializing less salient information (Johnston & Noakes, 2005). This inclusion and exclusion of information (De Vreese, 2005) thus evokes the construction of a fixed and preferred cognitive frame. This cognitive frame will, then, be activated to interpret relevant objects, events, phenomena etc. from a fixed perspective (Valkenburg et al., 1999), which impacts directly or indirectly people's interaction with the society and in the society.

3.3 Force Dynamics

Force dynamics is a schematic system concerned with the linguistic representation of force interactions and causal relations occurring between certain entities. Talmy (1988, 2000) defines force dynamics as a basic schema referring to the implicit forces operating among the events in a scene, which plays a semantic role in certain grammatical structures (1988). Force dynamics is the syntactic construal of "how entities interact with respect to force" (Talmy, 2000:409). Talmy's claim is that entities are likely to either rest or move, and that these states are subject to pressure which prohibits, inhibits, or motivates movement. It involves concepts such as the exertion of force, resistance to such exertion and the overcoming of such resistance, blockage of force and the removal of such blockage, and so forth (Talmy 1988: 49).

While there are linguistic means with which we encode the interaction of forces in the physical realm (e.g., *John pushed the rock away*), Talmy argues that force dynamics play an important part in different semantic areas as well. Force can be at work in the physical, psychological, or social domain and is construed through language. So, for example, lexical items that exhibit force-dynamic patterns "refer not only to physical force interaction but, by metaphoric extension, also to psychological and social interactions, conceived in terms of psycho-social 'pressures'" (Talmy 1988:50). We thus get expressions such as *John pushed Lisa to study harder*, where *pushed* stands for "encouraged". Recently, the concept of Force Dynamics can be extended to discourse.

Moreover, Talmy argues that the force dynamics system serves as the organizing logic for the linguistic encoding of causality. The claim is that any construal of causation is in fact a force dynamics construal. Consider the basic causation expressed in *John pushed the rock away*. In force dynamics terms the pattern evoked here involves “a stronger Antagonist [*John*] that comes into position against an Agonist [*the rock*] with an intrinsic tendency toward rest, and thus causes it to change from a state of rest to one of action” (Talmy 1988:57). This pattern, referred to by Talmy as “onset causation of motion,” is the prototypical case of “causation.”

Regarding the participants in a force-dynamic event, Talmy distinguishes between two opposing entities: the ‘Agonist (Ago) and the ‘Antagonist’ (Ant). The first force is the center of attention, while the second is considered in terms of its effect on the first. The Ago is always assigned an intrinsic force tendency towards motion or rest, action or inaction. It is the entity in primary focus. As its name suggests, the Ant represents the Ago’s opposing counterpart. The Ant itself does not act upon an intrinsic force tendency. Rather, its chief purpose is to affect the Ago in a way or another. In their interaction, the focal entity may be able to manifest its force tendency, or it may be overcome. Each entity, in force dynamics, possesses an intrinsic force tendency: either tending toward rest (or inaction) or toward motion (or action). They can be at rest or in motion. At any given moment, there is a balance of

strength in which one entity is stronger and the other weaker, or both equal. The result from this force dynamic interaction is either a directional movement or stasis. The force interaction between the two may result in motion or rest, action or inaction. For example, in the sentence “the door cannot open” we think of the door as having an intrinsic tendency towards motion, while the antagonist is stronger, which results in stasis, rather than motion (see the following Figure (5) for an overview of all terms and symbols).





Figure (5) Overview of terms and symbols (adapted from Talmy, 2000: vol. 1, p. 414).

When identifying force dynamic constructions, one outlines an agonist (AGO) against an antagonist (ANT) and finds their intrinsic force tendencies. These are represented in the following Figure (6):

a. Force entities

Agonist (Ago):



Antagonist (Ant):

**b. Intrinsic force tendency**

toward action:



toward rest:



Figure (6): representations of force entities and intrinsic force tendency

Once the entities and their intrinsic force tendency toward action or rest have been identified, the stronger force, that is the force that manifests its tendency against the other, is represented by a plus sign. Sometimes a negative sign is used to represent the weaker force (the following Figure (7)), although this is not necessary. The resultant state of the stronger entity over the weaker entity is represented below:

c. Balance of strenghts

stronger entity: +

weaker entity: -

d. Resultantaction: rest: 

Figure (7) representations of balance of strength and resultant action or rest

3.4 Force-dynamic Patterns

These considerations result in different patterns of dynamic, forceful interactions. Talmy distinguishes between two primary groups of patterns (with four further subtypes each):

3.4.1 Steady-state Force-dynamic Patterns

Talmy (2000:413) establishes four “basic steady-state force-dynamic patterns” depending on the configuration of four groups of factors with two members in each. Bratishenko (2011:294) summarized those groups of factors in table format as follows:

Table (2). Groups of factors in basic-state force dynamic patterns

<p>Force entities</p> <p>Agonist/Antagonist</p>	<p>Intrinsic force tendency:</p> <p>Towards action/towards rest</p>
<p>Resultant of the force interaction:</p> <p>Action/rest</p>	<p>Balance of strengths:</p> <p>Stronger entity/weaker entity</p>

The simplest case of force dynamics relates to the force relation that occurs between two interacting entities: the AGO and the ANT. Both have an intrinsic force, which is a tendency for either rest or motion. When the AGO and the ANT interact with opposite forces, the force relation between the two entities is called *resistance*; while if the agonist's and antagonist's forces apply in the same direction, the force relation is called *increment*. The result of the force interaction depends on the balance of strengths. These force relations are further broken down into a number of patterns:

- The Causative pattern: when a weaker AGO with a tendency toward rest is forced by a stronger ANT, resulting in motion or action.

- The Weak Despite pattern, with the stronger AGO showing a tendency toward stasis .The weaker ANT exerts force against the AGO unsuccessfully, resulting in stasis or inaction.
- The Strong Despite pattern, with the stronger AGO showing a tendency toward motion that is faced with a weaker resistance of the ANT, resulting in motion or action. In this pattern, the ANT fails to block AGO.
- The Causative Hindrance pattern, with the weaker AGO showing a tendency toward motion is faced with a stronger ANT, resulting in stasis or inaction. This pattern is termed by Johnson (1987, 45–46) BLOCKAGE image schema.

The first group of schemas, those that describe steady relations among participants, can be distinguished further into ‘despite’ and ‘causative’ patterns.

In those interactions that are of the ‘despite’ kind, the Ago is able to maintain its intrinsic tendency – towards either motion or rest – despite an external force, the Ant, opposing it. In other words, the Ago may either pursue its action even in the face of attempted hindrance or it may prevail with stability and remain in place. Talmy (2000: vol. 1:416) presents the expressions *The ball kept rolling despite the stiff grass* and *The shed kept standing despite the gale wind blowing against it* to illustrate cases of defying a hindrance and prevailing stability, respectively.

‘Causative’ schemas, on the other hand, always represent scenarios in which the Ant has the upper hand and causes the Ago to either move or be blocked (e.g. *The ball kept rolling because of the wind blowing on it and The log kept lying incline because of the ridge there; 416*). Thus, the Ago is not able to realize its intrinsic tendency against the force exerted by its opposing entity. All in all, either the Ago is successful in realizing its intrinsic force tendency or the Ant succeeds in posing as a hindrance.

They are presented in following Figure (8) and the examples given below correspond with these schemas.




Figure (8). Steady-state force-dynamic patterns (Talmy, 1988; 2000)

- a. The ball kept rolling despite the stiff grass.
- b. The shed kept standing despite the gale wind blowing against it.

- c. The log kept lying on the incline because of the ridge there.
- d. The ball kept rolling because of the wind blowing on it.

3.4.2 Shift-in-state Force-dynamic Patterns

In addition to the four steady-state schemas, there are four shift-in-state of opposition schemas. They are invoked when another variable is introduced: changing mode over time either with entering or leaving force. In this type of changing pattern, the Antagonist, rather than impinging steadily on the agonist, or instead enters or leaves this state of impingement (Hart, 2011), is presented in the following Figure (9) The arrow indicates whether the antagonist is entering or leaving the current state, and a slash on the resultant line separating the before and after states of activity (Tamly, 1988).




Figure (9). Shift-in-state force-dynamic patterns (Talmy, 1988; 2000)

- e. A gust of wind made the pages of my book turn.
- f. The appearance of the headmaster made the pupils calm down.
- g. The breaking of the dam let the water flow from the storage lake.
- h. The abating of the wind let the sailboat slow down.

The patterns in (e) and (f) are of an onset ‘causative’ type, realized by ‘made’, in which a stronger Ant not previously in place comes into position against a weaker Ago to prevent it from realizing its intrinsic tendency: either by causing it to move (e) or by causing it to come to a halt (f) (Talmy, 1976). Hence, linguistically, ‘made’ or its alike lexical devices form the active linguistic stimuli of Ant against Ago. In contrast, (g) and (h) are of an onset ‘letting’ type where a stronger Ant previously in place leaves its state of impingement, thus allowing the weaker Ago to realize its intrinsic tendency either toward action (g) or rest (h) (Hart, 2011). In this case, ‘letting’ becomes the linguistic passive linguistic stimuli of Ant against Ago.

Hart (2011) suggests that Talmy’s (1988, 2000) theory of force-dynamics represents a useful framework for the Cognitive Linguistic Approach to CDA. Using this analytical framework, he identifies some of the indicators

of, and demonstrates the ideological qualities of, force-dynamic conceptualizations in immigration discourse. Force-interactive patterns are provoked by elements in text including certain adverbials, prepositions and various open-class elements which seem to have inherent in their conceptual representation a force-dynamic component. The force-dynamic analyses reveal the ideological potential of force-dynamic conceptualizations in immigration discourse. He concludes that the major contribution that the theory of force-dynamics can make is that it allows us to address the conceptual importance of transitivity choices at the interpretation-stage; something which he believes is currently “under-researched” but fundamental to the claims of CDA.

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